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This thesis aims to articulate a dispositionalist theory of possibility.
The standard way of explaining possibility, and modality in general, is by reference to
possible worlds. At the same time, discontentment with possible worlds and their role in the
metaphysics of modality has been present in the literature at least since Kripke. The later
years this scepticism towards possible worlds has been voiced by a group of philosophers
known as ‘new actualists’. They generally support a view of modality not based upon
possible worlds while displaying a more positive attitude towards concepts like dispositions,
powers, and potentials. My project shares this attitude towards the metaphysics of modality,
and the aim of this thesis is to explain modality, particularly possibility, by referring to this
world only. That is, I will ask what, in the actual world, substantiate the truth of modal
claims.
The solution defended in this thesis, dispositional essentialism, takes as a starting point
a particular subset of dispositional properties. I refer to these properties as powers, or
dispositional essences, and they are defined as sparse, fundamental properties which are
essentially dispositional—and electrical charge can serve as a good example. There are two
positive aspects of assuming powers to be existing. Firstly, we get an account of property
identity at the fundamental level. We may say that the distinction between what these
fundamental properties are and what they do is removed, so what it is to be a certain
property becomes equivalent with what it is disposed to do. Thus, the dispositionality
present in the world goes ‘all the way down’ to the most fundamental level where there is
no further structure to appeal to. There is no need to ground dispositions in ‘respectable
categorical properties’, because dispositions are respectable entities in themselves.
Secondly, this account of fundamental properties yields automatically an account of the
laws of nature. The fundamental laws are now grounded in the essential relations between
fundamental properties. This means that we, by assuming powers to be a part of our
ontology, gain an account of laws which is more parsimonious than what the competing
views offer, since these competing views will need an account of laws in addition to an
account of fundamental properties. Assuming powers to exist gives us both of these things
at once.
However, another consequence of assuming powers to exist is that relations between
fundamental properties will have to be seen as necessary, because these relations are given
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by the essences of these properties—they could not have been different. This entails one
particularly important consequence for the accounts of laws based upon powers: the laws of
nature will have to be seen as absolutely, metaphysically, necessary. This, in turn, influences
what is deemed possible, since what is possible is limited by the laws of nature. Hence, in my
account the domain of the possible is radically diminished, as compared to other accounts
of possibility and the laws. This is generally perceived as a problem for the dispositional
essentialist, because it collides with our intuition that the laws of nature are contingent,
and that happenings going beyond the laws of nature, metaphysically could happen. That
is, we may say that, for the dispositional essentialist, the metaphysical modalities collapse
into the nomic. Our grounding of possibility in the properties of the actual world gives
us a domain of the possible which is consistent with the laws of nature. We do not have
grounding for possibilities going beyond this; there is nothing in the world in which these
alleged possibilities may be grounded.
Thus, we see that the dispositional essentialist view of the fundamental properties of
the world is radically different—particularly when it comes to the idea of nomic change—
from views advocated by defenders of Humean supervenience. We can get a rough idea of
this difference by considering the following illustration. Humean accounts of fundamental
properties are often visualised by speaking of the ‘Humean mosaic’. Yet, as I shall argue,
the powers theorist can in a similar fashion speak of the ‘dispositional essentialist web’.
These metaphors make the difference between the two views especially clear. Where the
removal of a tile in a complex mosaic floor might lead to minuscule change, perhaps not
even noticeable, removing a thread from a web has a much more dramatic effect; the web
unravels.
If we accept that possibility and the laws of nature are closely related in the way
I described, this gives us a third reason to assume powers to be existing. Powers will—
through their capacity to determine the laws of nature—also constrain possibility. Accounts
of possibility in terms of dispositions have become popular lately, but I hold that some of the
assumptions made by some of the proponents of these accounts—such as the expectation
that dispositional accounts of possibility can deliver genuine possibilities going beyond
the laws of nature—are problematic. Thus, we are better off by explaining possibility by
referring to powers and not mere dispositions. However, an account of possibility in terms
of dispositional essences will perhaps seem less impressive than a more general dispositional
account of possibility, since it is not able to directly explain each and every possibility in
the world. However, I argue that we will have to settle for an explanation of what generates
possibility. The hope is still that such an account of property identity, laws of nature, and
possibility will fare better than any competing view, because of its parsimony and its closer
connection with science.
Finally, we need to note that because of the discrepancies between our intuitions about
the laws of nature on the one hand, and the view advocated by the dispositional essentialist
vii
on the other (who holds these laws to be necessary), accepting dispositional essentialism
entails that we need to defend our distrust of intuitions in this case. Hence, an additional
aim of my thesis is to show that the necessity of the laws of nature is not a ‘bug’, but rather
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Leaving possible worlds behind
1.1 Introduction
This thesis is a defence of dispositional essentialism—roughly speaking the idea that the
fundamental properties of the world are essentially dispositional—and in the subsequent
chapters I will argue the following.
1. Possible worlds provide an unsatisfactory account of modality, including the modal
features of properties.
2. The appeal to possible worlds should be replaced with dispositional essentialism as
the main metaphysical position explaining the modal features of the world.
3. Following this, I argue that the laws of nature—given by the dispositional essences
of fundamental properties—limit the domain of what is possible.1 Although disposi-
tional essentialism is not meant to tell us which things are possible, we can get an
understanding of the modal limitations that are at play, and as such figure out under
which conditions something is possible. Bearing in mind that the laws of nature are
grounded in essences, accepting dispositional essentialism entails that the laws of
nature are not only physically but metaphysically necessary.
This introductory chapter of the thesis will proceed as follows. In section 1.2 I will
address some overarching research questions in the metaphysics of modality, focusing on
which problems we aim to solve and which theoretical methods we have available. I will
in particular give a criticism of the framework based upon possible worlds. I will focus
mainly on the role played by possible worlds in modal logic and metaphysics, deeming the
1Laws of nature are one of the most important topics in this thesis, but it is critical that we do not
make the mistake of thinking that the laws discussed are coextensive with the laws found in contemporary
science. These scientific laws can be revised, proven wrong, or be inaccurate in some way or another, but
this is not the case for the genuine laws of nature. These are the laws we through science strive to discover
and understand. Thus, I place myself in the landscape of naturalism, but my views here, while informed
by current scientific practice, are not limited by it.
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first use legitimate and the second highly questionable. Thereafter, I will present some of
the problems that possible worlds were meant to solve, as well as some of the problems
created by their introduction. Both what may be referred to as ‘genuine modal realism’ and
‘actualism’ about possible worlds are problematic, but I will mainly target the problems
faced by the actualistic interpretations of possible worlds. I suggest that it is advisable,
firstly, to leave possible worlds as an important metaphysical entity behind, and, secondly,
to support an understanding of modality in terms of dispositions.
In section 1.3 I will present the alternative conception of modality based upon dispo-
sitional features existing in the actual world. I will address certain challenges tied to the
conceptual apparatus which has hitherto been used in this field, as well as narrowing down
the vocabulary I will use in the thesis. I will also distinguish between different kinds of
dispositionality, as there are several options available. Generally speaking, I will give my
support to dispositional essentialism, an account which specifically focuses on the essences
of fundamental properties rather than the more general dispositions of objects.
Section 1.4 presents the plan for the rest of the thesis.
1.2 Possible worlds
1.2.1 Metaphysics of modality
At its core, the metaphysics of modality is about the following question: what makes modal
claims true? The goal of my project is to find what in the actual world witnesses the
truth of modal claims, that is, claims including operators such as possible, necessary, can,
and must, such as ‘It is not possible to travel faster than light’, or ‘I could have been a
dancer.’ In what follows this will be limited mainly to the question of what makes something
possible. This includes related queries such as what limits the domain of the possible, or
what makes claims of possibility true. This perspective, focusing on finding truthmakers
for modal claims among what exists in the world is a relatively recent development, but it
is implicit in earlier debates too, e.g. in the modal actualism we find in the work of Saul
Kripke.2 The view I will argue for in this thesis carries with it a commitment to some kind
of realism about modality, going beyond the actualism of Kripke. The modal features of the
world are thought of as real features, not something to be explained away, but something
we should embrace.3
We can think of the metaphysics of modality as an attempt to account for, in a system-
atic way, the basic properties of the world. This is the underlying metaphysical structure
2Particularly Kripke (1981)
3We can take the following formulation from Lewis (1970, p. 175) as an example of explaining modality
away: “Given an obscure modal argument, we can translate it into a nonmodal argument (...) Once we
have a nonmodal argument, we have clear standards of validity; and once we have nonmodal translations
of the premises, we can understand them well enough to judge whether they are credible.”
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of the world which grounds all its modal features, that is, the features of the world which
enable us to make modal claims in ordinary discourse with the conviction that they make
reference to something real.4 A different, but related, question is how we can come to know
something about the truth of modal claims. This latter epistemic question is undoubtedly
important, but it is not one which will primarily be discussed in my thesis, which will
mainly be a metaphysical endeavour, rather than an epistemic one.5
The most widely known and commonly accepted explanation of modality has been
through the concept of possible worlds. I have already stated that I find the possible worlds
centred understanding of modality unsatisfactory, but in order to see why this is the case,
we need to know what the possible worlds are set to explain; more precisely, which role
they are seen to play, and what problems appear if we choose to go down this well-travelled
path.
1.2.2 Leibnizian biconditionals
The background for much of the metaphysics of modality, particularly in the 20th century,
has been the Leibnizian biconditionals, named after Leibniz’s postulation that God chose
the best of all possible worlds.6 With these biconditionals as a starting point, we explicitly
tie the concepts of possibility and necessity to the idea of a plurality of possible worlds,
so that what is assumed to be basic modal concepts can be defined in non-modal terms as
follows:
• Something is possible if and only if it is the case at some possible world
• Something is necessary if and only if it is the case at all possible worlds.
Starting with these two biconditionals, we are able to define both contingency and
impossibility in similar fashions. Something is contingent if and only if it is the case at
some worlds but not at others, and something is impossible if and only if it is not the
case at any possible world. Thus, by doing this we explain, or perhaps even remove, the
problematic modal notions of possibility and necessity. We replace them with something
categorical, and postulate the existence of these categorical entities or categorical truths
across possible worlds.7
4The term ‘grounding’ used in a more technical way has become popular in later years. I do not enter
into this debate, and when I use this word, I simply mean to address a relation where something is the
foundation or explanatory base of something else. See (Maurin, 2019) for a discussion of the relationship
between grounding and metaphysical explanation.
5I will, however, discuss questions tied to conceivability and intuitions in chapter 7. For an introduction
to the epistemology of modality, see (Vaidya, 2016).
6(Leibniz, 1985, p. 67)
7Again, Lewis (1970, p. 175) may serve as an example of this kind of attitude towards the modal
notions: “Philosophy abounds in troublesome modal arguments—endlessly debated, perennially plausible,
perennially suspect. The standards of validity for modal reasoning have long been unclear; they become
clear only when we provide a semantic analysis of modal logic by reference to possible worlds and to
possible things.”
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Possible worlds as a philosophical tool have been useful in many ways, and they still
are—particularly in modal logic. But we need to untangle where the concept is of use,
and where it is not, as well as which roles possible worlds are justified in having in our
explanations. We also need to clarify what job exactly the concept is supposed to be doing.
Are such possible worlds meant to be solely a formal device, or can they provide more
substantial explanations as part of a conceptual analysis? Extending the importance of
possible worlds beyond their role as a formal tool is often seen as problematic, and Robert
Stalnaker notes the following:
In both formal and philosophical discussions of modality, the concept of a pos-
sible worlds has shown itself to have considerable heuristic power. But, critics
have argued, a heuristic device should not be confused with an explanation.8
And, following this, it is claimed that if possible worlds are to be more than heuristic
aids in modal logic, the concept itself must be both explained and justified. This is the
predominant story in much of the literature on the development of possible worlds, and
the roles they may be seen to have. The possible worlds have proven fruitful as long as
its use as a formal model is concerned, but as soon as their use goes beyond this formal
role, the concerns regarding the ontological status of the possible worlds that make up this
framework becomes prominent.9
In relation to this, I will argue that possible worlds can be said to have at least three
different roles, as follows:
1. Possible worlds may be employed in modal logic as a formal tool with a semantic
function.
2. Possible worlds can give a conceptual analysis of what modality is.
3. Possible worlds may be used as truthmakers for modal claims.
Each of these claims demands a more ontologically substantial role for the possible
worlds than the former, and I will argue that these roles are largely independent of each
other. It is for example clear that possible worlds can provide an informative conceptual
analysis of modality, and that this is seen as something which will enlighten our views of
modality. For a traditional conceptual analysis to be seen as successful, however, it should
match up with the intuitions we have about the concepts at hand.10 Even though I argue
that we should be sceptical of this role being given to intuitions, it is still possible to agree
that possible worlds give us some kind of picture, or story, which is illuminating.
8Stalnaker (1976, p. 65)
9An example of this way of presenting the story of the possible worlds is found in (Marmodoro and
Mayr, 2019, p. 112).
10Margolis and Laurence (2019) specify that ‘matching up’ with intuition is seen as problematic for
example by philosophers of a naturalistic persuasion, as they would want for philosophy not to rely on
intuitions in this way, and rather be continuous with science.
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At the same time, even though we might find possible worlds useful as a heuristic
device, it is not given that we at the same time agree that they provide truthmakers for
modal claims. Still, we see that modal claims are in need of truthmakers, and that possible
worlds can be viewed as a provider of this. Regarding this latter role we have to ask the
following: Firstly, whether possible worlds can do this job in a satisfactory way. Secondly,
whether we have good reason to assume that they can play this part. In addition we might
want to ask whether there are better candidates for the job available.
It is particularly pressing to stress, as hinted at above, that these different roles are not
automatically connected to each other. The fact that something may be a useful formal
tool is not in itself a good enough argument for it also being introduced into metaphysical
explanations. And, subsequently, if we think possible worlds provide a good conceptual
analysis of modality, this is also not an argument for them thereby being truthmakers
for modal claims.11 In addition it should be mentioned that we can also question whether
possible worlds provide a good conceptual analysis at all. Even though we are able to replace
modal talk with pictures or stories about worlds—which are easier for us to grasp—this
does not entail that the conceptual analysis is correct.
This means that arguing that possible worlds should be used in certain ways, e.g. as
a formal tool, is not automatically an argument for them being used in other ways as
well. This point is of utmost importance for my thesis, as I do not aim to rob the possible
worlds of all philosophical use. However, I aim to gain a more adequate picture of the
modal features of the world, and this, I argue, entails removing possible worlds as the
central concept in this context.
Arguing, as I am about to do, that possible worlds should not play the role they have
been set to play in contemporary philosophy is no small task. Explanations of modality in
terms of possible worlds have been the standard story we tell as philosophers—it is what
we teach our undergraduates. Possible worlds is a concept which is deeply ingrained in
theoretical philosophy. This means that if we aim to dispose of the possible worlds’ role as
an important entity in metaphysical explanations, we should have good reason to do so.
This requires explaining the usefulness of the concept, which subsequently requires a closer
look at the use we currently put the concept to. It is this task we now turn our attention
to.
1.2.3 How did the notion of a possible world become so impor-
tant?
1.2.3.1 Possible worlds and their role in modal logic
Modal logic is the field of logic dealing with inferences about the possible, the necessary,
and the impossible. In order to express this we generally use 2 to express necessity, and 3
11An example of how possible worlds is used as truthmakers can be found in (Lewis, 2001b).
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in order to express possibility. As opposed to standard first-order logic, modal logic is not
extensional, but rather intensional. This entails that the truth values of the propositions in
modal logic are determined not only by their forms and the extensions of their parts, but
by something additional. Hence substitutivity principles holding in standard extensional
logics no longer hold here.12 Even though the entities involved in modal logic are associated
with extensions in the actual world, these extensions are not enough to distinguish what
are intuitively distinct entities of that kind.13
The fact that modal logic is intensional was not the only challenge for early 20th century
logicians trying to make sense of the logic of the possible and the necessary. Another obvious
problem was that modal logic is a field with a vast array of non-equivalent logical systems
we can work within. Some of these systems existed already in the earlier parts of the century.
We find five such systems presented in (Lewis et al., 1959), originally published in 1932,
where the syntax of these systems were given. However, the fact that no complete semantics
existed was clearly problematic, and meant, in particular, that even though the syntax of
the different systems could be specified, the logicians lacked the means to interpret the
systems. This also meant that they were not able to give completeness proofs. Because of
this, it was a breaktrough when the introduction of the notion of a possible world, with an
intuitive core taken from Leibniz’s idea of necessity as truth across possible worlds, made
it possible to give semantics for the different systems of modal logic. Although these ideas
were presented by several philosophers at roughly the same time, Kripke’s articles from
the late 50s and early 60s are generally seen as the starting point for a complete possible
world semantics for modal logic.14
In (Kripke, 1959) Kripke introduces the possible world semantics for normal modal logic
systems, and states that we should intuitively think of the model structure as including
a set of all ‘possible worlds’, a particular world which is the actual world, and a relation,
R, between worlds.15 Kripke explains the R-relation as follows. If we have w1Rw2, then
w2 is possible relative to w1. I prefer to use the notion of an accessibility relation instead,
such that w2 is accessible from w1. In addition to a model structure, we need the notion
of a model. A model is an ordered triple ⟨W,R, V ⟩, where W is a non-empty set of objects
(the ‘worlds’), R is a dyadic relation defined over the members of W, and determines for
each w and w′ ∈ W , whether or not wRw′. That is, this relation determines for every
world in the model which worlds are related to each other. This also includes whether the
worlds are accessible to themselves. V is an assignment of values to all formulas in the
model, structured as pairs ⟨α,w⟩, such that each formula has a truth value at each world.
The modal operators are then interpreted as follows. 2α is true in w if α is true in every
12Menzel (2017)
13Divers (2006, p. 9)
14See (Kripke, 1959) and (Kripke, 1963), but also, for example, (Hintikka, 1969) and (Prior, 2003).
15Normal systems are those which includes the statement K: 2(α → β) → (2α → β) as well as the
rule of necessitation: ⊢ α implies ⊢ 2α . For simplicity I will only consider propositional modal logic here.
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accessible world, and otherwise false. 3α is true in w if α is true in at least one accessible
world.
With this as a starting point we are able to say something about validity in the different
systems of modal logic as well. The key is the accessibility relation R, and the different
restrictions we can place upon it—these restrictions are directly tied to validity in the dif-
ferent systems. For validity in the weakest of the normal systems, K, there is no restriction
placed upon the relation; K-validity is validity on every model no matter how the worlds
are related. Kripke’s article restricts itself to four systems in which R is at least reflexive,
that is, for every w ∈ W , wRw.16 Let us look at three of these systems, T, S4, and S5.17
The weakest of these systems, T, demands that the models be reflexive, whereas S4 re-
quires reflexive and transitive models, and S5 needs the models to be reflexive, transitive,
and symmetric. With these restrictions in place, we can start speaking of T-validity, S4-
validity, and S5-validity, as validity in precisely those classes of models (with the relevant
restriction on R).
Given these models, the question of choosing between the different systems becomes a
question about the relationship between worlds, as that is what the divergence amongst
the systems amounts to. Because of this we can make a more informed choice about the
systems we should be working within. Michael J. Loux (1979) highlights the following
case for assuming S5 as the correct system for addressing points concerning metaphysical
questions. Here we can ask ourselves if we think that what is metaphysically possible or
necessary is something which can vary in different possible worlds. If we answer this in
the negative, as is common, we end up with S5 as constituting the correct system for
metaphysical modality. Hence, we see that through the introduction of the possible worlds
we were able to limit the modal operators, 2 and 3, by way of accessibility relations
between worlds, such that the modal operators are working as quantifiers over possible
worlds.
Kripke’s formal semantics ensured that we could make sense of the difficult intensional
notions of possibility and necessity through focusing exclusively on extensional features of
each particular world, and the relationships between such worlds. This is exactly the same
move as we saw when presenting the Leibnizian biconditionals; they eliminate problematic
notions and replace them with notions which somehow seem more respectable. In the same
way as modality can be seen to emerge from sets of categorical entities existing across
worlds, so the modal logic can be understood as referring to extensional features of different
possible worlds, and the modal operators are seen as quantifiers over these worlds.
16There are exceptions where we would not want R to be reflexive. (Hughes and Cresswell, 1996, p. 43)
highlights the system D as an example of this. Here the necessity operator is interpreted as an obligation,
or a ‘moral necessity’, hence we would not want the axiom 2α → α, which demands reflexivity, to be the
case because this would mean that what ought to be the case actually is the case as well.
17T is in some publications, among these Kripke’s article, referred to as M.
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1.2.3.2 Possible worlds and their role in modal metaphysics and other fields
Given the success of modal logic, it is perhaps not surprising that philosophers wanted
to use the powerful tool of possible worlds in other fields and for other, albeit related,
problems.18 After all, as we have just seen, possible world semantics were able to turn the
very problematic field of modal logic into a logic with the extensional formal semantics it
formerly lacked. In addition, it might be argued that by explaining possibility as truth in
some possible world we are very much in line with some of our intuitions about the nature
of modality and the meaning of modal discourse.19
When spelled out in this way, it does not seem particularly puzzling that some wanted to
use this powerful tool to gain understanding not only of the logical machinery of modality,
but also of the related questions of what possibility and necessity really are.20 If we take
the Leibnizian biconditionals at face value, they seemingly give us a tool to provide exactly
this, and thus, the advancements based upon possible worlds made modal notions more
acceptable in philosophy. This meant that the Leinbnizian idea that our world is just one of
many possible worlds—and that these possible worlds establish what we are talking about
when we are using modal notions—re-entered the field of philosophy after modal notions
had been viewed with great scepticism by certain philosophers. We find an example of
this general scepticism towards modal notions before the introduction of possible worlds
in (Quine, 1948):
Wyman’s slum of possibles is a breeding ground for disorderly elements. Take,
for instance, the possible fat man in that doorway; and, again, the possible bald
man it that doorway. Are they the same possible man, or two possible men?
How do we decide? How many possible men are there in that doorway?21
Quine found modal notions, particularly those representing modality de re, to be both
unclear and ontologically esoteric; it is difficult for us to separate between what is necessary
and what is only accidentally the case, for instance. However, following Quine’s work we
also see that the introduction of possible worlds does not automatically provide any help,
unless we are explicit about what sort of entity a possible world is, because possible world
semantics in itself leaves some vital questions about the nature of the worlds wide open:
Surely, such semantics are formulated in an extensional metalanguage, but since
in this metalanguage one quantifies over possible worlds, the semantics does
not bring us any further toward understanding the modal notions unless the
notion of possible worlds is made clear.22
18Kripke (1981) is a readily available example.
19Menzel (2017)
20See for example Lewis (1986a).
21Quine (1948)
22Quine (2013, p. xxii) Preface to the New Edition, by Dagfinn Føllesdal.
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I believe this is a correct characterisation of the burden of explanation which rests upon
the shoulders of the possible worlds theorist. Even though it seems quite natural to want
to include the use of possible worlds in fields like metaphysics, such an inclusion also leads
to the need for more knowledge regarding the nature of the possible worlds themselves, a
question which is not answered by the way we use the worlds in modal logic. If this notion
is to be used in a successful way, we need to know the identities of the possible worlds. This
realisation might be seen as a starting point for one of the more substantial complications
regarding the use of possible worlds semantics to gain a further understanding of modality
and modal notions; our explanations mean nothing if they cannot be supplement with a
convincing interpretation of what possible worlds are. This is a crucial question also here,
and I will return to it in section 1.2.4.
The problem of the identity of the possible worlds is clearly a substantial issue, and I
propose that due to the sheer size and importance of this question we have to a great extent
ended up speaking about the wrong things when discussing modal metaphysics. The goal of
our enterprise in the metaphysics of modality should be to gain a further understanding of
what modality is and what modal notions mean, and I contend that simply tying all modal
notions to possible worlds does not provide satisfactory explanations of them.23 However,
we tend to never get any notable further progress regarding answering these questions
once the possible worlds have been introduced, because questions concerning modality gets
translated into questions concerning possible worlds, and the most important questions end
up being those which are related to the possible worlds, their ontological status, and their
identity. It is certainly the case that these questions need answers, given that we want to
explain modality in this way. But there are other questions which sorely need attention
too, such as whether possible worlds can explain all modal notions in a satisfactory way,
or even whether possible worlds gives the correct picture of modality. Before going into the
inevitable debate regarding just what sort of entities possible worlds are, I want to focus
on some of the issues which have been considered to be elucidated by the introduction of
possible worlds.
When looking at the use of possible worlds in fields other than modal logic, we find
instances of philosophers utilising possible worlds as a purely formal tool at first, before
turning to a more widespread use of the worlds as a more philosophical or conceptual tool
later. We find an example of this in (Kripke, 1981), where the preface states that the work
presented in Naming and Necessity grew out of his earlier work on modal logic and possible
world semantics. This book steps quite far outside the domain of logic, and discusses both
clearly metaphysical questions, such as the queries concerning identity, and also questions
which have more to do with the philosophy of language (such as the considerations around
a theory of names and of rigid designators). These inquiries all make explicit use of possible
worlds.
23This is also addressed by Vetter (2015, p. 6).
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By introducing talk of possible worlds also in areas like philosophy of language, epis-
temology, and metaphysics, we have been able to give answers to quite a few problematic
questions. We find that possible worlds have been employed, for example, in order to explain
what a proper name is, and how it differs from definite descriptions.24 It is, for example,
possible than another person was the tutor of Alexander the Great, so the description ‘the
tutor of Alexander the Great’ cannot in any way be equivalent with the proper name Aris-
totle. By considering questions concerning possibility, we see that even though it might
seem tempting, names cannot be reduced to definite descriptions, not even to sets of, or
loose clusters of, such descriptions. The contingency we see when considering definite de-
scriptions is no longer in place when we consider proper names, at least not if we follow
Kripke and his claim that names are rigid designators. ‘Rigid designator’ is yet another
concept which may be explained with the use of possible worlds, as rigid designators are
those designators which will refer to the same individual in all possible worlds.25
From these considerations alone, we already see that the question of identity across
possible worlds have to be of great importance. That is, if we are to speak of individuals
existing at possible worlds and across possible worlds (which we have to do in order to
explain rigid designators), we need to sort out what is meant by this, and which ontologi-
cal commitments these claims come with.26 The query concerning identity across possible
worlds is of a more metaphysical nature than the questions regarding designators are, hence
we see how the issues concerning philosophy of language and those concerning metaphysics
are very much intertwined. There are several additional important examples of the role
of possible worlds in contemporary philosophy. They have, for example, been seen as pro-
viding a notion of truth-conditions, and they have been contributing to arguments and
thought experiments about physicalism in the philosophy of mind.27 However, the prime
target for the use of possible worlds, outside modal logic, must be said to be the area of
metaphysics, and it is this use which is of particular importance for my thesis. According
to this use, possible worlds are not only useful in order to clarify metaphysical debates,
but also that they may be used in order to distinguish the metaphysical modalities, or
modalities interpreted in a metaphysical way, from other classifications we may employ.
We have already seen how the modal notions—possibility, necessity, contingency, and
impossibility—may be understood in terms of possible worlds, and how the worlds can
show us how these terms are related to each other. This other role taken on by possible
worlds is supposed to provide an understanding of how different kinds of modality relate to
each other. We commonly distinguish between several different varieties of modality, such
as logical, metaphysical, nomological, and deontic. These distinct kinds of modality are
24See, for example, (Lycan, 2018, Chapter 4)
25We might add ‘where that individual exists’, to make sure no-one uses this claim to posit necessary
beings.
26I will return to this question in section 1.2.4.
27Kirk (2019)
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generally seen to be related to each other in a particular way, which possible worlds can
help enlighten. John Divers speaks of this in terms of how different kinds of impossibility
limits the realm of the possible, such that something which is nomically impossible will
still be metaphysically possible, for example. “Possible worlds talk is involved to elucidate
these distinctions”, Divers states, and the distinctions he is referring to can for example be
what kinds of necessity entail other kinds of necessity, and what kinds of possibility entail
other kinds of possibility.28
In these cases, modality of a given variety will be characterised by what is the case in a
specific range of possible worlds. To clarify this by way of an example, this understanding
entails that the logically possible worlds will be those worlds which comply with the set
of constraints which we may refer to as the laws of logic, whereas the nomically possible
worlds will be those which are constrained by the laws of nature. The laws of logic are
generally seen as more permitting—including further possibilities—so the set of all logi-
cally possible worlds will include the set of all nomically possible worlds. Hence, we gain
some understanding of the relationship between the logical and the nomic modalities. This
relationship between the set of all logically possible worlds and all the nomically possible
worlds can explain facts about necessity as well. We can for instance see that the fact that
nomic necessity does not entail logical necessity is witnessed by there being at least one
logically possible worlds which is not a nomically possible world.
It may still be argued that possible worlds represent what Loux describes as “an exotic
piece of metaphysical machinery, the armchair invention of a speculative ontologist lacking
what Bertrand Russell called ‘a robust sense of reality’.”29 A defence against these types
of criticism can be to state, as Loux does, that possible worlds are really only formalising
what are generally held prephilosophical views about modality. If we agree with this, we
might argue that what is done in modal logic and possible worlds centred metaphysics is
just taking these thoughts some steps further, by formalising and systematising them in
this framework.
If we support this kind of argument, we have to agree that possible worlds are somehow
connected to our intuitions. That is, Loux’s point seems to be that the possible worlds are
supposed to be cleaning up our prephilosophical ideas regarding modality, but also that
the worlds add nothing more than clarity. However, if all they offer is clarity, and a more
formal way of presenting generally held views about modality—if possible worlds are simply
reflecting our intuitions—how can we know whether or not those intuitions point towards
correct assumptions about what is possible and necessary?30 If they reflect only already
existing ideas about what is possible or not they cannot be used to separate between those
28Divers (2006, p. 4ff). I note that seeing the metaphysical possibilities to outstrip the nomic ones is a
common intuition to have, but it is something I will argue against in this thesis.
29Loux (1979, p. 30)
30I will return to this question in chapter 7, where I will present an example showing that what we
intuitively believe to be possible does not reflect genuine possibilities in all cases.
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intuitions which point toward genuine possibilities and those that do not. We may also ask
why we should be able to intuitively pick out all and only the possible worlds, given that
there is no adaptive advantage to getting things right about possible worlds.31
In addition, when we are speaking of these prephilosophical assumptions or intuitions
we also need to ask whose intuitions we are referring to. It is overly optimistic to assume
on behalf of humanity that there is a set of prephilosophical beliefs or intuitions which can
be referred to in this way, and which our philosophical concepts are directly connected to.
We also need to consider that our intuitions might not reflect what is genuinely possible,
or that different people have differing intuitions, due to several different reasons, such as
cultural background, or even our level of education.32 If this is indeed the case, philosophical
concepts which are seen to elegantly match our intuitions only seem even more problematic.
In addition to the fact that the connection between possible worlds and intuitions can
be seen as problematic, it should also be mentioned that the label possible worlds has lead
to some issues in itself. At the same time as arguing that possible worlds can be used in
more fields than logic, Kripke urges us not to get carried away by the fact that possible
worlds are called precisely this. That is, he worries that referring to these entities as possible
worlds might lead us to picture them in unfortunate ways, and that this image we have of
the possible worlds as something along the line of faraway places, or distant planets, has
contributed to the creation of problems which might not have been so prominent had they
been otherwise named.
Kripke goes so far that he refers to the possible worlds as a metaphor.33 He also suggests
that in order to avoid these misunderstandings, we could use ‘counterfactual situation’ or
‘possible state (or history) of the world’ instead, or even replace talk of worlds with plain
modal talk, like ‘it is possible that...’. This last suggestion is extremely problematic. If the
talk of possible worlds can so easily be discarded and replaced by the modal notions they
were supposed to explain in the first place, what explanation is left for the possible worlds
to do? It seems that if Kripke is right, possible worlds have no particular explanatory
role over and above just being an alternative way of saying that something is possible or
necessary.
1.2.4 Genuine realism or actualism
1.2.4.1 Possible worlds—concrete or abstract?
Let us, for now, disregard the worry that possible worlds talk might not be explanatory
after all, and assume that modality is indeed best understood in terms of possible worlds.
31This is discussed in (Nozick, 2001, Chapter 3), see also (Vaidya, 2016, Section 1.2.4). I will return
also to this topic briefly in chapter 7, when dicussing the limited use of intuitions.
32See for instance Weinberg et al. (2001) which investigates how intuitions might be differing between
cultures.
33Kripke (2005, p. 228)
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That is, we assume that these worlds really are the explanatory entities we wish them to
be, and that they can provide a conceptual framework for modality, as well as supplying
modal claims with their much needed truthmakers. If this is indeed the case, the following
two questions will have to be satisfactory answered by all accounts of possible worlds.
1. What is a possible world?
2. What does it mean to exist at a possible world?
The answer to the first question will to a large degree determine the answer to the
second question, and I will in general mainly focus on the first question. In addition, we
should note that all the answers provided by the notion of possible worlds will in turn
depend on, and be coloured by, the answers we are able to provide here. I will go so far as
to argue that if we are unable to find satisfactory answers to these questions, the framework
of possible worlds, tempting though it may seem, can turn out to be quite problematic in
itself.
When debating the identity of the possible worlds—what sort of entity the possible
worlds are—there are several options available, and these alternatives largely fall into two
separate camps which we may refer to as being either genuinely realistic interpretations,
or actualistic interpretations. For the former, the possible worlds are seen as really existing
entities on a par with our world. The most well-known proponent of such worlds is David
Lewis, and because this interpretation of possible worlds is so dominated by his work it is
quite uniform.34 For the latter, the possible worlds are in one way or another made up by
certain entities, such as states of affairs, already existing in the actual world, and the worlds
themselves are supposed to be ‘abstract entities’. The existence of these abstract entities
are stipulated because they have a job to do; modal claims are in need of truthmakers, and
possible worlds are assigned to this task. There are multiple suggestions from a substantial
amount of philosophers available regarding exactly which entities make up these worlds and
how the worlds themselves should be interpreted—but no general agreement concerning
what sort of entity these abstract worlds are supposed to be—something which leads to
this field being very diverse.
A genuine modal realist will have no problem explaining what a possible world is, or
what it means for something to exist at a world. A possible world is the same sort of thing
as our world, and different individuals inhabit other worlds in the same way as we inhabit
our world. A world is made distinct by what is spatially or temporally related; that is,
things that are related either spatially or temporally exists in the same world. Different
worlds are not related to each other in this way. This entails that all other worlds are
34This does not mean that he is the only one arguing for, or accepting, genuine modal realism. Divers
(2006), for example, ends up concluding that if we are to be realist about possible worlds, then we should
definitively be genuine realists. This is a conditional claim, surely, but his book highlights several of the
reasons why genuine realism would be preferable over any of the actualistic varieties.
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inaccessible to us, because all worlds are inaccessible to each other. Referring to a world
as ‘the actual world’ as opposed to other worlds is not an indication of difference in the
ontological status, nor is it something which entails that the actual world is somehow ‘more
real’ than the other worlds. For the modal realist, pointing out ‘the actual world’ is on a
par with speaking of ‘this house’ as opposed to all the other really existing houses; it is an
indexical picking out the object of interest, but without imposing ontological difference.
The biggest problem for the modal realist, ontological cost aside, is to explain identity
across possible worlds in a satisfactory way. Given that all worlds are really existing entities,
the same object cannot exist in several different possible worlds. Hence, modality de re will
have to be witnessed by way of counterparts existing across possible worlds. Following this,
‘I could have been a dancer’ is true because a counterpart of me is a dancer in another
possible world. The counterpart relation is questionable for several reasons, but especially
because it demands there to be a relation of similarity between objects existing in different
possible worlds.35
It should be noted that questions concerning the identity and structure of possible
worlds are far more pressing and difficult to answer for the actualist than they are for a
possibilist of Lewis’s description. This is due to the fact that since all worlds are really
existing and fundamentally the same sort of entity as our world for Lewis, what it means
to be a world and what it means to exist in a world will be answered in exactly the same
way whether we are speaking of our world or of some other possible world, although this
simplicity comes at a great ontological cost. This solution is not open for the actualist,
hence they must be able to describe what kind of entity a possible world is.
If we want to make use of the beneficial features of possible worlds, but are reluctant
accept the existence of a plurality of really existing worlds—ontologically on a par with
our world—we might instead interpret these worlds as something else than real flesh and
blood worlds. As already mentioned, this will in general entail viewing the worlds as some
form of abstract entity, made up of the things that exist in our actual world. We should
note that several, if not all, of the alternatives presented as actualistic possible worlds are
to greater or lesser extent underdeveloped compared to the genuine realism of Lewis.
Even though the actualist worlds are not genuinely existing worlds of the same general
constitution as ours, these views are still realistic interpretations of possible worlds, as the
worlds are made up of entities which already exist in the actual world. Because of this we
can say that each possible world actually exists—that is, for each possible world there is
some actually existing entity to which that world is identical—but only one is actualised.36
Hence, we can safely refer to these interpretations of possible worlds as a kind of realism
as well, of an actualistic variety. This assumption, alongside the idea that there exists a
35This is one of the things Kripke argues quite forcefully against in his (Kripke, 1981), and other early
criticism is also found in (Plantinga, 1974). For a more contemporary criticism, see for example (Fara and
Williamson, 2005).
36Divers (2006, p. 21f.)
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plurality of (actualist) possible worlds, is the theoretical backdrop behind the different
kinds of actualist realism, all of which answer the question of the identity of the possible
worlds in a slightly different way. To get an idea of the diversity among the actualists, I
will present some of the suggestions briefly.37
The most common way of viewing actualist worlds is perhaps to see them as maximally
consistent states of affairs. This is referred to as Plantingan Realism in Divers’s book,38
because it is presented and defended by Alvin Plantinga, for example in his (Plantinga,
1974). According to this view, the possible worlds are possible states of affairs, possible
in ‘the broadly logical sense’.39 But not every possible state of affairs is a possible world.
In order to be a world a state of affairs must be what Plantinga refers to as maximal or
complete. Completeness or maximality in this context amounts to the following:
[A] state of affairs S is complete or maximal if for every state of affairs S’, S
includes S’ or S precludes S’.40
A key idea for this branch of actualistic realism is the distinction between something
existing and something obtaining. All the possible worlds exist, and represent through their
existence, the different things that could have happened, but only one world obtains. The
actual world is the only maximally consistent state of affairs which obtains.41
Another option is to advocate a form of combinatorial realism, in which possible worlds
are seen as constructs out of actually existing individuals and actually existing properties.
This view is advocated by, among others, John Bigelow describing it as
a kind of Restaurant Theory of the Modal Universe. Something is possible when
the ingredients all exist, which constitute its recipe.42
Bigelow assumes that combinatorialism is capable of providing truthmakers for modal
claims to the same extent as genuine modal realism can, because combinatorial realism can
construct a replacement for each and every possible world the genuine realist has in their
theoretical depository. That is, according to Bigelow, to supply truthmakers for “whichever
modal opinions we happen to hold”.43
A third option is what Divers refers to as ‘book realism’. This understanding of possible
worlds take them to be world books, or maximal or complete stories of the world, which are
made up by structured propositions or interpreted sentences of a specific (world making)
37For a more comprehensive survey of different interpretations of possible worlds see e.g. (Divers, 2006).
38Divers (2006, p. 173f.)
39Plantinga (1974, p. 44)
40Plantinga (1974, p. 45)
41Plantinga (1974, p. 45)
42Bigelow (1988, p. 41)
43Bigelow (1988, p. 42). If we do not want possibility to correspond perfectly with conceivability this is
an obvious problematic approach.
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‘language’.44 Book realism is also described in (Plantinga, 1974), and here the possible
worlds are all and only the maximally consistent sets of sentences:
[B]ooks too have a maximal property; if B is a book, then for any proposition
p, either p is a member of B or else not-p is. And clearly for each possible world
W there will be exactly one book.45
Finally we have what we may call ‘nature realism’. Nature realism is the view that seems
most closely related to the position defended in this thesis. These philosophers understand
possible worlds as either world natures, world-properties, or ways that they world might have
been.46 This view has been advocated by, among others, Bigelow and Pargetter (1990).47
In addition to these more specified genres of actualistic interpretations of possible worlds
there are some philosophers who are clearly actualist without subscribing to one particular
interpretation. One example of this is Kripke. Although his way of describing possible
worlds have traces of both book realism and nature realism Divers acknowledges Kripke
as ‘a most influential advocate’ of a more generic actualistic realism.48 In Kripke’s writing
we also see tendencies that for the actualistic realist the goal is not primarily to present
a thorough account of possible worlds, but rather to utilise possible worlds in order to
investigate particular issues in the metaphysics of modality. This means that possible worlds
are more a means to an end than the object of enquiry.49
These things are part of the reasons why someone (e.g. Divers) may argue in favour of
genuine realism. These actualist positions are invariably less comprehensive, and in some
cases based upon underdeveloped accounts which are perhaps meant to present a very
specific application of possible worlds, and to distinguish this view from genuine realism.
Because of this, the proposals are often not meant to be comprehensive accounts in every
case—this nonetheless means that the actualist side have no comprehensive theory which
can match genuine realism.50
Following the many suggestions of what possible worlds are, according to the actual-
ist, it becomes clear that the question of the identity of worlds is both real and difficult
for the advocates of actualism to answer, and as of now there is no particular account
which stands out from the other interpretations in terms of either clarity, usefulness, or
comprehensiveness.
44Divers (2006, p. 178)
45Plantinga (1974, p. 46)
46Divers (2006, p. 177)
47Bigelow goes on to argue for a view even closer to mine in (Bigelow et al., 1992).
48Divers (2006, p. 337)
49But the question regarding the identity of the possible worlds still needs to be answered, and, hence,
these accounts come across as less comprehensive and, as mentioned earlier, often underdeveloped as
compared to genuine realism.
50Divers (2006, p. xiii)
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1.2.4.2 Stipulating possible worlds
When arguing for the existence and use of actualist worlds it is common to say, as I have
also done, that we stipulate the existence of possible worlds in order to solve certain issues in
the metaphysics of modality. Stating that possible worlds are stipulated is also an important
part of Kripke’s critique of the genuine modal realist, particularly as a way of meeting the
apparent demand for a criterion of identity across possible worlds. However, we need to
ask, firstly what stipulation is meant to be doing, and, secondly, whether stipulation is
performing these tasks in a successful way. Let us first take a closer look at what Kripke
means we can achieve by way of stipulating the existence of possible worlds.
One important question to ask when it comes to the inhabitants of possible worlds
is how we are supposed to know that the individuals we are speaking of as members of
another possible world are the same as those we are making modal claims about. If we
assert that Nixon could have lost the 1968 US presidential election, we are in effect saying
that there is a possible world where Nixon exists, ran for president, and subsequently lost.
How do we know whether the ‘Nixon’ of this other possible world is the same Nixon we
have here in our world? Do these kinds of issues entail that we need to have particular
criteria of identity across possible worlds?
According to Kripke, arguing that there is need for such a criterion is a result of viewing
possible worlds in a completely erroneous way.
‘Possible worlds’ are stipulated not discovered by powerful telescopes. There
is no reason why we cannot stipulate that, in talking about what would have
happened to Nixon in a certain counterfactual situation, we are talking about
what would have happened to him.51
Thus, it is given that the world in which Nixon lost the election includes Nixon—this
very man—with whatever features he is to have in the given world, because as Kripke
puts it, “[g]enerally, things aren’t ‘found out’ about a counterfactual situation, they are
stipulated.”52
I do however contend that the role of stipulations advocated by Kripke is problematic
in itself, and that stipulations cannot play the intended role in a satisfactory way; as a
solution, invoking stipulations is simply not good enough, even though they do prevent the
actualist from having to deal with some of the more problematic features that a genuine
realist of Lewis’s ilk will have to solve.
In order to show that the role intended for stipulations is problematic, we need to
distinguish between different ways of using this concept. It seems to me that Kripke is
using the notion in two slightly different ways. Firstly, stipulations are used to ensure,
as we saw above, that we are talking about the same individuals across possible worlds.
51Kripke (1981, p. 44)
52Kripke (1981, p. 49)
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Secondly, it also seems that stipulation is what in some sense creates the possible worlds,
i.e. that we stipulate the world and thereby know that what we have just stipulated is
a possible world. If facts about possible worlds are not generally ‘found out’, but rather
stipulated, the stipulation is what gives us access to the worlds.53
I will grant Kripke the following. Stipulation does indeed pick out the correct individual.
We can stipulate that this very person exists in another possible world and be sure that
we are speaking of the right person. However, what I am more unsure about is whether
stipulation gives us access to possible worlds. That is, if we stipulate something about a
particular individual, how can we be sure that the stipulated situation is indeed possible?
Divers states that even though we are able to stipulate distinct situations, we cannot
thereby be guaranteed that the situation is possible.
What is not in the gift of my stipulation (...) is that such a world is a possible
world. It is one question how we know which objects are the objects of our de
re modal thought and talk, and perhaps there stipulation has a legitimate role.
It is another question altogether how we know what is modally true of those
objects, and there stipulation has no legitimate role to play.54
I can, by stipulation, specify what I am talking about, but I cannot thereby successfully
distinguish between possible and impossible worlds, it seems, unless I take possibility to be
coextensional with the things I can consistently imagine. Divers takes this to be another
feather in the hat for the genuine realist, since they at least have a guarantee that the
worlds they are referring to are possible.55
From this we see that if we choose to follow the lead of the more traditional actualists we
are left with a conceptual understanding of possible worlds which more or less correspond
to situations we can consistently imagine. After all, our ability to stipulate is limited by
our ability to consistently imagine or conceive of things. This seems to still be the case
also if we specify that possible worlds are maximally consistent sets of e.g. states of affairs,
because our ability to judge what is to exist in such a world is still largely dependent on
our ability to stipulate what is supposed to be existing in the given world. The relationship
between stipulating something and being able to conceive of something is most certainly
complicated; is it the case that we, in order to be able to stipulate something need to be
able to consistently conceive of it? If this is the case, subscribing to a stipulation based
view is at the same time a subscription to an unfortunate conflation of terms in which
possibility collapses into mere conceivability. We simply cannot assume that our ability
to consistently picture situations, i.e. stipulate a possible world, will be able to capture
53As far as I can tell, this is an example of what Divers (2006, p. 273) refers to as stipulations giving
epistemic access to possible worlds.
54Divers (2006, p. 273)
55Divers (2006, p. 274). But if we remember Bigelow’s comment earlier in this chapter, even genuine
realists seems to be in danger of conflating possibility and conceivability.
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all and only those situations which are possible. This is a gross overestimation of the
human ability to picture things consistently, and I hold there will be errors both because
we are able to consistently picture situations which are not possible, and because there are
possible situations which we may not be able to consistently picture. Whereas the eventual
relationship between stipulation and conceivability will not be a main topic of this thesis,
I will return to problems tied to conceivability and intuitions in relation to the laws of
nature in chapter 7.
1.2.4.3 The Humean connection
An important question to ask is whether the success of possible world semantics led us to
be inspired to look outside the actual world in order to find the ground of modality, or if
we were so deeply entrenched in empirical and categorical assumptions about the world
that we simply had to look outside the actual world, because the grounding of modality
could not be found in the actual world anyway. If it is the latter, this is based upon an
assumption about the structure and properties of the world which is deeply Humean in
character—and this is an assumption we can argue against. As far as I can tell, this point
has not received the attention it deserves in the literature, something which is a forceful
reminder of the influences of empirical traditions and Humeanism in philosophy.
By assuming possible worlds as the key concept in modal metaphysics, we can say
that the modal features of the world are determined by categorical properties, not only
in this world, but in other possible worlds as well. Hence, the assumption that we need
possible worlds seems grounded in the assumption that the properties and objects in the
world cannot themselves provide this, or in the assumption that modality cannot be a real
feature of the actual world. That is, we need to ground modality in respectable features of
reality, i.e. in something which is categorical. This shows that the assumption that possible
worlds are needed is an assumption that is deeply rooted in Humean metaphysics. I will go
into details about Humean views of properties in particular both in chapter 2 and 4, but
for now it suffices to say that a Humean view of properties entails there are no essential
modality located in the properties themselves. Hence, a consequence of having Humean
inspired metaphysics is that modality will have to be ‘outsourced’, so to speak. There
is no modality in the entities in the world which substantiate the modality we want to
explain—we need possible worlds if we are to have modality at all.
Instead of accepting properties which are inherently modal in the actual world, a plu-
rality of worlds, each with its own categorical properties and claims, are posited to be
existing in some way or another. Thus, modality is something which results from consider-
ing several other worlds, but never just our actual world. I argue that at the core here we
find Humean assumptions about what are and are not respectable metaphysical entities;
and dispositional properties which are not grounded in something categorical are examples
of entities which the Humean will not accept. I reject Humeanism, and contend that there
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are indeed respectable entities to be found in the world, in which modality is grounded.56
If we reject Humeanism, we may also reject the possible world centred understanding of
modality, because the ground for accepting this view is at its core deeply anchored in a
Humean way of viewing properties.
1.2.5 Towards a new actualism
This thesis is clearly actualist, and aims to contribute to the new actualism that takes
inspiration from Kripke, in stating that the starting point for establishing what grounds
the truth of modal claims should be the actual world. These new actualists harbour a scep-
ticism about possible worlds which I wholeheartedly share. Because of this, a distinction
between softcore and hardcore actualists found in (Contessa, 2010) is useful at this point.
Whereas the softcore actualists agree with the possibilist that a version of the Leibnizian
biconditional capture modality in an adequate way, and that this commits us to the exis-
tence of possible worlds in some shape or form, the hardcore actualists want to get rid of
the possible worlds in the context of metaphysics. That is, possible worlds might still be
useful in many ways, for example as a heuristic device, but a reductive analysis of modality
on the basis of possible worlds should be rejected:
Hardcore actualists think that what makes modal propositions true are irre-
ducible modal features of the world (such as laws of nature, dispositions, or
essences).57
Although it is clear that it is relatively easy to oppose the modal realism of Lewis (e.g.
by pointing out the aforementioned ontological cost of assuming fully real possible worlds,
or by arguing that the question of transworld identity becomes too difficult to answer
properly), the new actualists argue that the actualist interpretations of possible worlds
have their problems too. It is, as mentioned above, not the case that we are freed from
complications when Kripke, for example, argues that possible worlds are stipulations, even
though specifying that possible worlds are stipulations makes the question of transworld
identity clear.
In conclusion, I argue that if we are able to find alternative ways of explaining the modal
features of the world—and this thesis argues that we are able to do just this—it does seem
that possible worlds are metaphysically redundant. I argue that modality is indeed real,
but instead of constructing actualist possible worlds as truthmakers for the modal claims,
we should rather account for the reality of modality by exclusively relying on the things
56The tendency of speaking of dispositional properties as being ‘respectable’ stems from Mellor (1978):
“Dispositions are as shameful in many eyes as pregnant spinsters used to be—ideally to be explained away,
or entitled by a shotgun wedding to take the name of some decently real categorical property. It is time
to remove this lingering Victorian prejudice. Dispositions, like unmarried mothers, can manage on their
own.”
57Contessa (2010, p. 341f.)
1.3 The new actualism: dispositions and essences 21
existing in the actual world. We need not go through the toil and trouble of explaining
what an actualist possible world is, because we do not need possible worlds in order to do
metaphysics at all.
This last specification is important. I argue solely that possible worlds should be de-
prived of their role as important metaphysical entities, not that they should be stripped of
all philosophical importance. Possible worlds are still useful, or even of crucial importance
in a wide array of fields, and I am not arguing that these uses of the concept are in any way
unjustified. This means that utilising possible worlds as a formal tool in modal logic, or
employing them for limited purposes in epistemology, philosophy of language and so on is
absolutely fine. They can even be accepted as useful in metaphysics, but then solely in or-
der to provide enlightening examples or illustrations, and in order to provide explanations
which will make things easier to grasp for the human mind. The only role I want to rob
them of is their role as truthmakers, and their more general role as important explanatory
entities in metaphysics. In a nutshell, possible worlds have little to do with the metaphysics
of modality.58
1.3 The new actualism: dispositions and essences
By now it should be clear that I wholeheartedly agree with the new actualist assumption
that removing the notion of possible worlds from the metaphysical account of modality
altogether is a good idea. Moreover, these worlds should be replaced with modal properties
existing in the world. I hold that there is no need to try to construct actualist possible worlds
if the purpose is to explain the metaphysics of modality. The possible world semantics is
a powerful tool, for example in modal logic, but I hold that we may do just as well, if not
better, by avoiding making reference to possible worlds as important metaphysical entities.
As Barbara Vetter states; having a powerful formal model is not the same as having a good
metaphysics.59
1.3.1 Replacing possible worlds
A whole new field of metaphysics has emerged searching to use dispositional concepts
to replace the possible worlds. This field can be traced at least back to (Bigelow et al.,
1992), and (Ellis and Lierse, 1994), but we find similar ideas also in (Shoemaker, 1980) and
(Swoyer, 1982). However, we might also search further back in the history of philosophy to
58This is also stated clearly by some of my fellow new actualists, e.g. Vetter (2011, p. 742)
59Vetter (2015, p. 6). She does not expand on her claim in this passage, so an answer to the question
of what good metaphysics amounts to is not answered. We find similar concerns in e.g. (Dipert, 1997, p.
334): “[L]ogical structure is historically associated with highly conceptualized thought, and in fact with
thoughts that are easily expressed in natural language. (...) Following such interests may ultimately make
logic a good theory of the linguistically expressible, a good philosophy of language, but a poor theory of
the metaphysical structure of the world (...).”
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find inspiration for this set of related views:
If a historical reference is required (or desired), the new actualists replace Hume,
as the metaphysician’s hero, with Aristotle; many of them would happily de-
scribe themselves as ‘neo-Aristotelians’.60
Replacing inspiration from Hume, in this context, entails a general rejection of the
thesis of Humean Supervenience, that is, in the famous formulation from Lewis, that “all
there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing
and then another”.61 Recall that if a Humean, such as Lewis himself, is to find modality
at all, they need possible worlds, because modality is not built into the world in any way.
This entails that a rejection of possible worlds as important metaphysical entities seems
to bring with it the rejection of Humeanism as well. I happily endorse this move. The
tendency to be anti-Humean is found already in (Shoemaker, 1980) with his argument for
focusing more on properties and objects when speaking of causality, as well as arguing that
property identity is tied to the causal powers of the given properties. Sydney Shoemaker’s
article ‘Causality and properties’ is thus an important precursor to the later dispositional
views of properties and objects.
It is important to note that what I refer to as the new actualism has grown to a diverse
field with quite a bit of substantial disagreement between the different philosophers and
branches, something which will be discussed thoroughly in my thesis. However, what they
all have in common is the belief that the modal features of the world in some way or another
can be explained by referring to the dispositions of objects or properties. Such dispositions
are actual, they exist even if they are never manifested, but they point, in some sense,
beyond themselves to something which might very well be counterfactual. The egg on your
kitchen counter could have been pushed to the floor and subsequently smashed, and the
slug in your garden could have been trodden on and squeezed. These counterfactuals are
partially grounded in the dispositions of the egg and the slug, and these dispositions are
present in the objects, it is argued, even though the egg was never smashed and the slug
was never trodden on.
The different accounts which may all be seen as new actualist are operating under a
quite wide array of names, which does not simplify things when we try to get a grasp of
the whole field. In this thesis I will use the term dispositionalist as a catch-all term for
philosophy done in this field, regardless of how the different philosophers refer to their
own theories, and which vocabulary they use to describe the tendencies in nature which
are meant to account for the modal features of the world. But how are we to understand
these dispositional features which are supposed to account for modality? A favourite of
dispositionalists is the disposition that a fragile glass breaks if struck with sufficient force.
60Vetter (2011, p. 744)
61Lewis (1986b, p. ix)
1.3 The new actualism: dispositions and essences 23
It can be tempting to account for dispositions in terms of possibility: the glass has a
disposition to break because there is a possible world in which I hit it and it breaks. But
since possibility is what we are trying to make sense of, and since dispositions also point
specifically to properties of actual things, it is natural for an actualist to attempt instead to
turn the explanation in the other direction. We can argue, in particular, that it is possible
that the glass might break precisely because it has a disposition to do so. Specifically, the
disposition of the glass to break could be taken to be the truthmaker for the modal claim
that it is possible that the glass will break (or, indeed, that it could have been broken
already). This move is at the core of the dispositional account of modality.
This entails that the dialectic is reversed in comparison with most accounts; we are
no longer taking necessity and possibility to be the primary notions. The focus is now on
concepts I find more discriminating, and possibility and necessity themselves need to be
explained by reference to some of these other entities. The hope is that by working with
more discriminating notions as a starting point, we may be able to give a more detailed and
accurate analysis of modality. By using concepts such as essence, power, and disposition, we
are able to tie modality to properties that exist in the world, and to the objects having these
properties.62 An essence is always an essence of some particular property or object, and the
same is the case for dispositions, so the modality that follows from this is clearly anchored
in the actual world. One might set out to explain all familiar modal notions, such as
necessity, possibility, and counterfactual conditionals by appealing to these features of the
actual world. However, for the moment, I limit my attention to the notion of metaphysical
possibility.
I do, however, have to specify that these kinds of macro-dispositions tied to (macro)
objects are not the focal point for all dispositionalists, and that the dispositions of the
fragile glass will get little attention in this thesis simply because my main focus will be on
dispositional essences of fundamental properties, not on dispositional expressions tied to
middle sized dry goods. However I do defend the use of the fragility example, or my earlier
examples with the egg and the slug, as a way to get a first grasp of what dispositionality is
about. Particularly with respect to gaining an understanding of how something might be
disposed to behave in certain ways under certain circumstances, and that the disposition
will be just as real even if those circumstances never come about, and the disposition
remains unmanifested.
I hold that if this kind of dispositional actualism is to be successful it needs substantial
further development; my goal is that this thesis is a part of this development. This entails,
among other things, that I have to provide a clear specification of what a conceptual
framework based upon dispositional entities can actually provide. Research questions which
62It should be noted that the accounts seen to fall under the new actualism puts very different weight
on the notion of an object. The theory presented here sees objects as an important metaphysical category
relevant for the explanation of dispositionality. If we on the other hand look at theories of dispositional
essentialism, the notion of a property is prior to that of objects. See e.g. (Bird, 2007).
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will be explored throughout this thesis include addressing the question of how possibility
may be understood in terms of some form of dispositional account, as well as the related
subjects of the status of higher order (chains of) dispositions, the possibility of very unlikely
events and alien non-actual beings and properties. The overarching theme of the thesis, and
the most important topic in the field in my opinion, is the question of the modal status of
the laws of nature. The reason for this being the main focal point is that the answer to this
question limits the domain of what is really possible in an effective and uncompromising
way. Moreover, it is a question we seem to have certain prephilosophical intuitions about,
which we will have to be able to bypass if we are to accept the understanding of laws of
nature I will argue for.
In addition to a specification of what dispositions might be able to do, we also need a
greater degree of clarity when it comes to distinguishing between different kinds of dispo-
sitional expressions, as well as a specification of what the different terms entail. This field
of study is unnecessarily complicated because a large vocabulary is used to refer to the
dispositional features of reality which are supposed to carry modality with them. Different
authors use words like ‘dispositions’, ‘dispositional properties’, ‘powers’, ‘tendencies’, ‘ca-
pacities’, ‘propensities’, and so on, to refer to these modal features of reality in different
ways, and this can be confusing.
The most obvious example of this problem is the term power which is used in widely
different ways in different publications. Because of the problematic aspects of using terms in
diverging ways, several authors have introduced new, better defined theoretical vocabulary
to replace the problematic and ambiguous pretheoretical terms. We find this in for example
(Bird, 2007), where he proposes that we use the word potency as a specific theoretical term
picking out a dispositional essence of a property, and we find it in (Vetter, 2015) where she
introduces potentialities as a way of picking out a very widely defined dispositionality.63
However, if these new expressions do not catch on, we end up with even more words
aiming to describe the same features of the world. For this reason, I will not introduce
new terminology in this thesis. It is my hope that the way I define the words I use will be
enough to avoid contributing to further confusion based on vocabulary. I will mainly use
the terms disposition, and power, the latter being a term solely used for what I will also
refer to as a dispositional essence. I will return to the question of terminology in chapter
2.
Another distinction which is of crucial importance in what follows is the difference
between a (mere) disposition and a dispositional essence. That is, between an overarching
and wide understanding of a disposition (similar to Vetter’s potentiality), and the specific
use of dispositional essence at the fundamental level of metaphysics.64 This also entails
that we need to distinguish between dispositional accounts of modality, and dispositional
63Bird later departs from using potencies as his main theoretical term, settling with powers instead in
his later publications.
64This fundamental level is a level where there is no further structure to appeal to.
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essentialist accounts. This thesis is primarily an example of the latter, although I argue
in my chapter 3 that dispositional accounts of possibility might still be useful as a way
to gain understanding of possibility at non-fundamental levels. Such theories are similar
to theories of how we understand possibility from the dispositions of everyday language.
Still, I argue that these accounts are no longer helpful when they include assumptions that
dispositional accounts of possibility allow possibilities going beyond the laws of nature.65
This is often a result of putting too much weight on what Vetter refers to as ‘extensional
correctness’, or what I will call catering to intuitions.66
Thus, I will rather argue for what is, at present, an incomplete theory of possibility
based upon dispositional essences. This means that what is possible is largely a matter
of supervenience, that is, that possibility is limited by, and grounded in, dispositional
essences in combination with both micro and higher order structures, and not a matter
of manifesting irreducible dispositions existing at each level of complexity. The example
of the fragile glass manifesting the disposition of fragility by breaking or shattering is an
illustration of the latter.
1.3.2 Dispositionalism tied to objects
Different dispositionalist accounts diverge not only when it comes to the level of meta-
physics on which they operate, but also when it comes to the question of being either largely
object-focused or property-focused. The accounts centred on the level of non-fundamental
metaphysics are naturally more object focused, whereas the explanations on the level of
fundamental or near-fundamental levels are mainly focusing on properties. The former will
concentrate on objects possessing certain dispositional features, such as a piece of chalk
being brittle, while the latter will deal mainly with fundamental properties, such as elec-
tric charge. Furthermore, these dispositional accounts of possibility, which examine higher
complexity things, also naturally focus on objects.
In addition there is divergence when it comes to the question of essentialism, and we
see that several dispositional accounts of modality are also essentialist accounts, among
these my own. Hence, this thesis is not only meant as a contribution to the literature
on dispositional understandings of modality, it is also at its core a thesis arguing for es-
sentialism. Essentialist accounts take inspiration from Kit Fine, who in his (Fine, 1994)
introduces important distinctions between essence and necessity. Fine shows that the un-
derstanding of essences in terms of necessity—that is, the traditional possible worlds cen-
tred explanation—is flawed, and that it does not capture the differences between the two
concepts. This has lead to the notion of an essence getting a far more important role in
65This is explicitly stated in (Borghini and Williams, 2008, Footnote 2, p. 21f.) and is assumed to be
an premise which can coexist with Vetter’s general account too, although she chooses to leave the question
wide open in (Vetter, 2015, p. 290). I return to this debate in chapter 3.
66Vetter introduces how the concept of extensional correctness is of relevance to her proposal in (Vetter,
2015, p. 15), and she refers to it throughout the book.
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the metaphysics of modality. In order to understand the concept of an essence we might
have to take it as something which is ontologically more fundamental than necessity.
Just as we will focus mainly on either objects or properties when speaking of dispo-
sitionality, this is also the case when it comes to the question of essentialism, different
accounts will have an overarching focus either on objects or on properties. An example of
the former, which Vetter (2011) calls object essentialism, would be a view taking inspi-
ration from e.g. Kripke’s ‘Identity and Necessity’, and some of the examples he presents
there.
Supposing this lectern is in fact made of wood, could this very lectern have been
made from the very beginning from ice, say frozen from water in the Thames?
One has a considerable feeling that it could not, though in fact one certainly
could have made a lectern of water from the Thames, frozen it into ice by some
process, and put it right there in place of this thing. If one had done so, one
would have made, of course, a different object.67
The thoughts from Kripke taken slightly further can be understood to lead to the
localised modality of the new actualists, and this is a further distinction from the more
traditional interpretation of modality, a tradition Kripke’s work is an example of. Whereas
possibility and necessity are non-localised and general, the modality tied to dispositions is
at its core local and hence it is anchored in the actual world in a far stronger way than we
find in more traditional actualism. As Vetter puts it, “an essence or a disposition is always
the essence or disposition of some particular object.”68 This focus on a local understanding
of modality is yet another difference between softcore and hardcore actualists, and the new
actualists are generally hardcore actualists.
Adopting the more discriminating notions of dispositional properties, powers, and
essences, in addition to departing from the more narrow understanding of modality as
something which should primarily be seen as concerning possibility, necessity, and the
counterfactual conditional, means that we, through the approach of new actualism, are
able to defend a more nuanced approach to modality. The hope is that this will entail
that we will also be able to more correctly capture the modal features of the world. In
traditional possible world centred metaphysics of modality, the notions of possibility and
necessity are at the core of the modal package, so to speak, and all the other concepts
will have to be explained in terms of these core ideas.69 This often entails that important
differences—such as the aforementioned distinction between essences and necessity—is at
least to some degree glossed over or overlooked. We remember how Fine shows that an
understanding of essence in terms of necessity is not viable, and that we need to turn the
order of ontological importance around, that is, it is essence not necessity which is the
67Kripke (2005, p. 232)
68Vetter (2011, p. 743)
69Vetter (2011, p. 743)
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central concept here. We find similar ideas in (Lowe, 2008) where it is claimed that “meta-
physical necessity is (...) grounded in the essences or natures of things”.70 This means that
we actually have to ask whether such an understanding of modality in general in terms of
possibility and necessity is even possible.
The relativisation to objects entails that modality in itself is a matter of circumstances
concerning objects, and following this it is clearly anchored in the world; the move from
focusing on the general concepts of possibility and necessity to the focus on dispositions
of objects ensures actualism. However, new actualism and an overarching focus on objects
need not entail essentialism. Among philosophers considered to be dispositionalist, but
not essentialist, we find for instance Mumford (2005) with his arguments against an object
focused essentialism, claiming for example that we can accept natural kinds without accept-
ing their essences. In addition it is also possible to speak of dispositional understandings
of possibility without invoking the concept of an essence. One example of this is found in
(Borghini and Williams, 2008), but also the account of possibility found in (Vetter, 2015)
is dispositionalist without being essentialist. In this book, she explicitly argues against
dispositional essentialism.
1.3.3 Property essentialism
However, the object-focused essentialism just discussed is not the kind of essentialism I
will examine primarily in this thesis. The branch of essentialism I defend is directed far
more towards properties than objects. It should also be noted that there is a substantial
divergence in the literature regarding to which degree objects are of importance at all.
As mentioned, this is particularly the case when we move from a more general disposi-
tionalism towards dispositional essentialism, but there is also divergence internally among
the dispositional essentialists. Brian Ellis’s essentialism which is generally considered to
be in the dispositional essentialist camp, and hence more property focused, also employs
the notion of a natural kind and thus speaks more of objects than for instance Alexander
Bird.71 Bird’s essentialism is more clearly tied solely to properties.
The topic of this thesis will mainly be a form of property essentialism, which have
been referred to as scientific essentialism in (Ellis, 2001), and dispositional essentialism
in (Bird, 2007). I will mainly use the latter term. According to Vetter (2011, p. 748),
dispositional essentialism is not intended to provide an account of metaphysical necessity
in general. However, one of the preliminary assumptions I will make in this thesis is that
dispositional essentialism is the foundation upon which the rest of the metaphysics of
modality can be built. That is, even though dispositional essentialism cannot directly
explain which particular situations are possible, and even though we can probably not
use dispositional essentialism as a recipe to enable us to discriminate between possible
70Lowe (2008, p. 24)
71See for example Ellis (2001)
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and impossible situations or scenarios in our everyday lives, it is the dispositional essences
which ground these possibilities. I will argue that we will have to settle for a relation of
supervenience here, and in addition that the main target for our endeavours should not
be to pick out which particular situations are possible, but rather to show under which
conditions something is possible. We are not directly explaining possibility, but giving the
grounds from which all the possibilities flow. This will also be the case for the account
of laws which follows from assuming dispositional essentialism. We might not be able to
explain every single non-fundamental law of nature directly, but we are explaining the
grounds from which the laws flow.
We see that there is a distinction between dispositional theories of modality which are
approaching the matter at hand from two different sides, so to speak. The first option is to
go through dispositions more broadly, as seen in for example (Vetter, 2015) and (Borghini
and Williams, 2008), and the second is to focus more specifically on the dispositionality
which is tied to certain essences, as seen in (Bird, 2007). Dispositional essentialism has
two features which are often considered problematic. Firstly, it is inextricably tied to a
particular view about the laws of nature, and secondly, it is closely tied to a conditional
understanding of dispositional essences. An additional goal of this thesis is to show that the
fact that the dispositional essentialist has to accept metaphysically necessary laws of nature
is not a problem, but rather something which makes the account more attractive. In order
to see this, we need to distinguish clearly between our expectations about possibility—that
the possible should somehow match what we are able to consistently conceive of—and what
possibility really is. This is the sole topic of chapter 7.
I will also defend the view that if we stick with dispositional essences as our main topic,
the conditional understanding of them does not pose insurmountable problems for the view.
In order to grasp this point, we should note that there are two main routes available when we
are to account for dispositions. One through the aforementioned counterfactual conditional,
and one more directly through possibility. The counterfactual conditional analysis entails
there is some kind of a stimulus-manifestation relation tied to dispositions, and that each
disposition will have particular stimulus conditions and particular manifestations. The
possibility approach centres around only the manifestation of the disposition, and this
view is perhaps most forcefully advocated by Vetter (2015).
I hold that the former, and more travelled, route through the counterfactual conditional
is to be preferred if we stick with dispositional essentialism as the starting point. However,
I will argue that the analysis of dispositional essences through counterfactual conditionals
is perhaps better seen as a picture to aid our understanding than a complete reductive
analysis. I contend that there is no reason to explain these dispositional essences away—
they are acceptable metaphysical entities in themselves—but we still need to understand
them. The picture is slightly different if one is arguing for an understanding of modality
in general starting from dispositions in themselves (not dispositional essences). The anal-
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ysis of mere dispositions in terms of counterfactual conditionals is clearly flawed in ways
which have problematic consequences at the level of non-fundamental metaphysics. This
is due to the fact that there is always room for interference between the stimulus and the
manifestation at non-fundamental levels. These features are commonly known as finks and
masks and I will return to these problems in chapter 2.
I maintain that dispositional accounts of possibility may be useful ways of gaining un-
derstanding about possibility, but I will also argue that this is not the case if these accounts
are made with assumptions which allow possibilities going beyond the laws of nature. My
suggestion in this regard will be that some of the problematic features these theories entail
stem from the combination of focusing solely on the manifestations of dispositions (that
is, a blatant disregard of the concept of a stimulus condition), as well as putting too much
weight on prephilosophical intuitions. As mentioned, I maintain that such theories, exem-
plified by publications like (Borghini and Williams, 2008) and (Vetter, 2015) are similar to
accounts of how we understand dispositional possibility because of their attention given to
the aforementioned extensional correctness:
We have certain firm convictions about what is or is not metaphysically possible
or necessary, and these had better come out mostly true on any metaphysical
account of modality.72
As mentioned, I tend to refer to this as catering to intuitions. It represents an overly
enthusiastic belief that our prephilosophical grasp of modality is more or less correct. This
might be the case regarding everyday modal beliefs, that is, our belief that the glass will
break when we drop it to the floor and similar things, but this cannot easily be transferred
to modal claims about, for example, the very big or the very small. It is very hard (if not
impossible) to find well grounded arguments for how and why we are supposed to have
proper intuitions about these domains.
Instead of accepting such a view, I will settle for an, at present, incomplete dispositional
essentialist account. Such a view entails that rather than explaining possibility at each level
where it occurs, we will have to see possibility as a case of supervenience, so that it arises
from fundamental dispositional essences in combination with the structural compositions
that underpins the configuration of macro-properties, macro-relations, and so on. This view
will depend on the laws of nature in order to explain possibility, and the laws in question
will have to be metaphysically necessary because they are grounded in essences—that which
could not have been different.
Dispositional essentialism is at its core a holistic view of the property structure at
the fundamental level. Thus, where the Humean views of fundamental properties can be
illustrated by referring to a mosaic floor—where the change of one single tile makes little
difference for the rest of the floor—dispositional essentialism is rather a web. If a thread is
72Vetter (2015, p. 15)
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removed from the web, it unravels. This is not the dispositionalism of everyday language,
e.g. ‘the glass was disposed to break because it was fragile’, but the hope is that it will
account for possibility in a more correct way nonetheless.73
1.4 Plan for the thesis
The thesis will proceed as follows. In chapter 2 I will clarify the topic of dispositional
essentialism (and the concept of powers), as a theory of properties which is an alterna-
tive to the more traditional categoricalism. Limiting the notion of powers to the level of
fundamental metaphysics, I argue that the assumption that powers exist may give us an
account of property identity and the laws of nature. In chapter 3 I discuss two examples
of dispositional theories of possibility. First Borghini and Williams’ dispositional theory,
and then Vetter’s account based on potentiality. I argue that dispositional theories of pos-
sibility cannot support a notion of possibility going beyond the nomic, even though some
of them claim to be able to accommodate such results. Hence, the laws of nature limit the
domain of the possible.
Chapters 4 through 6 will be centred around the topic of the laws of nature. Chapter
4 will outline those accounts of laws available for the categoricalist, and I mainly focus
on Lewis’s and David Armstrong’s versions. If we are to argue that the accounts of laws
implicit in dispositional essentialism are superior to those available to the categoricalist,
we need to know what we are up against. Chapter 5 discusses the different accounts of
laws open to the dispositional essentialist. There are mainly two options available: one
relying on the concept of a natural kind in addition to that of a power, and one stemming
directly from the fundamental powers themselves. I will advocate the latter view. Chapter 6
presents the most pressing problems the dispositional essentialist will have to solve in order
for the account of laws to be successful. These problems include how to deal with what I
will call global laws of nature, and fundamental constants. I propose that the fundamental
structure of the world is a web, not a mosaic, and that this holistic understanding of the
most fundamental properties in the world is helpful when we are to grasp the resistance to
nomic change I shall argue for.
Chapter 7 discusses what is generally seen as the biggest obstacle to accepting a dis-
positional essentialist account of the laws of nature. Dispositional essentialism entails that
the laws are metaphysically necessary, and that the domains of nomic and metaphysical
possibilities as such are coextensional. However, it is common to assume the laws to be
metaphysically contingent even if they are nomically necessary, hence dispositional essen-
tialism collides with our prephilosophical intuitions in this area. This chapter focuses on
the role intuition may be seen to have in our philosophical theories, as well as the differ-
73I will return to the question of supervenience in chapter 5, but note already that also the structural
composition also depends on the fundamental powers.
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ences between possibility and conceivability. I argue that even though the contingency of
the laws is conceivable, or imaginable, for us, this does not entail that this is also thereby
a genuine possibility.




This chapter is about properties, and about the properties of properties. If we are to use
dispositional properties in order to understand questions regarding modality, we should
know which properties are fit for the job, and which are not. In this chapter I will introduce
the account I defend in this dissertation, dispositional essentialism, and show the areas in
which this view will be useful, as well as drawing attention to its limitations. Dispositional
essentialism is not, I argue, an account which can give us the answers we crave in all areas
related to modality. Rather, its scope is more limited than what it is often assumed to be,
and we should be careful not to overestimate the usefulness of the account.
The chapter will proceed as follows. First, in section 2.2, I present some important dis-
tinctions regarding properties, and the properties of properties. Of special importance are
the distinction between sparse and abundant properties on the one hand, and the distinction
between quiddities—properties which are not essentially dispositional—and dispositional
essences, or powers on the other. In section 2.3, I turn to the discussion of dispositional
essentialism, a dispositional account focusing on the essences of fundamental properties.
Section 2.4 points out the crucial differences between fundamental and non-fundamental
metaphysics. Some dispositional explanations are, I argue, only suitable for addressing
issues in either fundamental metaphysics or non-fundamental metaphysics, but not both.
The question of where the concept of powers belong is the key question both in section
2.4 and in section 2.5, where the latter section asks whether powers, understood as sparse
properties with dispositional essences, can be seen as existing also outside the domain of
fundamental metaphysics.
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2.2 Properties
2.2.1 Dispositions and powers—abundant or sparse?
As specified in chapter 1, I am defending a view of modality which may be referred to
as a new actualist view, which entails removing the notion of a possible world from the
metaphysics of modality and replacing it with certain modal entities existing in the actual
world, in particular dispositional properties. However, different dispositionalist accounts
rely on different kinds of properties, so it is important to specify exactly which kinds
of properties we are speaking of when discussing these accounts. Because of this I will
commence by making some general remarks about properties, which will be of crucial
importance later on.
When we speak of properties, it is common to make a distinction between sparse prop-
erties and abundant properties.74 Abundant properties are such that for each predicate we
can think of (and quite possibly some we cannot even conceive of), there is some prop-
erty that corresponds to it. The abundant properties’ job is simply to provide semantic
values of meaningful predicates.75 Sparse properties, on the other hand, will be a subset
of the abundant ones, more strictly defined; we can say that these properties are the ones
which are needed in order to give a complete and correct scientific description of the world.
Sparse properties may also be referred to as natural properties. I will, at present, limit the
sparse properties to the realm of the fundamental properties, and return to the question
of non-fundamental sparse properties in section 2.5 of this chapter.
The distinction between different kinds of properties is relevant at this point for two
reasons. Firstly, it is relevant as a background for the different accounts based on dis-
positional terms, because the notion of properties invoked varies between accounts. For
example, both Andrea Borghini and Neil E. Williams’ article ‘A dispositional theory of
possibility’, and Vetter’s book ‘Potentiality: from dispositions to modality’ (which will be
thoroughly examined in chapter 3), both feature a liberal view regarding which properties
are the relevant ones. This is not the case for the account for which I will argue. Secondly,
the distinction between the sparse and the abundant properties is also crucial if we are
to explain the difference between dispositions and powers. Here I will follow Bird (2016),
and argue that there is an important difference between dispositions and powers, and that
treating these terms as interchangeable is a disadvantage for any dispositional theory, as
it clouds genuine and important differences between two different concepts.
Dispositions are commonly exemplified by things being fragile, soluble, and so on. These
are properties that in some sense point beyond themselves, or tend towards something, as
they have the ability to bring about some manifestation when they are met with appropriate
stimulus. Thus, the fragile glass is disposed to break if it is, for example, struck with
74Lewis (1983), Lewis (1986a)
75Schaffer (2004, p. 98)
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sufficient force. It is important to note that the disposition in question is present in the
properties of some object even if they are never manifested. If we have a set of six identical
glasses, where one of them breaks, the remaining fragile glasses that perhaps never break
are just as disposed to break as the fragile glass which actually happened to do so.
The term disposition is suitable for describing abundant properties, as the examples
show, but it is not reserved only for these properties. ‘Disposition’ is treated as a catchall
term in this thesis, and can refer to a very large group of different properties which may
be used to describe features of objects or of other properties. What we refer to as dis-
positional properties, broadly construed, will often be abundant properties, and they can
also be accidental properties. However, in some cases they will be sparse properties, and a
particularly interesting subset of the dispositional properties is what I will refer to as the
powers. These powers are sparse properties which are essentially dispositional, so in this
case we are using dispositional terms to describe the essences of properties. The way these
properties act, react, and interact is grounded in their dispositional essences. What they
can and must do are essential to them.
I will argue that the specific case when a sparse property has a dispositional essence
is the only instance where the powers term should be used. As my preliminary concept of
sparseness is restricted to the fundamental properties, this entails that the fundamental
properties in our world would act as they actually do no matter what. The concept of
essence invoked here is similar to the idea of a real essence in Locke’s An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding. It is what makes something what it is.76 This means that we may
go so far as to say that these properties are what they do. However, it is important to note
the following: “Even if properties are what they do, a propertied entity does not have to be
doing things at all times; it has merely to be capable of doing them.”77 In the essences of
these properties lies the capacity to interact with other properties which in turn also have
dispositional essences. As is generally considered to be the case, altering an essence will
make whatever possesses this essence, be it an object or a property, into something else
than what it actually is. Locke speaks of objects, but the concept translates to properties
as well. As the essence of the property is dispositional, it will necessarily have the same
dispositional role across possible worlds, or simply ‘no matter what’ if we are reluctant to
speak in terms of possible worlds.
Thus, we see that when we are moving from speaking about dispositions to speaking of
powers, we are, on the one hand, moving from speaking largely about objects and abundant
properties to speaking of fundamental properties. On the other hand, we are also moving
from a more general to a more specific term. This means that rather than focusing on the
fact that things may be disposed to do something (e.g. break when hit),we are talking
about fundamental properties with a particular kind of essence which is characterised in
76Locke (2004, p. 373f.)
77Bird (2007, p. vii)
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a dispositional way. This is in contrast with several dispositional accounts of possibility
which are largely focusing on objects. I will go into details regarding such accounts in
the following chapter. When discussing dispositional essentialism, however, it is all about
properties.
It is important to note that in my view we are not only describing different things when
we speak about powers or dispositions, but we are also, crucially, operating at different
levels of metaphysics depending on which notion is used. Most things described as dispo-
sitions (fragility, solubility), belong to the area of non-fundamental metaphysics, and are
not powers. A power, understood as a property with a dispositional essence, is a concept
that belongs in fundamental metaphysics, that is, metaphysics dealing with the most fun-
damental entities.78 Hence, there is a substantial difference in the ontological commitment
behind assuming there to be dispositions and assuming there to be powers existing:
[E]veryone thinks that things have dispositions. But it is highly contentious
whether anything has a power.79
We may say that these terms differ in degree of contentiousness such that arguing that
something may be characterised in a dispositional way is a very different statement to
assuming that powers really exist. Accepting the existence of dispositions is something
that most philosophers will do to some degree, although their understanding of what a
disposition is, and how it is best described will vary. This is not the case when it comes to
assuming the existence of powers. Powers are far more problematic, because holding that
there are actual powers existing entails a commitment to essentialism. In addition, powers
can do work which I argue dispositions are not fit to do, such as grounding the laws of
nature.80
The distinction between dispositions and powers, as described here, is not generally
agreed upon. There are substantial amounts of literature arguing that the notions of both
dispositions and powers are useful when we are to understand modalities, but there is no
consensus on exactly what each term refers to.81 This means that when navigating the
literature of this field it is of crucial importance to investigate exactly what is entailed by
the terminology that is used.82 Particularly problematic is the fact that several philosophers
do not notably distinguish dispositions from powers. Some even explicitly state that they
take dispositions and powers to be interchangeable terms. Because of this it is common to
see examples like ‘the glass has a power to break’ in some of the literature, something which
78Bird (2013) and Bird (2016). I return to this topic in section 2.4.
79Bird (2016, p. 341)
80The question regarding the relation between powers and the laws of nature will be explored in more
detail in chapter 5.
81See for example (Mumford, 2004), (Mumford and Anjum, 2011), (Vetter, 2011), (Vetter, 2015), (Ellis,
2001), (Bird, 2007), (Bird, 2013), (Bird, 2015), and (Bird, 2016)
82For a survey of this, see for example (Bird, 2016), where he argues that the powers terminology has
been stretched too far, and that the notion is often used in ways that is not warranted by the definition
he prefers.
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is unfortunate in my opinion as it creates confusion solely on the basis of terminology.83
To avoid this, I argue that we should acknowledge the difference between dispositions and
powers. In addition, we should note that it is not the case that accepting one of these
concepts as part of our ontology requires or entails accepting the other.84 It is possible to
argue for dispositional understandings of several concepts without arguing that there are
powers. It is also possible to argue for a powers based ontology without accepting any of
the more general dispositionalist theories on the market.
To sum up: dispositions, following Bird’s vocabulary, is a subset of all properties, and
this subset contains both abundant and sparse properties. This is in line with Vetter’s, and
Borghini and Williams’ liberal dispositionalist views. They do not discriminate between
different kinds of properties in their theories, and do not put particular weight on the
fundamental ones. Vetter does hold that if there are such things as fundamental properties,
then these will also be dispositional, as the dispositionality goes all the way down.85 A
power, understood as a property with a dispositional essence, is something different, and
more specific, than a disposition. Because the assumption that there are dispositions and
the assumption that there are powers are quite different assumptions to make, I hold that
specifying that there is, and should be, a distinction between these terms is fruitful.
2.2.1.1 A note on terminology
An important question I would like to address in this chapter is whether we can use the
existence of powers as fundamental metaphysical entities to explain modal features in non-
fundamental metaphysics, and in philosophy more generally. I will argue that, in most
cases, assuming the powers ontology to be able to do such work is not justified by the
theory, and that often it goes far beyond the function such a framework may have. As
a result, the importance of powers in non-fundamental metaphysics will have to be, for
example, in the form of supervenience. That is, the non-fundamental properties will be
understood as supervening on the powers. I will return to this issue in chapter 3, section
3.6.
In order to discuss such questions in a sensible and unambiguous way, however, I need
to first make some distinctions regarding the terminology I will use. This is of particular
importance, as some of the problems related to wrongful usage of the powers ontology are
due to issues connected with choice of terminology. However, one cannot blame it all on
such linguistic issues. I presented some issues related to terminology in chapter 1, but the
character of this field means that it does indeed seem justified to go into further detail
regarding this.
83See for example (Mumford and Anjum, 2011) for a very clear example of this use of the powers term.
We find these tendencies also in (Jacobs, 2010), and (Borghini and Williams, 2008).
84(Bird, 2013), (Bird, 2016), as well as Vetter’s discussion regarding the laws of nature in (Vetter, 2015)
support this claim.
85Vetter (2015, p. 25)
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Throughout this thesis, the word disposition will in general be used such that it de-
notes being disposed to do something in a wide sense. That is, it is a term that can be
used about all kinds of properties, both abundant and sparse, and we can also use a dis-
position based terminology to speak about objects. We may say that this object has that
disposition, and in that case we are speaking of how this object will behave, or is likely
to behave in certain circumstances. We might even extend the disposition term such that
it can include what Vetter calls potentialities, which includes things which fall outside our
ordinary understanding of dispositions, such as the potentiality that a robust bridge might
break. I will save the details of Vetter’s account for chapter 3, section 3.4, but for now
it suffices to say that potentialities are dispositional possibilities rooted in objects, which
include both instances like abilities, and things which seem weaker than dispositions, such
as potentials.86
However, such a wide understanding of dispositionality might just as well be included
in what we address as ‘dispositions’, rather than introducing new terminology to take care
of this interpretation. Including such things in my concept of dispositions does of course
entail shifting the term somewhat from its use in daily language. By doing this, we give
it a more technical meaning and a range that exceeds its common usage, but this needs
not be problematic in and of itself. For the purpose of this dissertation I will argue that
such a wide understanding of dispositions is defendable. This means that we can say, for
example, that a robust bridge is still disposed to collapse under certain circumstances. For
the remainder of this dissertation, I will use the potentiality term only when quoting Vetter
or directly referring to her work, otherwise I use disposition.
Powers, on the other hand, is usually seen as a more technical term but it is still often
used interchangeably with dispositions. I do not support this use. Here, the word power will
always be a technical term, and it will solely refer to a property with a dispositional essence,
such as charge, and nothing else. Following from this it makes little sense to say that a
macro-object has a power to do something. This is in line with (Bird, 2013) and (Bird,
2016), while (Bird, 2007), as mentioned in chapter 1, uses the word potency. Bird wished to
avoid both the powers term and the disposition term when writing ‘Nature’s Metaphysics’,
as the use of these notions often are confusing at best, but he has not kept this terminology
in his later works. Potency is a technical term for a property with a dispositional essence,
so it is interchangeable with his use of power in his subsequent articles. I will use the term
potency only when quoting directly from (Bird, 2007), otherwise I use power. In addition, we
should be careful not to confuse Bird’s potencies with Vetter’s potentialities. The similarity
of these notions is also a motivation for me to not use either of them.
86Vetter (2015, p.19)
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2.2.2 Quiddities or Dispositional Essences?
So far, we have seen how the terms ‘disposition’ and ‘power’ relate to different sets of
properties, and that the relevant subset of properties for applying the powers term is the
so-called sparse ones. However, in addition to highlighting the difference between abundant
and sparse properties, there is yet another distinction pertaining to how we understand
the natures of the sparse properties themselves which needs to be discussed. Should such
properties be understood as having dispositional essences, or should they be seen as quid-
dities?
The distinction between properties seen as quiddities and properties seen as having
dispositional essences is important because we may distinguish between different meta-
physical theories depending on how they view fundamental properties. I follow Bird (2007)
in introducing three categories. These categories refer to views regarding the modal status




An understanding of sparse, fundamental properties solely as quiddities will be an
example of categorical monism.88 Seeing all sparse, fundamental properties as having dis-
positional essences is an example of dispositional monism, and this is the view I find most
plausible. Arguing that the set of all sparse, fundamental properties contains a mix of
quiddities and essentially dispositional properties, entails holding the mixed view.89
It is important that we do not make the mistake of defining quiddities as being utterly
non-dispositional. It is undeniable that properties with a dispositional character exist in
the world, exemplified by the standard instances of things being fragile, soluble, or elas-
tic, but also in those cases where we are dealing with sparse properties, such as charge.
Categoricalists do not deny the existence of such properties. The key point is rather a
case of holding that a certain property has an actual dispositional character, while at the
same time denying that this has anything to do with the essential characteristics of this
property—thus one can argue that the same property could exist in another possible world
without having this dispositional characteristic. In this case, the property is understood
as a quiddity, and when I classify philosophers as being categoricalists about properties in
what follows, this is the main tenet of their view which is of relevance.
A property is seen as having a brute identity according to categorical monism; it is self-
identical, but its essence does not contain much more than this. The dispositional character
87I have chosen to keep the vocabulary from (Bird, 2007) here, but dispositional monism can also be
referred to as powers monism, as it is in (Bird, 2016).
88See Lewis (1986a), Armstrong (1983)
89See Ellis (2001), McKitrick (2018)
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of a property is not essential to it, and thus the properties are only contingently tied to the
theoretical roles they play. These theoretical roles include such things as the roles they play
in actual laws of nature. The point is that these kinds of dispositional characteristics are in
no way essential to the properties if we see the properties as quiddities. This understanding
entails that properties have no essential modal character, and the nomic features of the
property are seen as contingent. Thus, properties may swap roles with each other in the
nomic structure of different possible worlds.90
We can, for example, picture a world which is isomorphic to ours, but where every
fundamental property and relation is replaced with alien properties and relations. This is
a world which would appear to be exactly like ours, but which according to the quidditist
should still be seen as a world distinct to ours. The result is what Robert Black refers to
as distinctions without differences.91 A common concrete example of such a situation, is
to imagine that there is a possible world where mass and charge has completely swapped
properties with each other. The quidditist will argue that the resulting world is distinct
from the actual world. This option is open for the quidditist because of the primitive
transworld identity invoked for properties. However, the alleged difference between the
two possible worlds is mysterious indeed, and for a dispositional essentialist such examples
makes very little sense. Swapping the nomic roles of mass and charge makes no difference
to the world—the only change would be calling mass ‘charge’, and vice versa.
Seeing the fundamental properties as quiddities and hence as being categorical is basi-
cally a Humean understanding of properties, and it excludes modality from the superve-
nience base. In Hume’s own words:
[T]here is nothing in any object, consider’d in itself, which can afford us a
reason for drawing a conclusion beyond it92
Such a view of properties will generally go hand in hand with the idea of laws of nature
as contingent.93 In addition, these theories are most often combined with a possible worlds
framework in order to explain modality. As mentioned in chapter 1, the Humeans, if they
are to find modality at all, are in some sense forced to look outside our actual world. This
entails that the metaphysics of modality will, for the Humean, be equal to the metaphysics
of possible worlds.94
It is an interesting fact that these quiddities are required for the Humean supervenience
base, even though it seems like this is at odds with present day science. This is peculiar
because some of the motivation for assuming that properties are quiddities is that this
idea is assumed to be closer to science than other theories.95 This is challenged by, for
90Cowling (2016, Section 7.1), Armstrong (1989, 59f)
91(Black, 2000, p. 94). Black is generally using quality where I use property.
92Hume (2007, Book I, Part III, Section XII)
93I will return to the question of accounts of laws of nature compatible with Humeanism in chapter 4.
94Vetter (2015, p. 7)
95See for example Lewis (1986b).
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example, Simon Blackburn, claiming that science “finds only dispositional properties all
the way down”.96 Blackburn argues that the best physical understanding of the world does
not give us any idea of what categorical properties, or quiddities, might be. They play no
role in the scientific understanding of the world, and that they do not ground anything.97
Without the closeness to science as motivation it is hard to see why Humean supervenience
should be accepted at all. In addition, if we reject Humeanism it is equally hard to see why
we would want, or even allow, possible worlds as an important part of the metaphysics of
modality.98
As opposed to this, I argue that certain sparse properties are essentially dispositional,
that is, I argue for a form of dispositional monism, or pandispositionalism, for fundamental
properties. According to this view, sparse fundamental properties will necessarily have the
same dispositions and thus have the same theoretical role in all possible worlds, so to
speak. We can view this as the identity criterion for these properties, rather than resorting
to the brute identity conditions of the quiddities. Dispositional essentialism guarantees
transworld identity of fundamental properties, without resorting to a notion of primitive
identity. A further crucial point is that these essential features of the properties also entail
that we cannot have a case of fundamental properties being related otherwise than what
they actually are, as these relations are part of the essence of the property. This is the key
assumption behind dispositional essentialism. Let us now go into the details of this view.
2.3 Dispositional Essentialism
2.3.1 Essences of fundamental properties
The variety of dispositional essentialism I defend in this thesis originates in a view first
articulated in (Ellis and Lierse, 1994). However, the most complete versions of the view are
found in (Ellis, 2001) and (Bird, 2007).99 As already mentioned, dispositional essentialism is
a view of the nature of properties. It is not primarily concerned with objects, and as such it
differs from several other dispositional accounts, some of which will be discussed in chapter
3. In addition, dispositional essentialism is a theory which clearly distinguishes between
different kinds of properties, where the relevant ones are the fundamental natural, or sparse,
properties. We assume these properties to be universals, and hold that such properties have
essences, or particular natures which are dispositional, and which determine the identity
of the property.
96Blackburn (1990, p. 63)
97Blackburn (1990, p. 65). Arguments against a Humean understanding of properties is also found,
more recently, in for example (Maudlin, 2007), and (Karakostas, 2009).
98(Vetter, 2015, p. 10)
99Traces of the account is also found in (Shoemaker, 1980), (Swoyer, 1982), and (Bigelow et al., 1992).
Important later sources are also (Ellis, 2002), (Ellis, 2009), (Bird, 2013), and (Bird, 2016).
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As already mentioned, the identities of dispositional essences are not simply primi-
tive, as the identities of quiddities are, and they are also not purely a matter of intrinsic
character. The essences, being dispositional in character, are determined not only by their
intrinsic character, but also by their relations to other properties (which also have dispo-
sitional essences):
If properties have a dispositional essence then certain relations will hold of
necessity between the relevant universals; these relations we may identify with
the laws of nature. The necessity here is metaphysical.100
This entails that the necessary features of a world also depends on the relationships
between properties, not only the intrinsic essences of the properties themselves. The essences
we address when speaking of properties includes relations between fundamental properties
which will hold necessarily.101 The world is thus, at the fundamental level, an interwoven
web of necessary relations.102 These relations are what we know as the laws of nature—laws
simply reflect the essences of the properties. Because of this, the dispositional essentialist
is committed to seeing the laws of nature as necessary, a feature which I will consistently
present as an attractive feature of the account, and not a ‘bug’. In addition, there is no
need to posit any primitive transworld identity for such properties. Transworld identity,
and intra-world identity, for that matter, is secured by the identity of the dispositional
character, given that these dispositions are presumed to be essences.
2.3.2 Are all fundamental properties dispositional?
Arguing for dispositional essentialism entails arguing that at least some sparse, fundamental
properties are powers. This naturally leads to the question whether all properties at this
level are powers, and here we find a striking difference of views among proponents of
dispositional essences. We remember that, at the fundamental level, Ellis holds the mixed
view, while Bird is a dispositional monist, the difference being that the dispositional monist
holds that all fundamental properties are dispositional, while the advocate of the mixed
view will hold that some properties are not essentially dispositional (that is, some are
categorical). While this is in general presented as a distinction with consequences for the
fundamental level, Ellis’s mixed view stretches beyond this, because he holds that there
are dispositional essences at other levels of metaphysics too, for example essences tied to
the natural kinds of chemistry. Hence, this dispute does not only reflect what goes on at
100Bird (2007, p. 43). I will return to what I take laws of nature to be more generally in chapter 4. For
now it is important to bear in mind that the concept of law debated in this thesis is a philosophical one,
and will as such not be exactly the same as a scientific law. Thus, when I am speaking of the laws of nature
I am not limited to speaking of the current laws of science, that is, the terms law of nature and scientific
law are not coextensive, although they are, I argue, overlapping.
101Bird (2007, p. 139)
102I return to this particular understanding of the relationship between the properties at the fundamental
level in chapter 6, section 6.3.3.
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the fundamental level. I do, however, argue that powers are entities which belong at the
fundamental level.
When it comes to the question of whether all fundamental properties are dispositional,
the problematic properties are generally held to be the structural ones, i.e. properties that
are required to account for the structure of things, and relations which are structural in
character (geometrical shapes, or distance/displacement for example). If we cannot explain
how such properties may be accounted for in dispositional terms, this is a problem for the
dispositional monist, not for the dispositional essentialist as such, because one can perfectly
well hold the mixed view, as Ellis does.103
If spatial and temporal properties and relations are fundamental properties and re-
lations, then the dispositional monist must provide reasons for thinking that they have
dispositional essences even though it does not seem like they do.104 In order to argue that
this is the case, Bird makes reference to contemporary physics, which seems to hold that
theories should be background-free. This entails that the structures in such theories (and
hence the structural properties we worry about, such as displacement) are no longer seen
as a background, a stage where happenings unfold, but rather as something which may
be recipients of effects, and also causes of effects. The requirement of background-freedom
gives us an opportunity to formulate an account of spatial and temporal properties where
also these kinds of fundamental properties have dispositional essences. I side with Bird in
this question, that is, I support a version of dispositional monism. However, I also hold
that this might not be the most important question for me to answer at this point. We
can get a long way by stating that at least some fundamental properties have dispositional
essences, and concentrate on the consequences this starting point has. This is what I intend
to do. Hence, I leave the question whether all fundamental properties are powers open, even
thought I hold that it is likely that this is the case.105
2.3.3 The Conditional Analysis
As briefly mentioned in chapter 1, there are in general two ways of understanding or
explicating dispositions. We will either connect them with possibility, or we will see them
as related to the counterfactual, or subjunctive, conditional. Both Borghini and Williams,
and Vetter are examples of the former, while the latter is the more canonical approach.
If we are to understand dispositional essentialism, however, we need to take a closer look
at the conditional analysis, and some of the problems with which this analysis is faced.
This is so because dispositional essentialism is inextricably connected with the conditional
analysis.
103See for example (Ellis, 2001, p. 111)
104We should note that questions of geometrical shape are not counterexamples, as such properties are
not fundamental ones, but can be further reduced.
105While the discussion regarding structural properties is slightly off topic for my dissertation, (Bird,
2007, Chapter 7) discusses it in great detail.
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In (Bird, 2007, p. 24) the conditional analysis of dispositions is presented as follows
(where DS,Mx means that x is disposed to manifest M in response to stimulus S, and
is the counterfactual conditional):
Conditional Analysis (CA): DS,Mx ↔ SxMx
There are several formulations in the literature, Lewis presents it as:
Something x is disposed at time t to give response r to stimulus s iff, if x were
to undergo stimulus s at time t, x would give response r.106
Thus, we see how the dispositional essences are defined in terms of conditional state-
ments. If we agree that at least some, and perhaps all, sparse fundamental properties are
essentially dispositional, and that these properties have real essences which includes a dis-
position to some particular manifestation M in light of some particular stimulus S, then
this may be expressed conditionally. If an object possesses some property, and this property
has the power P, then no matter what, the property (and hence the object) in question is
disposed to yield M in response to S. This is formulated as
2(Px → D(S,M)x)
At the same time, if we were referring to a simple conditional analysis of mere disposi-
tions at this point, rather than dispositional essences, we might as well note straight away
that the consensus is that this analysis is, as Lewis puts it, “Simple indeed—but false”.107
This is due to well-known problems, including several acknowledged counterexamples.108
Since these problems are so prominent in the literature, my presentation of these issues
will be brief. An important point to note is that Bird proceeds to argue that these coun-
terexamples may not be as damaging as they seem for the dispositional essentialist. To the
contrary, Bird (2007) argues that they have an important role to play when it comes to
explaining the relationship between the dispositional essences and the laws of nature. I’ll
argue Bird is in general right, that is, the counterexamples need not be damaging for the
dispositional essentialist. However, his additional point about how these counterexamples
have important roles to play for the explication of the laws of nature fails. The reasons for
this failure lie in the relationship between fundamental and non-fundamental metaphysics,
so I save the details for section 2.4.3.
Following this, the main points I want to address in the current section are that, in
spite of the fact that the conditional analysis indeed has its problems, these problems are
mainly a concern for non-fundamental metaphysics. They are, I argue, in no way damaging
for the powers ontology, such that dispositional essences might still be explained by way
of conditionals.
106Lewis (1997, p. 143)
107Lewis (1997, p. 143)
108The criticism starts with (Martin, 1994), and his notion of a finkish disposition, but there are several
other examples, see e.g. (Lewis, 1997), (Bird, 1998) and (Bird, 2007), and (Vetter, 2015)
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There is also another way of looking at the conditional analysis of dispositional essences
which I am sympathetic towards. According to Ellis, we may, in a sense, turn the account
up-side-down, and subsequently argue that the analysis of dispositional properties as essen-
tial natures may explain why it is the case that dispositions have such a special relationship
with the counterfactual conditional:
Dispositional properties support subjunctives because their existence entails
that certain kinds of natural processes would occur in certain kinds of (pos-
sibly idealized) circumstances to the objects that have these properties. The
subjunctive conditional simply spell out these implications.109
Hence, what we are speaking of here is not so much a definition of dispositional prop-
erties as it is is a criterion for identification. That is, not something which gives their
precise identity, but something which describes important features of them nonetheless.
This point may be a useful idea to keep in mind when speaking of the conditional analysis
of dispositional essences too. Perhaps it is not so much a clear definition as it is a way of
recognising the behaviour of a particular subset of properties. Following this, the important
point is not how we choose to formulate the content of a disposition, but rather how it
really works. In light of this it seems that the conditional analysis, rather than defining
what the different dispositions or powers may be, are providing a useful approximation of
the dispositional content in question. These approximations will be more or less accurate,
depending on our knowledge about the subject in hand. I do, however, assume that in ideal
circumstances specifying some counterfactual conditional corresponding with the disposi-
tional essence in question would be possible, and that the specification that there is a need
for both a stimulus condition and a manifestation is absolutely crucial. I will return to this
discussion in chapter 3, section 3.5.
2.3.3.1 Finks and Masks
The counterexamples to the conditional analysis of dispositions are generally referred to as
finks and masks.110 The finkish dispositions, as presented in (Martin, 1994) are dependent
on the fact that the manifestation of a disposition usually takes some amount of time to
come about. The finks need this time gap in order to work, because a finkish disposition is a
disposition that is lost after the stimulus condition has occurred, but before the manifesta-
tion has taken place. Thus, the manifestation of the disposition does not come about even
though the object had the disposition, and the stimulus condition occurred. This entails
that one of the claims of the biconditional is false while the other is true. This is obviously
problematic for the analysis.
109Ellis (2002, p. 79) Note that Ellis’s vocabulary is different from mine, and so is his ontology, so I will
be restricting the relevance of this quote to the dispositional essences at the fundamental level, although
he would argue that this is relevant at certain non-fundamental levels as well.
110Masks are sometimes referred to as antidotes, see e.g. (Bird, 1998). I will generally use masks.
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If we stick to the level of everyday, non-fundamental, examples, an instance of a finkish
disposition can be the familiar disposition of fragility in a glass object, where the object is
subjected to rapid heating or cooling. A cool glass has the disposition of being fragile, but
in this case striking it leads to the glass heating up substantially, such that the disposition
disappears, and the glass is not broken or shattered even though it had the disposition and
was subjected to the correct stimuli. In the same way, objects may gain dispositions. A
piece of heated glass is not disposed to break, but cools rapidly upon being struck, gains the
disposition and breaks nonetheless. Lewis (1997) presents a reformed conditional analysis
as a response to these problems, but as this reformed analysis does nothing to repair the
problems of masking, which we shall turn to now, I propose that we stick to the simple
conditional analysis—for simplicity.111
While the disposition in the finkish case would vanish if put to the test, the disposition
remains throughout when we are speaking of dispositions being masked. The time gap
that allows for the finks to come about is irrelevant for the cases of masking. In the case of
masking, the causal chain leading to the manifestation of the disposition is interrupted. A
simple example is that of poisoning, where one, if poisoned, can inject some form of antidote
to the poison, and as such prevent the manifestation of the poisoning from coming about.
The poison’s disposition to kill or harm is left unchanged, but is interfered with by the
medication.
These problems may be seen as being so damaging that the conditional analysis of
dispositions must be abandoned. An example of this approach is found in Vetter (2015).
She presents a substantial critique of the conditional analysis in far greater detail than
what I have presented here, and proceeds to go beyond these simple complaints focusing
on finks and masks. Her discontent with the conditional analysis is so great that it actually
makes it impossible for her to accept a connection between her theory of possibilities and
a dispositional essentialist view of properties and laws. This is something I will return to
in chapter 3. For now, I will turn to how, if at all, these issues affect the understanding of
powers.
2.3.3.2 A connection with ceteris paribus laws?
We remember that the conditional analysis is seen by Bird as the following necessary
equivalence:
2(D(S,M)x ↔ SxMx).
The essences of the fundamental properties in question are such that they include dis-
positions to give some particular manifestation M in response to stimulus S, as articulated
111Lewis’s reformed conditional analysis is formulated as follows. Something x is disposed at time t to
give response r to stimulus s iff, for some intrinsic property B that x has at t, for some time t’ after t, if x
were to undergo stimulus s at time t, and retain property B until t’, s and x’s having of B would jointly
be an x-complete cause of x’s giving response r. “An unlovely mouthful” as he himself points out.(Lewis,
1997, p. 157)
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earlier. Because of this, it is the case that in all possible worlds any property with the
dispositional essence in question is disposed to yield M in response to S. Hence, we have
the necessary counterfactual conditional
2(Px → D(S,M)x)112
From these two together we can derive the following universal generalisation:
∀x((Px ∧ Sx) → Mx)
This universal generalisation is basically referring to the strict laws of nature; those for
which there are no exceptions. Yet we know that this cannot be the whole story, as the
conditional analysis is known to be false because dispositions may be finkish, or they may
be masked. This means that both finks and masks needs to be taken into account. Including
these features entails that the universal generalisation would look like this: ∀x((Px ∧ Sx∧
finks and antidotes to D are absent) → Mx). This version is such that it admits exceptions,
that is, it can be interpreted as reflecting what we normally refer to as ceteris paribus laws,
that is, laws which do not hold under certain circumstance, but which only hold ‘other
things being equal’. Finks and masks can in such cases explain the circumstances where
these laws do not hold. Thus, dispositional essentialism explains both strict and ceteris
paribus laws, Bird suggests. This connection with ceteris paribus laws is supposed to make
the problems created by the existence of finks and masks appear less damaging. But can
such a connection really be found?
First, we should look at whether or not the problems represented by finks and masks
are troublesome also at the fundamental level. This can be done by asking whether ceteris
paribus laws are a macro phenomenon, or whether this is something which may also occur
when we are dealing with the most fundamental laws of nature. In the standard cases of
finkish dispositions, Bird reminds us, the causal basis for a disposition is removed before
it can complete its causal work. However, for the fundamental dispositions there is no
such distinct basis, as we are already operating on the fundamental level.113 In addition,
as previously mentioned, the finks need time in order to work, so the manifestation of a
fundamental disposition must in that case not be instantaneous if it is to be finkish. Bird
argues that the manifestations for fundamental dispositions either are instantaneous or
that they occur at the next possible time (given that time is discrete), in both of these
cases there is no intervening moment where the fink can occur.114 The conclusion is that
there are no finkish fundamental powers.
112Bird (2007, p. 45)
113A conceivable problem at this point is that this will not work in a world which is infinitely complex,
because in an infinite descent there are no fundamental properties. This is discussed in, for example,
(Schaffer, 2004, p.99). I am aware of this, but assume fundamentality in this thesis. That is, that there
is a level where there is no further structure we can appeal to in order to explain the behaviour of the
properties.
114Bird (2007, p. 61f.)
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When it comes to the concept of masks at the fundamental level, the conclusion seems
to be that figuring out whether or not there are masks at this level is a task for fundamental
science, not philosophy, but it is at least plausible to assume both the finks and masks to
be a macro-level phenomenon.115 If this is the case then ceteris paribus laws are also a
macro-level phenomenon. A consequence of this would be that the conditional analysis
is not problematic at the fundamental level. Bird suggest that it would, in addition, be
outright helpful at the non-fundamental level, because of its connection with the ceteris
paribus laws.116 This sounds promising, but, as mentioned earlier, saying that finks and
masks are macro-level phenomena giving us the ceteris paribus laws at this level does not
quite work. In fact it is outright problematic. In order to see how and why this is the case,
we need some additional machinery. Because of this, I will return to this question after
establishing where the powers ontology belongs in a landscape that we might divide into
two separate domains: fundamental and non-fundamental metaphysics.
2.4 Fundamental versus non-fundamental metaphysics
2.4.1 Identity, laws, and modal fixity
By now it should be clear that when we are speaking of properties, we are speaking of
different things when discussing dispositions as opposed to powers. Our general conception
of dispositions does not entail that these entities are powers. Dispositions, in my framework,
can be all sorts of properties, including both abundant and accidental properties, whereas
powers, by definition, are sparse and essentially dispositional. In addition, when we are
speaking of powers we are operating at the level of fundamental metaphysics, and powers
cannot do much work outside this quite narrow area, except as a supervenience base. I will
return to this topic towards the end of chapter 3, but for now it suffices to say that powers
will not be able to directly generate explanations of phenomena at non-fundamental levels.
I support what may be labelled as a necessitarian conception of powers, that is, one
which holds that a power is a sparse property which has a dispositional essence, and that
the identity of the property is given by this dispositional character.117 What I aim to provide
in this section are plausible reasons to assume that powers are a key part of our general
metaphysical framework, and show the consequences such an assumption will have for
related issues in the metaphysics of modality. This means that the arguments aim to show
us what we gain by introducing these entities in our ontology, but they give no conclusive
answers to whether or not powers exist.
115This is in line with (Bird, 2007, p. 63) stating that “the direction of the development of physics with
ever fewer fundamental properties and corresponding forces indicates that the prospects for antidote-free
fundamental properties and thus strict laws only at the fundamental level are promising.” Bird prefers
‘antidote’ instead of ‘mask’.
116Bird (2007, p. 59ff.)
117Similar to (Bird, 2016).
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It should also be made clear from the start that not everyone agrees with this sharp
distinction between dispositions and powers, nor with this definition of powers. Some ar-
gue that powers may in fact give explanations of a very wide spectrum of philosophical
conundrums, like causation, free will, and even morality.118 The most common area to as-
sume the usefulness of powers seems to be that of causation. Causation initially appears to
be very closely connected with questions of fundamental metaphysics, but the properties
discussed when debating causality are most often non-fundamental ones. Hence, I argue
that powers have no relevance in such debates.
The problem with the excitement tied to the assumed usefulness of a powers ontology is
that many such assumptions are wrong. The reason for this is that the proponents of certain
powers-based ontologies expect these ontologies to offer not only explanations regarding
fundamental properties, but also explanations of what certain non-fundamental properties
are, or, in the most extreme cases, what all properties are. This is problematic because we
do not, at present, have arguments justifying this use of the powers ontology. Opposing
this, I will use this part of the chapter to argue that powers can do the following:
1. They can explain what the fundamental properties are, that is, they give a good
account of property identity at the fundamental level, and
2. They can explain what the fundamental laws of nature are.119
Bird (2018) suggests a third possible use of powers, which is more speculative, but very
interesting.
3. Powers may be able to give us an account of possibility and necessity. That is,
they may give us an account of modality in general: “If powers are ontologically
fundamental, then this fact about dispositions may be used to ground facts about
what is possible.”120
If this is the case, powers may be all we need in order to explain modality. I will mainly
focus on the two first points now, and return to the third, more speculative, point in the
next chapter.
Firstly, we should recognise that the reasons for assuming powers at the fundamental
level are particularly related to the modal fixity of these powers. It is because of this feature
we are able to say that a powers-based view of properties will tell us what it is to be a
particular property. And it is because of this same feature that powers give us such a
compelling account of the laws of nature. If we recall the discussion regarding quidditism,
and the example of properties swapping places with each other in the structure of the
world, the powers theorist will hold that two fundamental properties are in fact the very
118See for example (Groff and Greco, 2013) for several examples of this.
119Bird (2016, p. 379)
120Bird (2018, p. 250)
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same property if they share dispositional character. The modal fixity of the powers makes
this the case.
Secondly, for the powers ontology to be useful beyond the fundamental level of meta-
physics, we would have to argue either that fundamental powers directly explain macro
phenomena, or that many or all macro properties are powers too, and that these macro
powers are playing an important role in explaining the given phenomena.121 This does
not, initially, seem too far fetched. If the fundamental powers can explain both property
identity and the fundamental laws of nature, would it not be natural to assume that there
exists macro powers which can explain macro phenomena in much the same way? An ex-
ample of this can actually be found inside the dispositional essentialist camp with Ellis’s
explanation of higher-level laws, such as the laws of chemistry. I will return to this in my
discussion of laws in chapter 5.
If we look at the two most compelling arguments for assuming powers to be existing at
the fundamental level, we can make this situation a little more clear. Let us, first, assume
that we take fundamental powers to be existing because they provide a favourable account
of property identity as compared with the alternative, which is to view them as quiddities.
Would it not entail that we should aim for the same result at the non-fundamental level
as well? That is, we argue that there are non-fundamental powers in order to avoid having
to see these properties as quiddities. This might seem like the rational choice to make, and
it probably would have been so if there were exactly two possible answers to the question
of what a property can be like at the non-fundamental level. If our choices were indeed
limited to seeing these properties either as powers or as quiddities, we would probably
want to categorise them as powers. But even though these are the two alternatives which
are available for us at the fundamental level, there is at least one third option available at
the non-fundamental level. For these properties, we can look at the manner in which they
supervene on the fundamental properties.
If one property is compounded out of other properties, then the identity of the
property may be given by the nature of that composition.122
That is, the essences of composite properties are not dispositional, but rather something
which reflects their composition or structure. This determines both what they are made of
as well as how the parts are structured.
We can present a similar argument if we, alternatively, assume powers to be existing
because this provides a good explanation of the fundamental laws of nature. Does it not,
in that case, seem natural to also assume there to be non-fundamental powers which can
account for the non-fundamental laws in much the same way? It might seem that way,
but we need not do so. These non-fundamental laws of nature, such as the laws we find in
121Bird (2016, p. 342)
122Bird (2018, p. 251)
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chemistry, already supervene on the fundamental laws of nature. Hence, the powers existing
at the fundamental level already explain the fact we hoped the macro-powers would explain.
From these two cases we see that macro-powers are redundant as explanations of property
identity and laws of nature.
In addition, I will argue that assuming powers alone may be used to account for other
macro phenomena, such as causation, are examples of illegitimate extensions of the pow-
ers ontology. Hence I agree with Bird when he claims that moving from fundamental to
non-fundamental metaphysics in this way is to overextend the powers ontology.123 The
arguments for powers existing at the fundamental level cannot be used to support the the-
sis that macro phenomena should be explained by macro powers, because the arguments
do not establish the existence of macro powers, as we shall see in the following section.
Arguing that powers are useful and might do important work at a fundamental level does
not directly imply that one should, or even can, argue that powers may do the same kind
of work at a non-fundamental level; we are neither committed to, nor entitled to do this.
Let us look at some examples of what such an overextension can amount to. One
instance of stretching the powers ontology too far is seen when arguing for something like
pandispositionalism, which states that absolutely all properties are either powers or clusters
of powers. We find this in e.g. (Mumford and Anjum, 2011), presented as follows.
If we take properties just to be causal powers, then we have a more parsimonious
ontology than that in which there are properties as well as the powers they
bestow. (...) All properties are clusters of causal powers, not just the overtly
powerful ones such as being explosive or corrosive.124
A less extreme example, which is nonetheless overextending the powers ontology, is a
form of the mixed view, where the main claim is that there will be both powers and non-
powers at all levels of fundamentality. All properties will not be considered to be powers
on this view, but the powers will exist on all levels of our ontology. Ellis (2002, p. 123ff.)
holds this view, and argues for a wide use of the powers ontology, for example in fields like
philosophy of mind, where the power of agency is discussed.125
Thinking that powers may have a use in such fields, or thinking that a powers ontology
is fitting for all properties is overly optimistic on behalf of the theory. Rather than support-
ing any of these accounts, I am committed to a more restricted view—more specifically
a restricted form of dispositional monism—where it is maintained that all fundamental
properties are powers, while it is quite possible the case that none of the non-fundamental
properties are.126 These three views—pandispositionalism, unrestricted mixed view, and
a restricted dispositional monism—are the options we are faced with if we believe that
123Bird (2013), Bird (2016)
124Mumford and Anjum (2011, p. 3)
125The power of agency is also the topic of his (Ellis, 2013).
126This is referred to as Restricted Powers Monism in (Bird, 2016, p. 354)
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there are powers at the fundamental level. Either all properties are powers on all levels,
or there are both powers and non-powers on all levels, or the powers are restricted to the
fundamental level only.127
2.4.2 Three arguments and three questions
In this section I will look at some further assumptions which can be made regarding the
existence of powers at non-fundamental levels. There are three common arguments for
powers extending beyond the realm of the fundamental found in the literature.
1. Properties that supervene on powers will also be powers.
2. The existence of macro dispositions entails that there are also macro powers.
3. The distinctive features of powers—direction, intensity, and the ability to exist
unmanifested—explain important macro phenomena, and, following this we should
assume that the relevant macro properties are powers.128
Corresponding to these claims are three questions we need to answer at this point.
1. Are compounds of powers also powers?
2. Are all dispositions powers as well, that is, are the terms co-extensive?
3. Can the existence of successful dispositional accounts of non-fundamental phenomena
be used as arguments for the existence of powers?
The short answer to all three questions is simply no. Let us investigate why this is the
case.
We start with the first question, and assume that we already agree that there are powers
at the fundamental level. If you believe that all the facts about a world supervene on the
instantiation of the fundamental properties and relations, should not also the compounds
of powers themselves be powers? This does not initially seem like a particularly implausi-
ble claim to make, and we do find arguments in the literature claiming that dispositions
actually do combine to form ‘bigger’ dispositions.129 However, even simple compounds of
dispositions are not themselves necessarily dispositions.130 This is in line with arguing, as
I will proceed to do, that properties at a non-fundamental level, for instance the proper-
ties of chemistry, do not in general have dispositional essences. It seems clear that certain
127The fundamental level of metaphysics is the level where there is no further structure to appeal to. To
explain the behaviour of properties at this level, we either need to appeal to external laws of nature, or,
as I do, to powers.
128Bird (2018, p. 252)
129Mumford and Anjum (2011, p. 175). Remember that Mumford and Anjum explicitly state that
‘dispositions’ and ‘powers’ refer to the same things.
130Bird (2016, p. 358f.)
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combinations of powers will result in properties with structural rather than dispositional
essences. A particular molecule, for example, will definitively have dispositional properties
which entails that they will react in certain ways when interacting with other molecules
for example, but the important question is not whether it has such properties, but whether
such properties are representing its essence. It seems more sensible to say that the structure
of a molecule is its essence, and that the property of being that molecule is supervening on
its building blocks, and the way they are related to each other. The dispositional charac-
teristics of these composite entities will depend on their structure, and on the dispositional
essences of the parts of that structure. This is not the same as saying there are no emergent
properties, but these emergent properties will not be essentially dispositional. An essence
of a compound property, even if it is made up of powers is not itself necessarily a power.
On the fundamental level we do not have such a structure to appeal to
When it comes to the second question—whether ‘dispositions’ and ‘powers’ refer to the
same set of entities—we have to note that equating dispositions with powers is a common
thing to do, and if this was only a question of terminology the problem would perhaps
not be so significant.131 This means that I have partly answered this question already,
when discussing the terminology used. However, there is more going on here than simply
a confusion of words.
If the problem really was confined to linguistic details, or simply the choice of words,
the dispute could be solved by particular attentiveness regarding our choice of vocabulary.
Perhaps even changing some of the terminology would help, such as using another word
for what has been defined as powers in this dissertation, since this term may be accused
of causing confusion because of its many different uses. However, simply doing this would
probably not solve the problem. The issue at stake here is that when the term power is
used in the way I have done, it is not possible that this is the same as a disposition, but
these distinctions are still conflated in parts of the literature. Hence, if we see powers
as denoting sparse properties that are essentially dispositional, and we proceed to argue
that such powers are relevant for the explanation of, for example, causality, we will get
unfortunate results.
This may happen if we, for example, argue that the disposition of fragility is the same
as the power of fragility, and that this power is causally involved in the breaking of the
fragile glass. In this case, the fact that the object is disposed to break leads us to conclude
that it has the disposition of fragility, and from this we conclude that it has the power to
break. But stating that fragility is a power is a highly contentious claim. By doing this we
are not only asserting that powers exist (remember that this claim is slightly contentious
131(Zagzebski, 2013) may be used as an example of usage of powers terminology which is clearly not
intended to or committed to seeing human powers as modally fixed properties, and which is thus an entirely
legitimate use of the expression. In such cases we see that the concept which is referred to as a power is
something quite different than the meaning of powers I advocate. For Zagzebski, the powers are more like
what I call dispositions, and dispositional theories of things like epistemology might well be enlightening.
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in itself), but we are actually claiming that there are non-fundamental powers; that is,
non-fundamental sparse dispositional properties which are modally fixed, which is an even
more contentious claim. If we are equating dispositions with powers in this way, the word
is used in a very loaded sense, and the question we have to ask is whether the property of
fragility can live up to this description. For fragility to be a power, it would have to be a
sparse property—a property needed to give a complete and correct scientific description of
the world. How could we possibly defend placing fragility in such a position?
It is more likely that in such cases we are not speaking of powers—in the sense of a
highly specific kind of property—but we are rather addressing the fact that the glass is
disposed to break, in the more metaphysically innocent way of understanding the word,
that is, we want to express that fragility is a mere disposition. Stating that there are
macro-dispositions in this way is uncontentiously true. As we have seen earlier, both dis-
positionalists and quidditists can accept that some things are disposed to act in one way or
another. The difference between the metaphysically loaded and the metaphysically harm-
less use of the term dispositions, or between powers and mere dispositions, makes it the
case that philosophers who clearly reject any idea of a powers ontology still may engage in
talk of dispositions without contradiction.
To show that this is not simply a verbal dispute, something that can be resolved simply
by adopting clearer terminology, (Marmodoro, 2009) may serve as an example. The way
Anna Marmodoro presents the powers term is largely in line with how I understand it, but
she then proceeds to ‘stretch’ the term way beyond this use. Marmodoro holds the question
of whether or not there exists ‘pure powers’ to be of particular importance. Pure powers
are powers that are not dependent on categorical properties. Powers, for Marmodoro, are
entities that are in a state of ‘readiness for action’, which entails that given appropriate
circumstances, they interact with the environment. Basically, powers do not have direc-
tionality, but a pure power is directed towards some manifestation.132 The ‘readiness for
action’ is all that powers are, and it is directed towards some kind of particular manifesta-
tion happening.
Marmodoro uses the example of electric charge, a pretty canonical choice of example,
when she is to illustrate what a power amounts to. This choice of example further strength-
ens the suspicion that when she speaks of powers she is indeed addressing the same type of
entity I am talking about. She explains how there is nothing more to charge than simply
the disposition to repel or attract other charges, and she clearly makes a connection be-
tween the powers and the fundamental level of metaphysics, speaking of the “fundamental
properties of the fundamental particles”.133 All in all, her concept of pure powers is closely
resembling the powers I argue for.
However, even though she speaks of powers in this way in the beginning of the article,
132Marmodoro (2009, p. 349)
133Marmodoro (2009, p. 337)
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she is clearly expecting the term to deliver more than just an account of certain aspects of
fundamental properties. She is in some sense using the existence of powers in fundamental
metaphysics to argue for a powers account of non-fundamental modal happenings. This is
detected by looking at her choice of further examples. She moves on to address fragility,
another canonical example, but one which refers to happenings on a completely different
level of metaphysics. The two examples are presented in the same way, meaning that she
maintains that there is nothing more to fragility than the disposition to break under certain
circumstances.134
In line with my earlier arguments, the case of fragility is far more complex than this,
and the analysis which is fitting for the fundamental powers falls short when we are to
understand more complex things, like the disposition of fragility. Marmodoro’s description
seems overly simplified for phenomena like fragility, and it is unable to capture the large
array of different ways in which something might be fragile. Again, remember the modal
fixity which is supposed to be one of the core features of powers. This feature is, to the
best of my knowledge, not present when we speak of things being fragile. ‘Fragility’, and
similar dispositional ascriptions, refer to a rather large group of similar properties for which
finding one explanation seems difficult, if not impossible. If we have a fragile glass and a
fragile ancient document, their fragility do not amount to the same thing, even though
both items are correctly labelled as being fragile. The reason for this might well be the
fact that there are no powers at this level of complexity, and we have to make do with
dispositions. Marmodoro’s notion of pure powers, I argue, is not something that can be
expanded to be used also for non-fundamental cases in the way she does.
Let us move on to question three. Can the existence of successful dispositional accounts
of non-fundamental phenomena be used as an argument for the existence of powers? So far
we have noted that the term disposition may be used both in a metaphysically loaded and
a metaphysically innocent way, and that both a power and a disposition may be described
in a dispositional way, ‘x is disposed to y’. This does not support equating dispositions
with powers, but does it mean that we can use the existence of dispositions to argue for
there being powers as well? We note that the more innocent use of ‘disposition’ allow
us to assert something like ‘poisons have the disposition to be harmful’, but this does
not entail that there is a modally fixed property, a power, grounding this. The confusion
over the extensions of powers and dispositions might lead us to think that the fact that
some phenomenon has a fruitful dispositional explanation should be an argument for or a
way of confirming that powers exist, but we need to resist this temptation. The eventual
fruitfulness of dispositional accounts are irrelevant for the existence of powers. Powers rely
solely on their modal fixity in order to explain the things they actually can explain. This
is not automatically transferable to dispositions.
Still, many dispositional accounts may be very useful. What is important is to refrain
134Marmodoro (2009, p. 339)
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from thinking that this usefulness is any reason to assume the existence of powers at
this level. Dispositions can be useful in themselves without the expectation that there is
supposed to be something metaphysically more substantial behind this. Successful dispo-
sitional accounts of different phenomena do not entail the existence of powers at any level,
but that does not make these accounts less successful in regard to what they were originally
meant for. As already stated, the assumption that powers indeed do exist needs its own
arguments, and the arguments I have addressed so far are not relevant for non-fundamental
metaphysics, so we cannot use them to support the existence of non-fundamental powers.
The arguments for answering these three questions in the affirmative fail mainly because
one cannot give satisfactory arguments for how macro-powers exist. That is, we have no
sound explanation of how we are supposed to move from the assumption that there are
fundamental powers, to the conclusion that there are also non-fundamental powers. As
long as no such explanation is provided we have no reason to assume that the properties
in non-fundamental metaphysics or in other areas of philosophy are powers. The fact that
I hold that the fundamental properties are powers does not give me the right to assume
that the non-fundamental ones are as well.
2.4.3 Back to ceteris paribus laws
Now that we have established the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental
metaphysics, and firmly placed the powers ontology in the fundamental domain, we may
return to Bird’s thoughts about finks, masks, and their alleged connection to ceteris paribus
laws. As mentioned in section 2.3.3, Bird (2007) argues that the finks and masks may be
useful in explaining ceteris paribus laws, and that in doing so they provide a positive rather
than destructive contribution to our analysis of dispositions. However, by arguing in this
way Bird himself violates the restrictions he imposed regarding where the powers ontology
might be applicable. This entails that some of the points in (Bird, 2016) can be used as
arguments against certain aspects of (Bird, 2007).
In the argument found in ‘Nature’s Metaphysics’ Bird takes the powers’ usefulness at
the fundamental level as a starting point—particularly the way they elegantly generate
the laws of nature—and extends this beyond the fundamental level without proper argu-
mentation for actually doing so. We remember how the finks and masks are not seen as
being problematic at the fundamental level, so they are not relevant as modifications of
the fundamental laws of nature. However, at the non-fundamental level, finks and masks
are troublesome for the dispositionalist, and Bird attempts to turn these problems into a
positive feature of dispositional essentialism by tying them to the non-fundamental ceteris
paribus laws. However, without a successful argument for the existence of macro-powers,
such a connection is not possible to make. The finks and the masks existing at the non-
fundamental level cannot be tied to the ceteris paribus laws in the suggested way because
laws on the non-fundamental level are not related to macro-level dispositions in the same
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way that fundamental powers are related to the laws of nature.
The laws at the non-fundamental level are not construed in this way, because there are
no macro-powers there to support them. Rather, the non-fundamental laws will supervene
on the lower-level laws; they are dependent upon the powers of the parts of the properties,
as well as their structural relations.135 As mentioned, the essences of the properties at this
level are not dispositional, but rather constrained by the structural composition of the
property, so the laws are not directly given solely by the dispositions of properties at this
level. Because of this, Bird’s argument for the usefulness of the finks and masks at the
non-fundamental level does not work as intended.
It is correct that the finks and masks pose no threat to the conditional analysis of
dispositions at the fundamental level, but it is not the case that the finks and masks can
give a positive contribution to the way we understand ceteris paribus laws at the non-
fundamental level. For Bird’s argument about ceteris paribus laws to work, we actually
need the existence of general non-fundamental powers, something he himself has argued
forcibly against. However, we might ask whether there are arguments for a more restricted
form of non-fundamental powers? This is the question we turn to now.
2.5 Non-fundamental powers after all?
2.5.1 Evolved functional properties
So far I have argued for limiting the scope of powers strictly to the fundamental properties,
but it should be made clear that none of these arguments are such that they eliminate
the possibility that non-fundamental powers exist. What we have demonstrated so far
is that the most common arguments for assuming there to be non-fundamental powers
do not in fact establish this to be the case. And it is with this as a background that
I will now turn to a novel argument aiming to establish that such powers could indeed
be seen as having a legitimate existence. After having restricted the domain of powers
to fundamental metaphysics in the aforementioned way, it is surprising that Bird (2018)
suggests that some particular non-fundamental properties may be powers after all. His
suggestion demands that we revisit the question of the existence of non-fundamental powers
even though earlier arguments for the existence of these entities have been unsuccessful.
Since the old arguments fail, we need new arguments, and that is exactly what Bird aims
to provide.
An important question at this point is why we would want to argue for macro powers
in the first place. Bird states that if modality in general can be explained by fundamental
powers, there are no possibilities left to be accounted for by way of macro powers.136 Hence,
135I will return to this discussion in chapter 5, section 5.3.3.
136Bird (2018, p. 251f.)
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an explanation of modality in general cannot be the motivation behind this extension of
the power term. The motivation must be something else, and it seems more tied to the first
argument for the existence of fundamental powers—the fact that powers give an account
of property identity. Through a successful account of macro powers we might be able to
understand some of the emergent properties better.137
Bird’s latest suggestion is that a particular subset of non-fundamental properties are
powers. The properties in question are the evolved functional properties. That is, the non-
fundamental powers are those properties that exist because they have been selected for
their function.138 The main arguments for assuming that there are powers—that they can
explain both property identity and the laws of nature—do not give us reason to believe
that non-fundamental powers exist, but maybe the new road through evolved functional
properties can offer what has been missing so far.
When I addressed the fundamental powers in section 2.4.1, one important feature of
these properties were their modal fixity, the fact that their dispositional features remain
fixed across possible worlds—or, to phrase it in another way, that these dispositional fea-
tures are essential to the property. Bird argues that precisely this has been missing from
the earlier arguments for macro powers.139 The arguments 1 through 3 for macro-powers
presented earlier neither focus on, nor establish the modal fixity of the macro powers.
Without this feature the property in question is not a power, even though it can, as we
have seen, be a dispositional property.
To ensure that what we are addressing really are powers, the features tied to modal
fixity—that powers have a particular essence or identity—has to be present also at the
macro level. We cannot overlook the fact that powers, by definition, are essentially dispo-
sitional just because we have moved beyond the fundamental level; the identity of a power
is related to what it does, or what it has potential to do. This needs to be the case for the
proposed macro-powers as well. The properties we are searching for must fulfil this and
two additional criteria. A macro power is a property which is
1. Non-fundamental — it supervenes on the fundamental properties
2. Genuinely sparse — not abundant, not a mere disposition
3. Essentially dispositional — the property’s identity is not constituted by the way it
supervenes on the fundamental properties.140
As mentioned, Bird claims that a set of properties fulfilling these demands exist, and
that the properties in question are the evolved functional properties:
137Bird (2018, p. 272)
138Bird (2018, p. 248)
139Bird (2018, p. 255)
140Bird (2018, p. 255f)
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Non-fundamental powers (NFP): [I]f a sparse property exists in virtue of
objects being selected for their dispositional characteristics, then that property
will satisfy those requirements.141
If this is correct, these properties should rightfully be seen as powers. To show how this
works, Bird uses the example of sightedness, where it might be argued that the capacity
of sightedness is just what sightedness is. The essence or the identity of the property is
the disposition to be able to see, hence the property clearly has a dispositional essence,
Bird argues. In addition, the property of having sight supervenes on a structure, so it is
clearly non-fundamental. In fact, it supervenes on several different structures, because the
property is multiply realised; there are many different kinds of sight. Still, the particular
structure giving each individual the ability to see is not the essence of the property, the
essence is the disposition. This entails that certain properties at this non-fundamental level
differ significantly from other non-fundamental properties, which, as I have argued earlier,
have structural essences.
But how do properties like sightedness differ from, say, fragility? We would not, and
should not, argue that fragility is a sparse property. Bird contends that explanations in-
volving sightedness, and other evolved functional properties, have a unity to them which
explanations involving fragility, and other abundant properties, lack. The reason why cer-
tain individuals are sighted is fundamentally different than the reason why some things are
fragile. Fragility does not have a shared evolutionary story among the individuals instan-
tiating the property.142 Sighted individuals have such a shared evolutionary story, even
though different kinds of sight are varied in structure. So, whereas the essence of sighted-
ness is the ability to see, the essence of fragility is not one single thing; rather, there are
several essences, one for each structure leading to the object being fragile.
When it comes to the question of sparsity, Bird focuses on the idea that the property
of sightedness is a product of natural selection on the basis of function, and is something
which enters into scientific explanations. As such it may be argued that it is sparse. This
conclusion presupposes that we hold the scientific and not the fundamental conception of
sparse properties. The scientific conception entails assuming that sparse properties may be
drawn from all of science, and not just fundamental physics. If Bird’s question about the
existence of non-fundamental powers is to be a genuine question, we need to assume the
scientific conception to hold. Assuming the fundamental conception decides the outcome
from the start. At the same time, we might want to discuss what is to be entailed in ‘all
of science’, but that debate is outside the scope of my thesis.143
Bird’s argument seems compelling so far. However, some of his formulations used to
argue that evolved functional properties are powers are highly problematic. The statement
141Bird (2018, p. 256)
142Bird (2018, p. 258)
143See (Schaffer, 2004) for additional detail about the scientific and fundamental conceptions of sparse
properties.
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NFP is one such statement. Another one is the following.
(...) natural selection is selection for function. When this gives rise to a new,
functional property, that property’s nature (...) will be the dispositional char-
acteristics that played a role in selection.144
These formulations have in common that they claim that some properties exist because
they are selected for. Vetter (2018) points out that properties that are selected for must
be developed before they are available for selection.145 Hence, selection is the reason they
continue to exist, but to the best of our knowledge properties come about before they are
selected for, so the functional role of the property cannot be the reason the property exists
simpliciter.
If we, as Bird does, assume what may be referred to as an ontic conception of sparse
properties, we do not want to say that the properties in question became sparse when the
evolutionary process started to select for this particular property. This is due to the fact
that the ontic conception of sparse properties ties these properties to universals: “whether
F-ness is sparse is a matter of whether there exists a universal (...) of being F”.146 As
mentioned earlier in this chapter, Bird explicitly assumes powers to be universals. The
sparse properties, understood as universals, simply cannot start being sparse when they
are selected for. If they could possibly be selected for, they would have to exist prior to
this. However, evolution by natural selection is seen as a highly contingent process, and
in the following section I will argue that the ontic conception of sparseness alongside this
contingency leads to some unfortunate consequences for Bird’s view.
2.5.2 Powers all over the place?
Vetter (2018) argues that the contingency of evolution by natural selection means that
many properties that could have been selected for ended up not being so, and also that
the properties that were selected for do not have this status necessarily. In short, evolution
by natural selection could have gone differently than it actually did. Hence, if evolved
functional properties are to have some special status—sparsity—this status must also be
the case for those properties that could have been selected for throughout history. This is
due to the fact that property existence and sparseness is generally not seen as a contingent
matter.147 Holding the ontic conception of sparse properties entails having to say that also
the potentially functional properties are sparse, given that evolution is to play the role
that Bird suggests it does. Vetter’s argument shows how this combination of views about
sparse properties makes Bird’s argument over-generate properties to such an extent that
144Bird (2018, p. 271)
145Bird mentions this, but he does not address the problems Vetter articulates.
146Vetter (2018, p. 280)
147Vetter (2018, p. 282)
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his theory of powers becomes almost indistinguishable from those he warns us against in
(Bird, 2013) and (Bird, 2016), particularly as his argument does not only include biological
properties such as sightedness, but also mental properties, and perhaps even properties of
artefacts.148 His account becomes overly enthusiastic in its acceptance of non-fundamental
powers.
One possible solution to this, proposed by Vetter, is to suggest a form of explanatory
dispositionalism, rather than Bird’s dispositional essentialism, which she refers to as ex-
istential dispositionalism. The focus for explanatory dispositionalism is the way in which
dispositionalism reverses the order of explanation in accounts of modality and laws, such
that dispositions have been “turned from a problematic explanandum into a respectable
explanans”.149 This should also be the centre of attention at the non-fundamental level,
according to Vetter. All we need to explain a macro disposition is within the object it-
self, in its categorical properties and the dispositions of its parts.150 Thus, we are able to
explain, for example, lawful generalisations at the non-fundamental level directly by the
dispositions present at that level, and indirectly by the more fundamental dispositions of
its parts, she claims.151 The crucial point for Vetter is the role the property actually plays
in explanations, and as such it does not really matter whether another property possibly
could have existed instead of the actual one due to evolution taking a different turn. The
actual role is what makes the property special, in the sense that it is explanatory relevant,
but this does not make it sparse.
The lacking sparsity is not seen as a problem for Vetter, it is rather the case that
accepting her argument entails “accepting that there is no interesting and sharp distinc-
tion distinction to be drawn among the non-fundamental properties, between ‘sparse’ and
merely ‘abundant’”.152 Hence, her solution is compatible with holding the fundamental
view of sparse properties, but not with the scientific view, since this view assumes there
to be sparse properties also among non-fundamental properties. If there is no sharp dis-
tinction between sparse and abundant properties, assuming there to be sparse properties
in non-fundamental physics or in chemistry becomes unintelligible.
If Vetter’s critique of Bird is correct, this alone is enough to abandon the course he
has set in this matter. However, her solution is not an option if we think the distinction
between sparse and abundant properties is substantial and real. If we think this divide
between different kinds of properties is referring to something real, also at certain non-
fundamental levels, we have to keep looking for a solution to this problem. I hold that this
distinction at least is an important divide at the levels of physics and chemistry. It might
148He does not provide any examples of these artefacts, and do not provide any details about which
concrete properties of artefacts could possibly be powers.
149Vetter (2018, p. 293)
150Vetter (2018, p. 295)
151I will return to this discussion in chapter 3.
152Vetter (2018, p. 292)
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even be relevant for biology and certain other fields too.153
2.5.3 Back to square one
A point which Vetter does not fully explore is the following. There seems to be tension
between the criterion that sparse properties are to contribute to causal and nomic explana-
tions, and the fact that evolution by natural selection is playing a crucial role, if we assume
the ontic conception of sparse properties. Bird agrees that a test to figure out whether
a property is sparse or not is to see if it is employed by our best scientific theories, in
a non-redundant way. Such use is strong evidence that the property is sparse.154 This is
an epistemic point, and not a definition of sparseness; it is a way for us to discover these
properties.155
However, the connection is deeper than a mere epistemic point for Bird. He asks, “Must
any ontic/sparse property be involved in some law or explanation?”, and answers that for
the dispositional essentialist it is necessary that any sparse property is engaged in such a
relation.156 Hence there is a necessary connection between the sparse properties and the
laws and explanations. This is in conflict with the idea that evolution by natural selection
is a highly contingent process. Let us have a closer look at this.
1. There is a necessary connection between sparse properties and laws or explanations.
2. Evolution determines which properties are involved in biological explanations.
3. Throughout our evolutionary history, some sparse properties have been selected for,
and some have not — given that sparsity does not spontaneously come about, and
that evolved functional properties are supposed to be sparse.
4. Hence, there exists some sparse properties which are not connected with laws or
explanations. This contradicts point 1.
How can we argue against Bird? Since he has two criteria for the evolved functional
properties being powers, apart from the obvious non-fundamentality of the properties in
question, it seems that we need to argue that one of them is false. So, either
I. (some of) the evolved functional properties are not sparse, or
II. (some of) the evolved functional properties are not essentially dispositional
153Schaffer (2004) makes reference to things like beliefs and minds, but I am sceptical of whether these
things truly are sparse properties or if they can be satisfactory accounted for by sparse properties at lower
levels.
154Bird (2018, p. 248)
155Note that this also entails that there is room for us to be mistaken about which properties are sparse,
and that we at the present moment might not be able to recognise certain properties as sparse.
156Bird (2018, Footnote 3, p. 249)
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Given the strength of Bird’s arguments for the dispositional essences of evolved func-
tional properties (at least in biology), I argue that the best option is to assume that some
of the evolved functional properties are not sparse. As far as I can see, there are three main
ways of arguing that this is the case.
The first, and simplest solution is to argue that the evolved functional properties are
not sparse by denying the scientific conception, since this basically erases the question.
This is not a good option because the scientific conception seems more plausible than
the fundamental conception, even though some redundancy must be allowed if we are to
accept sparse properties beyond the fundamental ones.157 However, as little redundancy as
possible should be an ideal. If something can be adequately explained by properties which
are ontologically on a lower level, the property on the higher level describing the same is
not sparse. I suggest this might be the case for some of the mental properties which both
Bird and Jonathan Schaffer refers to. Even though things like beliefs may seem to be sparse
from out present scientific vantage point, they could turn out not to be so. That is, they
could possibly be accurately explained by properties on an ontologically lower level.
The second option is to deny the ontic conception, and instead, for example, adopt
some comparative notion of sparsity, where properties can be ‘more or less sparse’ than
each other.158 We might also choose to accept Vetter’s solution and effectively eradicate the
whole distinction between sparse and abundant properties at the non-fundamental level.
That would entail losing a distinction which is useful, relevant, and which I hold to be real.
There is a distinction between the class of properties needed to be able to give an accurate
description of the world, and the class of all predicates.
A third option is denying that evolution based on function is an indication of sparseness.
The fact that the evolutionary story opens for a veritable avalanche of sparse properties
is problematic if we want our theory of powers to be distinguishable from, say, Stephen
Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum’s pandispositionalism. Remember that the properties that
could have been selected for are all actually sparse properties, because the ontic conception
does not open for things being more or less sparse, or things becoming sparse; the properties
are, or they are not, sparse. If we are serious when we state that evolution is a highly
contingent process, then evolution is not a good judge for what makes a property sparse
or not.
How does this influence our view of dispositions in general? According to Bird, dispo-
sitions can be:
1. Abundant—not sparse
2. Accidental—sparse, but not essentially dispositional
157Lewis (1986a, p. 60) demands sparse properties to 1. ground objective similarities, 2. carve out causal
powers, and 3. serve as a minimal ontological base. Schaffer (2004) replaces the minimality demand with
a primacy demand, hence allowing redundancy among the sparse properties.
158Lewis (1986a) argues that the distinction between the natural and other properties admits of degree.
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3. A power—sparse and essentially dispositional
A consequence of my argument is that the first category will include some abundant
properties with dispositional essences, because that is what we end up with if we argue
that the evolved functional properties are not sparse while accepting the rest of Bird’s
account; they are not part of the ontological back-bone of the world, so to speak, but they
nonetheless seem to be modally fixed. Given that properties that are selected for through
evolution are selected for their function, i.e., what they do or can do, it seems fair to say
that they are essentially dispositional, without at the same time being sparse. In addition,
it seems correct that the identities of these properties are not constituted by the mode
of supervenience; the properties are all supervening on some kind of structure, but this
structure is not the property’s essence.
Bird’s arguments for viewing the evolved functional properties as properties with dis-
positional essences are compelling, the arguments for seeing these properties as sparse are
not. The actual properties Bird use as examples, like sightedness, might be sparse for all we
know, but not for the reasons he points to. Basing his argument on the contingent process of
evolution by natural selection, there are countless properties that could have been selected
for but were not. Since Bird holds the ontic conception of sparse properties, the properties
that are sparse carve out the structure of the world and are universals. Such properties do
not start out as abundant and become sparse ‘along the way’, they are sparse from the
start. Hence all the properties which potentially could have been selected for—those which
were not, but could have been, selected for—must also be sparse.159
As mentioned earlier it seems like the combination of the ontic conception of sparse
properties and the role given to evolution in Bird’s argument is not viable. Given the
contingent nature of evolution by natural selection it is not a reliable source when we want
to figure out which properties are sparse and which are not, and the consequence of the
argument is an enormous over-generating of sparse properties. Without a reliable criterion
for sparsity, we have no clear argument for the existence of non-fundamental powers either.
Hence, the situation has not changed; at present we only have well founded arguments
for assuming powers at the fundamental level. If we are to argue that some biological
properties are indeed powers, for example, we are still searching for a satisfactory argument
establishing this.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued for dispositional essentialism about fundamental properties.
That is, I have argued that one of the basic entities in our ontology should be that of
159A possible solution is arguing that evolution is not truly contingent, but this does not seem to be in
line with our ordinary conception of evolution by natural selection; a precondition for evolution actually
happening is that there are real alternatives.
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powers—sparse properties which are essentially dispositional. Given the inclusion of such
a concept we have a machinery which is able to yield both an explanation of property
identity at the fundamental level, as well as an account of the fundamental laws of nature.
Even though attempts have been made to expand the domain of powers to that of non-
fundamental metaphysics as well—even by Bird who has argued forcefully against this
in earlier publications—such an expansion runs into several problems which makes it a
suboptimal choice. For the present time we are better off assuming powers to be a feature
of fundamental metaphysics only.
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Chapter 3
Dispositional theories of possibility
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I will give an in-depth examination of two accounts of possibility based on
dispositions, namely Borghini and Williams’ dispositional theory of possibility, and Vetter’s
understanding of possibility in terms of potentiality. In addition I will consider whether an
account of possibility in terms of dispositional essences, or powers, is a viable option.
When discussing the dispositional theories of possibility, I will in particular focus on the
connection between these accounts and the laws of nature. The most important question
in this regard relates to whether or not the notion of metaphysical possibility advocated
by the dispositionalists will be seen as going beyond the laws of nature. I argue that this
is an important question also when discussing dispositionalist, as opposed to dispositional
essentialist, accounts. This is so even though an account of the laws of nature does not
automatically follow from assuming general dispositionality in the world. In this respect, we
see that Borghini and Williams (2008) clearly argue that their explanation of metaphysical
possibility encompasses more than merely the nomically possible, while Vetter (2015) does
not wish to draw a conclusion on this matter. That is, she seems to hold that her account
of possibility in terms of potentiality can quite happily coexist with several explanations
of laws of nature, and that basing our understanding of modality upon potentialities does
not commit us to a particular view regarding the laws.
I hold that the way the relationship between the dispositional accounts of possibility
and the laws of nature is presented by these authors entails that a discussion about the
domain of the possible is unavoidable. We need to investigate whether the supposition that
dispositional possibility can be detached from the domain of the laws of nature is true. In
this chapter, I will argue that the belief that the metaphysically possible goes beyond the
nomic is an ill-advised assumption to make when possibility is explained in a dispositional
way. In addition, I will argue that Vetter’s open minded position regarding accounts of
laws might not be a viable choice either.
The chapter will proceed as follows. I will commence by examining some of the reasons
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why a dispositional theory of possibility may be seen as advantageous compared to a more
traditional approach based on possible worlds, in more depth than what the introductory
chapter of the thesis gave room for. Following this I will turn to two dispositional theories of
possibility. In section 3.3, Borghini and Williams’ ‘A dispositional theory of possibility’, and
in section 3.4, Vetter’s ‘Potentiality: from dispositions to modality’. I will be focusing my
attention primarily on the domain of the possible. In that respect, Borghini and Williams
(2008) argue that the domain of the metaphysically possible resulting from their theory
will encompass more than solely possibility restricted by the laws of nature, whereas Vetter
(2015) does not want to conclude decisively either way regarding this question. Her account
of possibility does not give us a clear conclusion as to whether laws are necessary or
contingent, she claims. I dispute whether she really can leave the door open for both of
these options.
In section 3.5, I delve deeper into the conundrums concerning definitions of possibility
in terms of the manifestations of dispositions alone, and the subsequent removal of, or
disinterest directed towards, the stimulus condition. I suggest that even though the removal
of this condition from dispositional accounts of modality seemingly solves several problems
tied to the conditional understanding of dispositions, this move also create further, and
quite severe, problems of its own. I bring the chapter to a close, in section 3.6, by exploring
the option of having a theory of possibility based on dispositional essences.
3.2 Background assumptions
The background for Borghini and Williams’ and Vetter’s explanation of possibility is the
assumption that the world we live in is a modal world, and that the modality it contains
is localised in the objects existing in the world. In line with the new actualism as presented
in chapters 1 and 2, their assumption is that we may use this localised modality to explain
matters which have earlier been settled by reference to possible worlds. As will be the case
for the better part of this thesis, I will limit my attention somewhat, and focus mainly
on metaphysical modality, particularly the notion of metaphysical possibility and the way
this relates to the laws of nature. Possibility explained in a dispositional way will be the
main topic of this chapter, while the following chapters will go into the details about the
laws of nature.
We remember from chapter 1 that the so-called new actualists want to explain modality
in a localised way, and that this enables us to dislodge the concept of a possible world from
its role as an important metaphysical entity. The localised modality which is assumed to
replace the focus on possible worlds is often thought to be situated in the dispositions of ob-
jects and properties of the actual world. This actual world is the only world which grounds
modality, something which makes the metaphysical landscape radically different for this
kind of actualism, as opposed to a more traditional possible world centred metaphysics.
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We can mention three main advantages for assuming dispositionalism about modal-
ity. Firstly, it is parsimonious. If we already have dispositional properties in our ontology,
there is no need to add anything more in order to explain modality. If we for example
agree that we need dispositions in order to explain certain properties of actually existing
entities, we have reasons that are not ad hoc to assume that there are properties that have
a modal character. Then it seems like a good idea to investigate if it is possible to use these
properties to explain other things as well, like metaphysical modality in general.160 Sec-
ondly, we have the naturalness of the ontological picture which accompanies it. Possibility
is anchored in what Vetter refers to as “realistically respectable bits of the world, ordinary
concrete objects”.161 Everything possible needs to be tied to actually existing entities. If no
connection can be made, then the alleged possibility in question is not genuinely possible.
The third advantage is related to this connection between actually existing entities and
the modal notions, and it is an epistemological point; we have epistemic contact with these
entities, at least potentially. Based on this contact we can get knowledge of the modal
properties of the world. In contrast, we do not have any epistemic access to non-actual
possible worlds, something which makes the alleged modal knowledge resulting from the
accounts based on such concepts highly speculative. Given the dispositional picture, the
knowledge of modal properties will not be a matter of pure philosophical speculation, but
rather a matter of practical and scientific knowledge about the world. This entails that our
ways of knowing about dispositions and our ways of knowing about metaphysical modality
will be the same.162 In addition, the dispositional explanation of modality is also advanta-
geous from the viewpoint of finding truthmakers for modal claims. Such truthmakers are
problematic if we agree with some form of Humeanism, where modality has to be separated
from the properties and objects themselves. As discussed in chapter 1, something along the
line of explanations in terms of possible worlds will be needed if we are to be able to explain
modality while remaining Humeans. The option given by dispositionalism offers something
actually existing as modal truthmakers instead.
Chapter 1 sketched several possible ways to tie modality to something which is dispo-
sitional and which also actually exist in the world, be it objects or properties, and with
greater or lesser focus on the concept of an essence. The accounts examined in the present
chapter focus mainly on dispositionality as a route to possibility. This is done under the
general supposition that if we are able to define possibility in a dispositional way, the
other common modal notions, such as necessity, will follow. The exchangeability between
possibility and necessity is of course the same as always even if we explain the concepts
in a new way, so the explanation of possibility will also be an explanation of necessity.
What we need to pay attention to, however, is that in contrast with the preceding chapter
we are now operating on a whole different level of metaphysics, and the main focal area
160Borghini (2016, p. 168)
161Vetter (2015, p. 11)
162Vetter (2015, p. 12)
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is no longer the dispositional essences of fundamental properties, but rather ‘everyday’
dispositions of macro-properties as well as dispositions tied to objects.
3.3 Borghini and Williams’ dispositional account of
possibility
3.3.1 Dispositions and dispositional properties
Borghini and Williams (2008) present and argue for a version of the aforementioned new
actualist understanding of modality. In line with the general tendencies of this segment
of the metaphysics of modality, this understanding entails removing the notion of possible
worlds from the discourse concerning the metaphysics of modality. The possible worlds are
replaced with particular modal properties existing in the world, the key components being
dispositional properties and dispositions. As should be clear from my arguments so far in
this thesis, I do agree with quite a few of Borghini and Williams’ background assumptions,
such as there being several good reasons why we should leave the framework of possible
worlds behind, and rather appeal to modal properties found in the world. While this may
be the case, I will proceed to argue that there are some quite substantial problems lurking
in the details of their account. Most importantly, I argue that they are defending a notion
of metaphysical possibility which is wider than what their own framework really allows for.
Borghini and Williams’ account is an established version of the dispositional view, but
I argue that their version of dispositionalism fails to make a proper connection between
the domain of the possible they argue for, and the actual dispositions in the world which
are supposed to ground this. Hence, my present goal is to bring attention to certain con-
sequences of their account which have been overlooked so far. Their proposal is explicitly
presented to have two main purposes. It is both a presentation of a theory of possibility,
and also an argument for a particular interpretation of the domain of the metaphysically
possible. I will in particular focus on the latter theme. The reason for this being that one
of their main claims regarding the domain of the possible, is that the metaphysically pos-
sible will go beyond what is allowed by the laws of nature. This will also be the case when
possibility is explained in a dispositional way.
I will argue against this idea, not only because I disagree with this understanding of
metaphysical possibility, but also because this claim is, as far as I can tell, not warranted by
Borghini and Williams’ own theory. I will suggest instead that the metaphysically possible
and the nomically possible are pointing to the same set of possibilities, also when our
explanations are merely dispositionalist and not dispositional essentialist. Explanations in
the dispositionalist manner do not provide a notion of the metaphysically possible that goes
beyond the nomic. This makes the notion of nomic possibility redundant in this context.
In order to understand Borghini and Williams’ suggestion of how possibility may be
3.3 Borghini and Williams’ dispositional account of possibility 71
grounded in dispositional features of the world, we need to get a grip on the vocabulary
and general theoretical machinery they employ. The first concept which is of particular
importance is their most basic notion; the dispositional property. These properties are
quite loosely defined as properties which ground the dispositions, but they are not further
specified in any way, such that there is no restriction at play regarding what kind of prop-
erties the dispositional properties may be. Thus, I assume that both sparse and abundant
properties may exhibit these characteristics according to Borghini and Williams.163
Since dispositional properties and dispositions are not the same concept according to
Borghini and Williams, we need to carefully distinguish them. The dispositional properties
are the irreducible base for a distinctive set of dispositions. This means that one single
dispositional property can produce a range of dispositions, and it is this particular set
of dispositions which individuates the dispositional properties. The dispositions, on the
other hand, are individuated by the manifestations they produce. We note that the focal
point here is solely on the manifestations of the dispositions, and not on a combination of
stimulus and manifestations for each disposition. This is an important point for both the
account of Borghini and Williams, and that of Vetter. A disposition may, in this framework,
be exemplified by the standard cases of things being fragile, soluble, and so on, that is,
what we might classify as everyday macro properties. The dispositional properties are the
properties which make it the case that the objects possess these various dispositions. A
concrete example of a dispositional property is not provided.
Even though there is no example of a dispositional property in Borghini and Williams’
article, they do provide examples of the relationship between a dispositional property and
a disposition, and also some of the different dispositions that may stem from the very same
dispositional property. One such example is their claim that it is the same dispositional
property in virtue of which a key has the disposition both to open a particular door,
and to be a device one can use to open bottles.164 What exactly this property might be
seems quite mysterious. In addition, I find it problematic that it is not only the case that
one single dispositional property is supposed to be able to support a complex disposition
such as fragility, but each dispositional property also support several other dispositions of
equal complexity. It is for example stated that a fragile glass has some set of dispositional
properties, and in virtue of instantiating one of these, the glass has several dispositions,
one of which is fragility. An explanation of how these mechanisms are supposed to work is
not given.165
163If my assumption is correct, this is in line with Vetter’s liberal account in (Vetter, 2015). She is far
more explicit regarding this point compared with Borghini and Williams.
164Borghini and Williams (2008, p. 27)
165The lack of detailed explanation may be seen to reflect the fact that we cannot always know which
dispositional properties are responsible for which particular dispositions, as mentioned earlier. However,
one should perhaps ask whether some additional detail would have been beneficial when it comes to
providing examples of dispositional properties, particularly as there is no restriction that these properties
be sparse.
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As explained earlier, Borghini and Williams’ goal is twofold. They want to explain what
the ontological basis for possibility is, in addition to determining the range or domain of
the possible. Both of these may be explained starting with the assumption that objects
possess dispositions, and that these dispositions are all we need in order to explain the
fact that some happenings are in fact possible. We should note that it is the dispositional
properties, not the dispositions, which are the truthmakers for metaphysical possibility,
even though it is claimed that the distinction between the dispositional properties and the
dispositions is not a deep one.166
3.3.2 Possibility explained
Their suggestion for a dispositional definition of possibility is initially presented as follows:
State of affairs S is possible iff there is some actual dispositional property D,
which supports a disposition d, the manifestation for which is (or includes)
S.167
By grounding possibility in this way, Borghini and Williams manage to explain it while
referring exclusively to this-worldly objects. From this we get almost all the possibilities
we need, they argue. By making this qualified statement they are anticipating criticism
claiming that there exists possibilities we need to be able to account for which the disposi-
tionalist seemingly cannot accommodate. An example of cases which go beyond what the
dispositionalist can provide is the alleged possibility of alien properties, or the ascription
of particular counterfactual properties of particular kinds of objects.
Borghini and Williams comment that asking whether a particular theory manages to
give us ‘all the possibilities we need’ is a puzzling question to ask, as it seems to imply
that we already know what is metaphysically possible, and that our job is simply to find
a theory that can explain this particular set of possibilities. This point is related to what
Vetter refers to as extensional correctness; the idea that accounts of possibility, hence
also potentiality- or disposition-based accounts, must respect, at least to a rather large
degree, our prior judgements about what is or is not metaphysically possible. This is an
idea I briefly addressed also in chapter 1. We remember that Vetter presents the idea of
extensional correctness as stemming from the fact that we have certain firm convictions
about what is or is not possible, but she also goes on to state the following:
The potentiality account should vindicate sufficiently many of those convic-
tions, or provide a plausible explanation where it does not.168
166Borghini and Williams (2008, p. 29). This statement only serves to make the relationship between
dispositional properties and dispositions more unclear.
167Borghini and Williams (2008, p. 28)
168Vetter (2015, p. 247)
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I think the last point is of particular importance, and I also believe that this point
has not received the attention it deserves in contemporary metaphysics of modality. If the
theory should prove not to respect our earlier ideas about what is and is not metaphysically
possible, it is important that it gives an explanation for how this might be the case.169
This is related to my general concern that we are not accurately acknowledging that our
intuitions about metaphysical modality could be mistaken, and that because of this it will
be unwise to simply aim for a theory that matches our pre-philosophical ideas.170
If we accept that our intuitions may be mistaken, aiming for a theory that closely
matches our intuitions may not be the best starting point. Concerning this, I argue that
by putting additional weight on the ability of our theory to provide an explanation of how
and why our views could be wrong in the first place, we may get closer to correct modal
knowledge. We should see explaining metaphysical possibility in an accurate way as more
important than simply catering to our intuitions.
While Borghini and Williams explicitly do not think we should let intuitions lead the
way, they do believe that we should be worried if a dispositional account of possibility is
not able to give a domain of the metaphysically possible which coincides with the standard
view of metaphysical possibility encompassing more than nomic possibility. In order to
mitigate the discrepancy between the expected domain of possibilities and the one they
can provide by their initial suggestion, they introduce a notion of higher-order dispositional
properties—properties included in the manifestation of other dispositions. The higher-order
dispositional properties will often be identical to already existing ones, but the key point is
that they need not be. Hence, the theory makes room for dispositional properties which are
not identical with any property currently existing in the world, that is, properties which
are merely possible. Higher-order dispositional properties, in conjunction with the ones we
already have present in the world give us the whole domain of the metaphysically possible:
[POSS] State of affairs S is possible iff there is some dispositional property
Dn (of some order n ≥ 1) which supports the disposition dn, the manifestation
of which is (or includes) S.171
As an example of such a higher-order disposition, Borghini and Williams use the com-
mon example of the fragile glass. In line with what has been described earlier, this glass
has some unspecified dispositional property, which gives the glass a whole range of dispo-
sitions, one of which is fragility. If the glass were to be treated in such a way that it were
to break, this would be the manifestation of the disposition:
That state of affairs will mean some change in the glass’s properties. We are in
no position to say exactly what that change is—short of describing the glass
169We find similar ideas in (Lowe, 2006, p. 142) where he argues that claims going against our intuitions
about natural laws must be backed up by substantial argumentation.
170I will return to the question of the role of intuitions in chapter 7.
171Borghini and Williams (2008, p. 31)
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as broken—but with whatever new properties the glass has, it now has some
different dispositions. One of these dispositions, not apparent beforehand, is
its disposition to be used as a cutting tool. But this is just one of many; with
each change of properties comes a change in dispositionality—and this means
greater possibilities.172
This example does of course not provide a new property, but it does show how the
concept is supposed to be working, and with this in place we can move on to look at how
Borghini and Williams use the notion of higher-order dispositions in order to argue for a
particular domain of metaphysical possibility.173
3.3.3 Going beyond the nomic?
As Borghini and Williams’ account is based upon actually existing dispositional properties,
they declare that it might be assumed that this is simply an explanation of nomic possibility,
that is, possibilities which are consistent with the laws of nature. However, the higher-order
dispositional properties provide ontological grounding for a wider range of possibilities than
any account of nomic possibility would provide, they argue, introducing the term super-
nomic to refer to this particular kind of possibility.174 Super-nomic possibility is supposed
to be equivalent with what is metaphysically possible.
Their suggestion is in short that the metaphysically possible explicitly goes beyond the
nomic, but that it is at the same time firmly grounded in the properties of the objects
existing in the actual world.175 One argument in favour of such an understanding is that it
is supposed to be more interesting than other accounts of metaphysical possibility, which,
according to Borghini and Williams, accommodate too much to either be interesting or
informative. I agree with this argument, as I firmly believe that the notion of metaphysical
possibility should not be just another name for logical possibility or conceivability. We
want to know what grounds actual possibility, not what we consider to be possible. Still,
a closer look at the idea of the metaphysical understood as equivalent to the super-nomic
is justified, as there are certain aspects of this interpretation which are unclear at best.
This will in turn reveal that although I do agree with Borghini and Williams’ view when it
comes to their motivation for introducing a dispositional account of possibility, we disagree
regarding which consequences such an account will have for our concept of metaphysical
possibility.
172Borghini and Williams (2008, p. 32)
173It should be noted that we find very similar formulations of dispositional accounts of possibility
elsewhere. As we shall see later, Vetter’s account of possibility has striking resemblances hidden behind
slightly different terminology, where iterated potentialities refer to much the same as the higher-order
dispositions do.
174Borghini and Williams (2008, p. 36)
175Borghini and Williams (2008, Footnote 3, p. 21f.)
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When I claim that certain aspects of Borghini and Williams’ account are unclear, these
unclarities are particularly related to the relationship between a dispositional account of
possibility and the laws of nature. We may follow Vetter (2015) and say that there are two
conflicting ideas at play in this respect which the dispositionalist needs to address. Firstly,
the metaphysical is commonly seen as a wider notion of possibility than the nomic, such
that the laws of nature may be perceived as metaphysically contingent. Secondly, it does
not seem to be the case that something could have a disposition to violate any actual law
of nature.176 If this latter idea is pointing towards something crucial regarding how dispo-
sitions work, one should assume this to be the case also for higher-order dispositions.177 If
so, it seems that the natural thing for the dispositionalist to do is to reject the first idea.
If possibility is grounded in dispositions, and no disposition may point beyond what is
nomically possible, there is no possibility for happenings which go beyond the actual laws
of nature. This entails discarding the common nested view of different kinds of possibility,
where the nomic possibilities is a proper subset of the metaphysical ones.
This is not what happens in Borghini and Williams’ case. As mentioned, they explicitly
argue that metaphysical possibility encompasses more than just nomic possibility, because
the metaphysically possible is grounded in higher-order dispositions—dispositions which
may give rise to properties not actually existing in the world. This is fair enough. The
manifestation of dispositional properties could perhaps bring new properties about. An
example of this could be the creation of new synthetic elements, where the possibility of
a new element also brings along the possibility that this substance has some dispositional
properties that do not presently exist in the world, such as a particular half-life. Nonethe-
less, such cases are clearly nomically possible, so they cannot be examples which would
confirm Borghini and Williams’ view. We need to ask, firstly, how accepting these higher-
order dispositions can give us a notion of metaphysical possibility that is wider than what
the laws of nature permit. Borghini and Williams actually claim that the set of possibil-
ities they can accommodate through the introduction of higher-order dispositions is not
far behind the set of possibilities provided by the genuine modal realist, when it comes to
things like admitting the existence of alien properties as genuine possibilities.178 Secondly,
we have to ask how something that is contrary to the actually existing laws of nature can
supposedly arise from something which is this-worldly and thus determined by precisely
these actual laws of nature. This does not seem to be the way dispositions work.
To answer these questions, we could try to find some property that might serve as an
example. Yet as far as I can tell the properties we can think of when asked to exemplify
higher-order dispositions will most likely be those which are already existing, similar to
176Vetter (2015, p. 281-282)
177Note that I do not assume that the intuitions or ideas we have in any way are responsible for this
being the case, nor that intuitions might ground any of our knowledge about dispositions. Intuitions can
be more or less correct or incorrect and part of our work should be figuring out which is which.
178Borghini and Williams (2008, p. 39)
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the example Borghini and Williams already provide. Moving beyond this, we surely seem
able to imagine things contrary to what the laws of nature would allow, but how are we
to distinguish between those which are supposedly genuine possibilities, and those which
are just figments of our imagination? As Borghini and Williams’ account of possibility
is supposed to be fully anchored in the actual world and its objects, using imagination
in this way does not seem to be beneficial to the theory. As mentioned earlier, Borghini
and Williams are quite explicit in their dismissal of the use of imagination as a source of
modal knowledge, holding it as doubtful that conceivability could even be useful as a guide
to knowledge of the possible.179 Yet, even though imagination or our ability to conceive
of things being possible is neither a source, nor a guide to the metaphysical possibilities,
Borghini and Williams seemingly want the set of the metaphysical possibilities to be more
or less overlapping with this.
With this as a background, I am not criticising Borghini and Williams for not providing
examples of higher-order dispositions giving rise to alien properties, as the act of providing
such examples could lead us into a highly speculative terrain. Nor am I criticising the notion
of higher-order dispositions in and of itself, but I am criticising some of the assumptions
made about higher-order dispositions, as well as the lack of explanation of when and how
the jump from the nomic to the super-nomic is supposed to be made.
I acknowledge that the account makes room for far-fetched and unlikely possibilities,
and that these are just as possible as the ones that are more commonly occurring. This is
fine; a theory of possibility should of course not only explain the most common occurrences,
but also those which are less familiar. However, going from this to the claim that one can
accommodate possibilities defying the laws of nature just does not seem to hold. If we think
of this as a branching structure, where the nodes are the manifestation of dispositions,
some of which may lead to alien properties existing, we must be able to trace all such alien
properties backwards in the structure through all actualized properties, all the way back
to some actually existing property. In accordance with [POSS], if it is not possible to trace
this backwards and anchor it in an actually existing state of affairs, the existence of the
alien property in question is not possible either. Hence, alleged possibilities grounded in
that alien property are not really possibilities at all.
I would actually go so far as to suggest that the reason why an explanation of when
and how properties are able to move out of the domain of the nomic possibilities is not
provided is that this cannot be found. Given how the theory is presented no possible
higher-order property would be such that it went beyond the existing laws of nature. I
simply do not think any such property may be existing; nomic possibilities may ground
other nomic possibilities, but something behaving in accordance with the laws of nature
cannot create properties which do not behave according to these laws. If we go back to
the idea of seeing such progressions in time as some kind of branching structure, each
179Borghini and Williams (2008, p. 38)
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point’s existence in a graph is a matter of whether a disposition has been manifested or
not, but each such outcome will be consistent with the laws of nature. The whole process
in question is determined by the actually existing laws. Adding more branches and nodes
will not help, neither will the iterations Borghini and Williams appeal to. Simply stating
that the definition of possibility depends on higher-order dispositions will not give us the
result they claim their theory offers.
What is needed for Borghini and Williams’ theory to work, are dispositions that lead
to different laws of nature. But, as mentioned earlier, no matter how far removed from
the actual world we are, no matter the amount of iterations, there will always be some
point where a move is made—where we leave the nomic possibilities and move over to the
super-nomic. This move needs explanation. For this to be a real possibility, there needs to
be an accessible point in the future history of the world where things have played out in
such a way that there exists a disposition which, if manifested, will go beyond the laws
of nature. Borghini and Williams’ account is missing the crucial explanation of how this
might happen, and as they are the ones claiming their theory supports possibilities going
beyond the laws of nature, the burden of proof is on them.
Borghini and Williams are explicit in presenting their theory as an actualistic and
naturalistic one. The only available world is the actual one, and the domain of dispositions
is limited to just this single world of space and time. There is simply no need for additional
worlds.180 Hence, everything deemed to be possible—and for Borghini and Williams this
includes happenings going beyond the laws of nature—will have to be possible by way of
dispositional properties existing in the actual world. That is, all dispositional properties
that have ever been, are, and will ever be instantiated.181
This means, in effect, that all possibilities included in Borghini andWilliams’ framework
can, potentially, happen here (or could potentially have happened here, if some different
dispositions had been manifested in the past), as this is the only world where possibil-
ities may be realised. According to this framework, we do not have other worlds with
conveniently different laws of nature acting as truthmakers for the possibility claims go-
ing beyond the nomic. In order for such possibilities to come about, the laws of nature
will have to be broken, and they will have to be broken here, in this world. This is a far
more incredible claim than, say, a generic Humean understanding of possibility and laws
of nature—at the very least they introduce other possible worlds to do this job, leaving
the laws in the actual world the same. It seems that instead of accepting that grounding
the metaphysically possible in the actually existing entities of the world entails that the
metaphysical possibilities will collapse into the nomic ones, they want to keep stretching
dispositionality beyond the domain where it can have any effect. But this seems like little
more than wishful thinking.
180Borghini and Williams (2008, p. 29)
181Borghini and Williams (2008, p. 29)
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If we hold that possibility results from actually existing dispositional properties, and
we also hold that no disposition can point beyond the laws of nature, then the notion of
possibility associated with such an account will be equivalent with the nomic possibilities.
Hence, it is in some sense arbitrary which word one chooses to use to denote this particular
kind of possibility; the choice will depend on other agendas one might have. I opt for using
metaphysical possibility to pick out the particular possibility described by the dispositional
account. This is, at least in part, motivated by a wish to describe the metaphysical in such a
way that is not so easily seen as something unnecessary vague, or as something mysterious
which is going beyond the existents of the actual world. The metaphysical should rather
be seen as something which is given by the properties existing in the world, by how these
properties are disposed to behave.
Borghini and Williams’ dispositional theory of possibility aims to explain possibility in
terms of actually existing dispositional properties. I have argued that the theory promises
more than it can deliver. Dispositions of actually existing things can perhaps bring about
alien properties, in the sense that we get some property not currently existing in the
world resulting from the manifestation of higher-order dispositions, but in no way will any
property be such that it has dispositions which, if manifested, may defy the laws of nature.
And with that, let us move on to a theory which is similar to Borghini and Williams’
in many ways, but which is presented in far greater detail. The question we want answered
at this point is whether the added detail of Vetter’s potentiality based account aids us in
our understanding of the connections between the disposition-based theories of possibility,
and the laws of nature.
3.4 Vetter’s potentiality account of possibility
3.4.1 Why potentiality?
It is perhaps not fair to compare one single article to one of the most comprehensive books
about dispositionality written recently, so it is obvious that Vetter’s monograph gives a
substantial amount of detail for which there was no room in Borghini and Williams’ article.
Apart from this, the most obvious difference between Borghini and Williams on the one
hand and Vetter on the other is the use of vocabulary. Diverging from most philosphers
in the field, Vetter (2015) develops a notion of potentialities as the basic entity in her
dispositional framework, instead of starting with dispositions or dispositional properties as
the main concept. The potentialities make up the conceptual base from which possibility
and other modal notions are defined. Because of this, we need to take a closer look at both
the reasoning behind preferring this terminology, and at what is meant to be included in
the potentiality term; that is, how it differs from the dispositions we usually discuss.
The main reason for preferring potentiality as the main term in Vetter’s vocabulary is
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that she needs a word which may be used in a theoretical and far broader way than what
is commonly entailed by the use of the word disposition. She seems to think that we have
few pre-philosophical intuitions tied to the term potentiality, but that we at the same time
will have
a rather firm pre-philosophical grasp on part of its extension. That part will
turn out not to be very precisely circumscribed, and I use the term ‘potentiality’
for whatever is the best and most general precise notion that includes the pre-
philosophical extension.182
This suggests that while we have few intuitions tied to the term in itself, we are sup-
posed to at least roughly understand its extension. A potentiality is, according to Vetter,
a more general notion of dispositionality, something which far surpasses what is ordinarily
thought of as a disposition. The potentialities will basically cover the same area as my
redefined dispositions from chapter 2, that is, they will cover a whole spectrum of degrees
of dispositionality: from what objects can barely do to what they have to do. This spec-
trum is in Vetter’s terminology articulated in terms of degrees of possession. A potentiality
possessed to maximal degree is something the object has to do; it has no potentiality to do
the opposite. In Vetter’s framework, the notion of maximality and the idea of nomological
dispositions—dispositions which in some way are tied to the laws of nature—are closely
intertwined. I will return to this in section 3.4.3.
As I have argued earlier, I contend that we can cater to this enormous spectrum without
having to introduce new terminology, but rather by simply defining dispositions in a more
technical way than what has been commonly done. The way Vetter speaks of dispositions
may actually be used as an argument for doing this. She notes that the expression ‘being
disposed to’ is not actually used in the same way within the philosophical context as
it is outside of philosophy. In ordinary language, this phrase is not commonly applied
to concrete inanimate objects—like the fragile vase being disposed to break—but rather
“only to agents, animate objects and (often personified) abstracta”.183 This entails that the
philosopher’s use of the word disposition is already somewhat removed from the everyday
use of the same term, and as I argued in chapter 2, I see no problem with this concept
being even further removed from its everyday use by turning it into a technical term.
3.4.2 Iterated potentialities
We recall that Borghini and Williams’ theory has a concept of higher-order dispositions,
while Vetter’s account features a notion of iterated potentialities, which fills much the same
function; they are a way of extending the reach of potentialities.184 We can use water as an
182Vetter (2015, p. 19)
183Vetter (2015, p. 66)
184Their vocabulary diverges because Vetter (2015, p. 135) wants to reserve the expression higher-order
disposition for dispositions of dispositions, and not dispositions for further dispositions.
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example of an iterated potentiality. Ordinary water does not have the potential to break,
but water does have a potentiality to freeze into ice, and ice has a potentiality to break.
Hence, water has “a potentiality to acquire (by freezing) a potentiality to break”.185 This
is what is entailed when we say that water has an iterated potentiality to break.
Potentialities may be extrinsic, and by repeated iteration an object may have poten-
tialities concerning objects entirely distinct from it. There is no limit to the number of
iterations, so we might even have cases where by the time the iterated potentiality is mani-
fested the original possessor may be long gone. Hence, we clearly see that the manifestation
of the iterated potentiality is not in itself a property of the object. The manifestation may
in the end concern something other than the iterated potentiality’s possessor in itself.
With this machinery in place, it is clear that these iterations greatly extend the reach of
the potentialities of any given object, and, as mentioned, these potentialities are such that
they may extend far beyond the object in question. Because of this we can say that such
potentialities are not potentialities for ‘being such that p’, but rather simply potentialities
for p, and even intrinsic iterated potentialities can be such that their manifestations do
not concern the possessor of the potentiality at all.186
After having introduced iterated potentialities, Vetter is ready to properly define pos-
sibility in terms of potentiality:
[POSSIBILITY] It is possible that p =df Something has an iterated potentiality
for it to be the case that p.187
This definition allows us to move from the localised to the non-localised; from the po-
tentiality which is always tied to some object, to possibility more generally. All possibilities
are as such anchored in some object or other in the actual world, so the main tenets of new
actualism is preserved.
An important divergence between Borghini and Williams and Vetter, is that the former
tie higher-order dispositions explicitly to the explanation of how the possibility grounded
in dispositions may go beyond the laws of nature, while the latter does not. While iterated
potentialities are relevant in Vetter’s argumentation for why dispositionally founded pos-
sibility may transcend the laws of nature, her overall argument relating to the domain of
the possible is more refined than Borghini and Williams’, and depends on other features
of potentiality as well. We turn to this topic now.
3.4.3 Nomological dispositions and the notion of maximality
As mentioned in section 3.3.3, we have two common and competing views pertaining to
the relationship between dispositional understandings of possibility and the laws of nature.
185Vetter (2015, p. 135)
186Vetter (2015, p. 139)
187Vetter (2015, p. 197)
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To recap, we know that it is common to assume that the metaphysically possible includes
possibilities going beyond the laws of nature, but at the same time it seems that dispositions
are constrained by what is nomically possible, and that nothing could have a disposition
to violate an actual law of nature. Vetter states, and I agree, that it is natural to assume
that this last point will also encompass potentialities, such that no object can have a
potentiality to violate any law of nature. If this also includes iterated potentialities, and
I see no reason why it should not, it seems we must reject the idea that metaphysical
possibility will encompass more than nomic possibility.
Vetter recognises that one way to solve the conundrum of the relationship between
dispositional possibility and the laws of nature is to accept dispositional essentialism, the
position I argued for in chapter 2. In that case we can, as Vetter suggests, argue that the
view that natural laws are contingent is based upon for example a confusion of metaphys-
ical possibility and conceivability.188 However, as Vetter is, to put it mildly, not overly
enthusiastic about the conditional analysis of dispositions, and as dispositional essential-
ism depends on this analysis, she is not ready to accept dispositional essentialism as it now
stands. Rather, Vetter proceeds to argue that her potentiality account may thrive along-
side both dispositional essentialism, and other shallower accounts of laws of nature such as
more traditional Humean views. Her potentiality view does not commit us to a particular
view of the laws of nature, she insists. Hence, her conclusion regarding the relationship
between dispositional accounts of possibility and the laws of nature is a refusal to take a
stance—she leaves the question wide open.189 In what follows I will question whether this
really is a reasonable stance to take.
I have already argued against Borghini and Williams’ explanation of how possibility
explained in a dispositional way allegedly was supposed to include more than nomic pos-
sibility. In doing this I showed that we do not need to appeal to dispositional essentialism
in order to argue that dispositional theories cannot account for possibilities going beyond
the nomic. However, even though Vetter’s account is similar to Borghini and Williams’ in
many ways, we cannot adopt exactly the same strategy here. The criticism must, in par-
ticular, be adapted to encompass Vetter’s notion of nomological dispositions. Nomological
dispositions are, according to Vetter, “the more fundamental dispositions which, in one
way or another, encode the laws of nature”.190 Such a concept does not exist in Borghini
and Williams’ terminology, and it is unclear whether they think dispositions at any level
of fundamentality have a role to play in generating the laws of nature.
Even though Vetter does not want to accept dispositional essentialism, she contends
that dispositions will exist at all levels of fundamentality, entailing that if there is a funda-
mental level of properties there will be dispositions among these properties. She does not
take a stance regarding whether all properties at such a fundamental or near-fundamental
188I return to this question in chapter 7.
189Vetter (2015, p. 290)
190Vetter (2015, p. 50) She does not specify what she means by encode.
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level are potentialities, hence she is settling for the weaker claim that at least some prop-
erties at each level will be potentialities. Among these potentialities, we find the subgroup
she refers to as the nomological dispositions. Nomological dispositions will be things like
charge, but since she does not notably distinguish between different kinds of properties in
terms of their fundamentality, it seems natural to assume that the nomological dispositions
will exist at higher levels as well.
The relationship between the dispositions and the laws is not completely clear in (Vet-
ter, 2015), except the fact that the nomological dispositions in some way or another encode
the laws. (Vetter, 2018) offers a hint of a clarification of this relation: Vetter uses the well-
known example of salt dissolving in water as a case of a non-fundamental disposition
entering into a lawful generalisation. She argues that the categorical properties of salt,
such as its composition or structure, are not enough to explain this law, even though those
properties are also contributing. What is needed in addition is the dispositions of the ions
of salt and water. This, in addition to the structural properties of salt and water are all we
need to explain the lawful generalisation that salt dissolves in water. This explanation does
not seem too far removed from the dispositional essentialist explanation of the same phe-
nomenon, that is, the explanation I favour. In addition, the explanation in Vetter (2018)
does not refer to the concept of nomological dispositions at all.191
If we return to (Vetter, 2015), an assumed fundamental property such as charge will have
to be characterised ‘in accordance with Coulomb’s Law’, but there are still uncertainties in
the details of how this is to be spelled out. She does, for example, not address whether the
dispositions are relevant for characterising the law, or whether the law is something that
will aid our understanding of the dispositions. What we do know is that, in the same way
as other potentialities, the nomological dispositions cannot adequately be characterised in
terms of conditionals, according to Vetter. They must be characterised in terms of their
manifestation alone:
Because of the quantitative nature of the involved properties (...) we must
think of the nomological dispositions as being individuated not by a separate
stimulus and manifestation property, but rather by a single, yet complex, man-
ifestation.192
I will return to the removal of the stimulus condition and the reasons why this is
problematic in section 3.5. First, let us delve into the notion of maximality as a distinct
property of the nomological disposition.
What is characteristic for the nomological dispositions, according to Vetter, are their
degree. Potentialities, hence also dispositions, come in degrees, and while their minimal de-
gree must be very minimal, such as a robust bridge’s potentiality to break, the nomological
191I am not sure if this reflects the fact that Vetter has changed her mind, or just that there was no
room for further details in (Vetter, 2018).
192Vetter (2015, p. 284)
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dispositions are at the other end of this scale. They are perhaps more akin to necessity,
and are always possessed to a maximal or perhaps near-maximal degree, she argues. The
suggestion that their possession might be only near-maximal is the loophole in Vetter’s
theory which gives her the opening she needs in order to argue that her potentiality ac-
count might indeed co-exist happily with theories advocating the contingency of the laws
of nature. I will return to the idea of near-maximality later.
First, we need to ask what possession of a disposition to a maximal degree entails? In
Vetter’s terminology this is a way of addressing the fact that this object does not pos-
sess any opposite potentiality. Whereas dispositions in general, in Vetter’s framework, are
potentialities of a sufficiently high degree, the nomological dispositions are the limiting
case, where potentialities are possessed to a maximal degree.193 If an object is maximally
disposed to F, then it will F in all possible cases, at all times. Such an object can do
nothing other than to manifest this disposition. Because of this, it will be the case that
the nomological dispositions behave in what she calls certain ‘law-confirming ways’. I will
look at different theories of laws more specifically in the following chapters, but note how
her language points in the direction of a more Humean view of laws here, in that these
dispositions are in some sense confirming the laws. She speaks of laws in general as some-
thing working on the dispositions, not as something stemming from certain dispositional
features existing in the world.
A problem for Vetter is that saying that charged objects have a potentiality in line with
Coulomb’s Law, and that they have this potentiality to the maximal degree does not tell
us what charge is. When we try to express what charge amounts to, we have two options
according to Vetter.194
1. Either, charge is the potentiality to exert a force F whose value stands to other
charges q and the distance between them r, in the relation F = ke q1q2r2 , or
2. charge is the maximal potentiality to exert a force F whose value stands to other
charges q and the distance between them r, in the relation F = ke q1q2r2
The first option allows a variety of degrees. We may say that it is a further determinable
property. However, since it is a nomological disposition, we want it to always be possessed
to the maximal degree. Thus, if we choose this definition, we need an additional, external,
fact about dispositions like charge which explains why they are always possessed to the
maximal degree. This fact is not part of its nature. Still, it is the case that only the
maximum degree of the potentiality to conform to the law precludes the object from also
having the potentiality not to conform to it.195 Because of this, we have to ask why it is
193Vetter (2015, p. 285)
194Vetter (2015, p. 285)
195Vetter (2015, p. 286). Speaking about ‘conforming to laws’ is another example of Vetter’s choice of
words on this matter, and yet again it points in the direction of a distinctly Humean way approaching
laws.
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the case that such dispositions are always maximally possessed if this is not part of its
description.
The second option entails identifying the nomological disposition with a “determinate
of the potentiality in question, namely, its maximal determinate”.196 Vetter holds that if
this is indeed the case—if the identification with the maximal possession of the disposition
correctly describes the property of charge—then the law in question will also be necessary.
In such a case nothing will have even an iterated potentiality to behave other than in
accordance with Coulomb’s Law.197 Nonetheless, we need to ask the reasons why we should
adopt this definition of charge, she claims. There must be some good reasons which entails
that the maximal-degree potentiality is the correct understanding of electric charge. Vetter
states that one possible option in this case is to argue that electric charge expresses a
natural property, and that this explains the maximality involved. While this might be the
case, this means that we have to ask why the maximal determinate potentiality should




. Vetter’s opinion on this matter is that stating that the one is more natural
than the other is simply ad hoc.198
According to Vetter, dispositional essentialists cannot explain in a satisfactory way
why nothing has a potentiality to exert a force of F = ke q1q2r2 to any other than the maxi-
mal degree, and because of this shortcoming they are not able to decisively conclude that
Coulomb’s Law (or other similar laws) are in fact necessary. If we cannot explain why
the potentiality is always possessed to the maximal degree, we do not have the machinery
to conclude in this matter. Because of the maximality problem, dispositional essentialism
“cannot simply adopt the present framework for thinking about dispositions and potential-
ities and then continue on the familiar path”, or so it is claimed by Vetter.199 This seems to
entail that until a satisfactory explanation is provided from the dispositional essentialist,
the dispositional essentialist view of laws and Vetter’s account of potentialities are not
completely compatible. Because Vetter is not satisfied with the hitherto existing explana-
tions for why the property of electric charge is as it is, a door is opened which allows her
to suggest that the nomological dispositions might in fact only be near-maximal.
If it is the case that some potentialities can be possessed to a near-maximal degree, this
entails that the object will generally act in accordance with the potentiality, but that a very
weak potentiality for not acting in this way also exists in the object. She claims that when
nomological dispositions are near-maximal in this way, it will be inherent to them that they
fail to manifest. However, because her view explains possibility without referring to the
stimulus condition at all, just the presence of such near-maximal nomological dispositions
are enough to make their manifestations genuine possibilities, even though they will not
196Vetter (2015, p. 286)
197Vetter (2015, p. 287)
198Vetter (2015, p. 287)
199Vetter (2015, p. 287)
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come about.
[W]e can think of laws as being grounded in potentialities without thinking of
them as metaphysically necessary. For clearly there are objects with potentiali-
ties not to behave in accordance with the laws, and hence with a (once-)iterated
potentiality for the laws to be violated: they are the very same objects which
have potentialities to behave in accordance with the laws.200
From this discussion we see that while Borghini and Williams rely on higher-order
dispositions in order to argue for the contingency of the laws of nature, Vetter’s argument
relies on the idea of near-maximality of the nomological dispositions.
I am not sure the dispositional essentialist should be overly worried about the challenge
from the idea of maximality, however. For example, we see that Vetter mentions charge
being a natural property, but she does not mention the other criterion for something being
a power, namely that the property is essentially dispositional.201 Ergo, Vetter addresses
only one part of what makes a property a power, and according to dispositional essential-
ism, powers generate the laws of nature. If we argue that certain properties basically are
what they do, or are disposed to do, there is no room for these speculations about such
dispositions being near-maximal.
3.5 The dethroning of the conditional
I will proceed to assert that, in order to argue against Vetter’s view we need to do something
more than just criticising the idea of near-maximality, and specifying the need for powers,
rather than thinking we can get by with her notion of nomological dispositions. We also
have to scrutinize Vetter’s argument that we can explain how dispositions work without
referring to a stimulus condition. Contrary to her claim that a dispositional approach to
possibility should be focused on the disposition’s manifestation alone, I hold that dismissing
the stimulus condition in this way is not adviceable. For example, we find that certain kinds
of cases which make it seem like laws are contingent may be eliminated from the set of
genuine metaphysical possibilities if we do not accept Vetter’s definition of possibility as
something solely tied to the manifestations of dispositions. In this section I will contend
that the definition of possibility proposed by Vetter leads to the set of the metaphysically
possible encompassing far too much.202
We have seen that the expansion of dispositional possibility beyond the domain of
nomic possibility can be grounded, as Borghini and Williams do, in the existence of higher-
order dispositions, or, as Vetter does, by introducing a concept of near-maximality. I have
200Vetter (2015, p. 288)
201I am assuming that she by ‘natural property’ means what I have been referring to as sparse properties.
202But this is not due to the concept of near-maximality.
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argued against both of these explanations, but there is a further consequence of both
of these accounts of possibility which has not been examined yet. That is, there exists
a third way for the dispositional accounts of possibility to provide explanation of genuine
metaphysical possibilities going beyond the nomic. The points I will address in the following
sections are compatible with both Borghini and Williams’, and Vetter’s accounts. However,
in this specific instance I am not certain that the outcome will be viewed as a positive
contribution to their accounts. My hope is that the cases discussed towards the end of the
current section are seen as sufficiently serious to call for the revision of these dispositional
accounts. Even though the conditional analysis has its shortcomings, I argue that not
addressing the conditions under which these dispositions will come about, that is, their
stimulus conditions, leads to unfortunate consequences. Let us turn to that question now.
3.5.1 Getting rid of the stimulus condition
As was addressed in chapter 1, there are, in general, two ways of tying dispositions to some
form of non-localised modality; either via a connection with counterfactual conditionals,
or via a connection with possibility. If we analyse dispositions in terms of counterfactual
conditionals, we will hold that a disposition is individuated by the pair of its stimulus
and manifestation conditions. Such an analysis might be either reductive or non-reductive.
A reductive analysis explains the disposition away, and claims that a disposition being
present is basically the same as the corresponding conditional(s) being true about the
object.203 This is not the understanding I wish to argue for. Rather, I want to advocate
a non-reductive view, where the conditional is meant to illuminate what we are speaking
about. We need not even call it an analysis, if this seems problematic in itself. I argue that
the conditional analysis is a way of encircling the concept we are trying to grasp, but that it
might still be a useful approximation at best. That is, we cannot say that there is nothing
more to say about dispositions once we have analysed them in terms of conditionals, but
the conditional analysis can point in the right direction and aid our understanding.
As we saw in chapter 2, dispositional essentialism is inherently connected with the
counterfactual conditional. The conditional analysis, referred to by Vetter as the ‘standard
conception’, has been scrutinized and found faulty by several authors.204 I presented some of
the problems tied to this understanding of dispositions in the preceding chapter, where we
saw that the issues with the conditional analysis are mostly due to the fact that the truth-
values of the dispositions and the corresponding counterfactual conditional may diverge
because of finks and masks. We also saw how the problematic aspects of the conditional
analysis arguably are not relevant at the fundamental level where the powers exist, so these
issues are seemingly of far greater importance for the more general dispositionalist than
they are for the dispositional essentialist. To avoid these problems, the two views presented
203Vetter (2015, p. 34)
204See, for example, (Lewis, 1997), (Bird, 1998), (Vetter, 2011), and (Vetter, 2015) for details.
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previously in this chapter focus explicitly on the connection with possibility. That is, the
dispositions are defined in terms of their manifestation alone. However, the existence of finks
and masks are not the only reasons why Vetter wants to leave the conditional understanding
of dispositions behind. In this section, I will focus on what she sees as problems tied
to extensional correctness, intuitions, and language use as additional reasons to prefer a
‘manifestation only’ interpretation of dispositions. I will start looking at her arguments
from language usage first, and then turn to the question of intuitions and extensional
correctness which will be considered together, as they are closely related to each other.
Vetter’s suggestion that we stop worrying about the stimulus conditions altogether, and
simply state that a disposition is best understood as ‘a disposition to manifestation M ’,
rather than ‘a disposition to M when met with stimulus S’, entails that the potentialities
are directly linked to the notion of possibility without needing to go via the counterfactual
conditional, that is, without having to deal with the stimulus condition of the disposition
at all. By individuating potentialities (including dispositions) solely by their manifestations
we obviously avoid the problems the conditional analysis is faced with, but are we sure
that Vetter’s possibility centered solution does not generate problems of its own? The way
the move towards an analysis centred on the manifestations of dispositions is presented by
Vetter, it seems that the route through possibility is surely less problematic. But I argue
that what is omitted from the more general debate is a thorough analysis of what we might
be missing by letting go of the stimulus condition as an important part of our understanding
of dispositions. Are we sure we are not removing a crucial part if we simply disregard the
importance of the stimulus condition? Are we really able to understand dispositions in an
adequate way if this condition is disposed of? I suggest that the answers here are ‘no’.
Vetter argues that the preoccupation with conditionals when accounting for dispositions
is ‘oddly at odds’ with how we ordinarily use dispositional terms in our everyday life.205
She claims that the link between dispositions and counterfactual conditionals is not as
strong as many philosophers have thought, and hence that there is room for arguments
that the important link between the localised dispositional modality and the more general
non-localised modal notions is rather something which goes through the manifestations
alone, towards the concept of possibility. Vetter’s argument for this shift consists in part of
looking at how these adjectives generally are used, as witnessed for example in dictionary
entries. Dispositional terms found in dictionaries, such as ‘fragility’ display mainly two
features in this regard:
1. They provide only one half of the putative conditional (the second half), and
2. the most natural paraphrase for the suffixes that go into their formation is not a
conditional, but rather ‘can’ or similar.206
205Vetter (2015, p. 63)
206Vetter (2015, p. 63f). Note that Vetter does not in any way think we can replace philosophy with
linguistics, but she assumes that the way language is used may give an idea also about metaphysical
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But is this ‘can’ unconditional? It seems not. It is still conditional on something hap-
pening. Even though there is no trace of conditionals in our ordinary use of language, or in
dictionary entries of particular adjectives, this does not entail that the stimulus condition
is not relevant or important. The absence could mean a number of different things. It could,
for example, indicate that the stimulus condition can be a whole range of different matters,
as is the case for a word like fragility. It would be impractical if our language was expected
to reflect this multitude of reasons why something might be broken or shattered. Imagine
that we have both a fragile glass and a fragile document. The use of ‘fragile’ entails that
these things may be destroyed if we do not treat them in a careful way, but the term is far
too wide to say anything about what kind of actions will lead to the disposition of fragility
to manifest in such markedly different objects. This does not entail that these actions are
irrelevant, they are just extremely varied. And it is not just the cases where we have com-
plex and diverse stimulus conditions which are relevant here. The fact that the stimulus
condition is often omitted could also be seen to reflect that the stimulus condition might
be unknown to us, and that quite a few dispositions come about without our knowledge of
which stimulus actually made that manifestation occur. In short, we need to acknowledge
that our way of using language does not exclusively have the conclusion Vetter wants to
draw here.
Another and important question we should ask at this point is the following. Does
it really matter how we pre-philosophically tend to use dispositional expressions? Is our
philosophical theory genuinely worse off if it does not mirror our use of similar concepts
or notions in our daily lives? I think not. Our analysis of the terms we use philosophically
should not limit itself to elaborations about what we really mean when we, in this case,
speak of dispositions, abilities, possibilities, and similar. We do not need to find the real
meaning of these terms, if this is understood as something that exists out there in the
world, specifically in how we tend to use words. We can rather argue for the existence
of specific concepts—powers, for instance—and then use things which already exists, like
the counterfactual conditional, to explain, and to circle in on the thing we want to have
explained in order to use it in a philosophical context. Just like in the sciences, having
technical terms is of great use in philosophy, but in order to use the concept of dispositions
in a philosophical way we do not have to be able to explain the folk notion of a disposition.
What we need to be able to do is to explicate the tool we are using in as precise a way as
possible, that is, to explain what the philosophical notion of a disposition entails.
3.5.2 Extensional correctness and the influence of intuitions
According to Vetter, any theory of modality will have to meet three constraints. Extensional
correctness, formal adequacy, and semantic utility. In this thesis I will mainly focus on
implications.
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the constraint of extensional correctness. Firstly, because this underlies much of Vetter’s
argumentation, and lays certain premises for her discussion, for example when it comes
to deciding which concepts are most important. Secondly, because this is where our main
disagreement lies. Both the idea of extensional correctness and the use of intuitions are also
key points when it comes to my argument that the laws of nature are, contrary to these
intuitions, necessary. This indicates that I will need to weigh the importance of extensional
correctness against the arguments I have for assuming the laws to be necessary.
For Vetter the use of intuitions is not only relevant when the question is whether or not
our philosophical theorising is concurring with our prephilosophical ideas about modality,
it is also something which is actively used in our theorising, for example as follows:
To get our intuitions in focus, let us use the stock examples of dispositions
again. Those, after all, provide our best grasp so far of potentiality.207
What is referred to as ‘stock examples’ are the standard examples of dispositions, such
as fragility. In addition to speaking about tuning in to our intuitions, we have also seen
that Vetter spends a considerable amount of time looking at how people actually use
language, in order to be able to employ actual language use as arguments for how we
should view dispositions. Both her focus on intuitions, and on actual language use are
elements of her arguments for why we should view dispositions as possibility-like rather than
counterfactual-like, and for why we should think that a metaphysical theory of possibility
needs to be able to explain things like the possibility of a talking donkey.208
I have already noted Vetter’s notion of extensional correctness before, both in chapter
1 and when addressing Borghini and Williams’ theory of possibility. To recap, the idea of
extensional correctness which is of relevance here amounts to the following.
1. We have certain ‘firm convictions’ about what is metaphysically possible and what
is not, and
2. These firm convictions should mostly come out true on any metaphysical account of
modality.209
The first questions that, I argue, will have to be asked here are, firstly, who are ‘we’
and, secondly, which are these ‘firm convictions’? That is, which set of convictions are such
that they are correctly classified as the firm ones Vetter is referring to. Moreover, is it
correct to assume that a wide interpretation of ‘we’ is in order here, such that we assume
that all humans of all times share some set of intuitions about modality which we should
207Vetter (2015, p. 85) in relation to specifying the idea of maximality.
208An example Vetter herself uses.
209Vetter (2015, p. 15). I used another formulation of hers earlier in the chapter, because of the additional
weight put on the aspect of explanation which was relevant at that point. This aspect is not the main
point now.
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cater to? The assumption that such a set even exists seems overly optimistic on behalf of
human beings as a group.210 In addition, even if such a set did exist, why should we make
sure that precisely these modal intuitions be validated by our theory of modality? For
instance, Vetter states that many of her main objections against a conditional analysis of
dispositions stem from its failure in relation to extensional correctness.211 This entails that
Vetter thinks extensional correctness is so important that when other accounts overlap to
a lesser degree with prior intuitions, we have good reason to discard them.
I do not think the importance of extensional correctness is anywhere near where Vetter
wants to place it, so I do not feel compelled to agree with her rejection of the conditional
analysis on this basis. Rather than accepting Vetter’s view, and argue that intuitions should
be given this kind of weight in our philosophical theorising, I hold that our metaphysical
explanations should instead contribute to separate our well-founded and correct beliefs
from those beliefs that are wrongfully held. This seems far more interesting than striving
to make our metaphysical explanations fit already held beliefs. In addition, I hold that
the use of stock examples and intuitions is problematic in itself when the justification for
this use is that this, allegedly, will provide our best grasp of potentiality. It is problematic
because it points in the direction of the given account being, to a large degree, an analysis
of how we use dispositional terms, and not of what dispositionality itself entails.
We might even go as far as to say that we do not need the folk notion of a disposition
at all. We have used the well known idea of a disposition in order to give us a hint of what
our philosophical concepts should entail. But in doing so we do not need to pay heed to the
way these notions are generally used in natural languages. We use well-known concepts in
order to elucidate the things we want to explain—to get an approximate idea of what we
are after—but the well-known concepts in themselves need not be incorporated into the
philosophical theory.
3.5.3 Too much possibility?
I argue that leaving the stimulus condition out of either the definition, or the individuation
of the disposition, does not entail that this condition is no longer relevant. The fact of the
matter is that very few dispositions will be manifested without there being something
making this happen, and that this something is crucial for the disposition being the way
that it is; for being exactly that disposition. The stimulus condition lurks in the background
anyway. Not addressing it does not make it go away.
In this section I want to present the following thought experiment. What if we assume
there to be certain dispositions which are really existing, but which have certain impossible
stimuli (as well as possible), and following this also certain impossible manifestations.
Which consequences would be seen if we assume Vetter’s account to be correct? As far
210See (Weinberg et al., 2001) for examples of how intuitions can vary between different cultures.
211Vetter (2015, p. 15)
3.5 The dethroning of the conditional 91
as I can tell, her account is compatible with these cases, but the interesting question is
whether she would take them to be further arguments for accepting possibilities going
beyond the nomic, or whether she agrees that such thought experiments may be used to
show serious flaws tied to the dispositionalist project. Another question is whether these
flaws are so great that the present, manifestation centred, form of dispositionalism should
be abandoned.
In line with my earlier position, I will argue that the latter consequence is the correct
one. A dispositionalism disregarding the stimulus condition should be abandoned. I would
also further specify that seeing the mere existence of dispositions as the criterion for pos-
sibility is an unsatisfactory explanation of possibility. Vetter’s alternative, manifestation
focused, conception of dispositions does not initially seem problematic, but it becomes prob-
lematic when it is used to explain possibility the way she does. The fear I have concerning
this characterisation of possibility is that it will, in the end, give us more possibilities than
what we initially bargained for. That is, we may end up concluding that more things are
possible than what is actually the case.
If our goal is to explain possibility, and to figure out which things are actually possible,
that is, to specify the domain of the possible, this is a serious problem. If we want a
correct theory of possibility, but still end up with a set of ‘possibilities’ which is larger
than the set of genuine metaphysical possibilities, something must be wrong with our
theory. Of course we can solve this by stating that what we are after is some kind of ‘wider
metaphysical possibility’, but this hardly seems satisfactory. I have already argued that
what is metaphysically possible given a dispositional theory of possibility will be exactly
those things which are nomically possible, so even though several dispositionalists accept
that the metaphysical may outstrip the nomic, I do not. My hope is that the following
example will make my position seem even more well-founded.
Let us look at an example of what might happen if we remove the stimulus condition
altogether. One problem has to do with the aforementioned question of whether there might
be genuine dispositions which have impossible stimuli and hence impossible manifestations.
How should we treat such dispositions if we do not consider the stimulus condition to be
of importance? If we, as Vetter suggests, view possibility simply as the fact that some
potentiality for a particular manifestation exists, how are we to deal with a potentiality
for having infinite mass when a material body is accelerated to the speed of light, for
example? It seems like this is a genuine disposition. A disposition which is at work at any
time when there is a change in some object’s mass and velocity, and the specific result—
the manifestation—is in this case completely dependent on the stimulus condition of the
disposition. This disposition relates mass and velocity in a dispositional way—such and such
change in velocity results in such and such change of mass, and as an object approaches
the speed of light, the mass approaches infinity. This is an effect of special relativity. If
m0 is the mass of an object in the frame of reference at rest, and u is the velocity of the
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according to special relativity, the mass of the moving object as measured in the frame at
rest appears as m = m0√
1−u2
c2
. This means that if we have an observer at rest and an object
accelerated to the speed of light, the mass m, measured in the frame of reference at rest,
approaches infinity as the formula shows (γ tends to infinity). This means that an object
with mass cannot reach the speed of light.
If we understand dispositions in a conditional way, we can explain how having infinite
mass is not a genuine possibility, because it is conditional on the object moving at the speed
of light. The stimulus condition is not possible, and neither is the related manifestation,
as this possibility is dependent on a disposition which is individuated by a set of stimulus
and manifestation conditions. However, if dispositions are individuated solely by their
manifestation, and if the possibility just depends on the disposition existing, then it seems
that Vetter must accept infinite mass as a genuine possibility. I cannot see how this could
be a desired consequence of assuming a dispositional account of modality.
Another problematic issue which needs to be examined when considering a manifes-
tation centred conception of dispositions is that it seems there could exist relevantly dif-
ferent dispositions which will nonetheless have identical manifestations, at least at the
non-fundamental level where Vetter mostly operates. Thus, if the individuation of the dis-
positions are based solely on the background of their manifestations, Vetter’s approach
will miss these differences, and judge distinct dispositions to be the same based on the fact
that their manifestation is identical. Vetter certainly recognises that saying that disposi-
tions are individuated solely by their manifestations is a simplification. Some dispositions
may for instance have the same manifestation but differ in degree, or two dispositions
may be different if one is extrinsic and the other intrinsic, even if their manifestation is
qualitatively identical in these cases. But, she specifies, none of these qualifications will
even be remotely similar to a stimulus condition.212 Reintroducing the stimulus condition
in the individuation of dispositions will mean that we can differentiate between such cases,
but such a reintroduction at the non-fundamental level also entails that we need to find
satisfactory solutions to the problems tied to finks and masks. Thus, we see that both the
understanding of dispositions as being tied to conditionals and the route through possibility
are problematic.
What I have been aiming to show in this section is that the missing stimulus condi-
tion leads to some very unfortunate consequences. I have also shown how these effects
are a separate and independent issue which neither depends on the notion of a higher-
order disposition as applied by Borghini and Williams, nor on Vetter’s notion of near-
maximality. The alleged expansion of the domain of the metaphysically possible based on
either higher-order dispositions or near-maximality is an intended part of each account, ex-
plicitly argued by their proponents. However, I fear that the effects of the missing stimulus
212Vetter (2015, p. 96)
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condition explained above, is both an unintentional and unfortunate consequence which
neither Borghini and Williams, nor Vetter, bargained for.
3.6 Dispositional essentialism and metaphysical pos-
sibility
So far in this chapter we have seen suggestions of how possibility might be described
and understood in a dispositional way. I argue that although these explanations might fare
better than a standard possible world centred approach, there are still quite a few problems
they face, and I cannot, as the accounts now stand, give my support to any of them. The
natural move, then, is to change our attention from the notion of dispositions to the notion
of dispositional essences.
We should, first of all, question whether or not there is a real demand for dispositional
theories of possibility if we already accept dispositional essences at the fundamental level as
parts of our basic ontology. Do we really need elaborate accounts of metaphysical possibility
in terms of dispositions in addition to what we already get from assuming dispositional
essentialism? In addition, and particularly in light of the discussion in chapter 2, we need to
ask whether the dispositional essences may legitimately be used to enlighten us concerning
possibility.
I have argued that there are two main reasons for assuming powers to exist, that is, to
assume dispositional essentialism about fundamental properties. By doing this, we obtain
both an account of property identity at the fundamental level and an account of laws of
nature. As briefly mentioned in the preceding chapter, Bird does mention a third, more
speculative, reason as well, namely, that it might be the base for an account of modality
more generally:
A further argument in favour of the ontology of powers is that it may be
able to provide an account of possibility and necessity, one with advantages
over Lewis’s modal realism. Dispositions are linked with counterfactual and
subjunctive possibilities. If powers are ontologically fundamental, then this fact
about dispositions may be used to ground facts about what is possible.213
In line with this quote, and with what I have argued earlier in this thesis, I contend
that dispositional essences through their connection with the laws of nature do provide
grounding for what is metaphysically possible, this means that we can expand the area
where powers are of relevance, beyond Bird’s account. Thus, it seems that if we already
213Bird (2018, p. 250). At this point he is referring to several philosophers who have presented disposi-
tional accounts of possibility, such as Borghini and Williams (2008), Vetter (2015), and Jacobs (2010), but
none of these have connected possibility with dispositional essences. Bird also refers back to his own (Bird,
2007, p. 218) where he does suggest a dispositional account of modality could be a possibility, through a
dispositional analysis of necessity. This suggestion has not been further developed.
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endorse dispositional essentialism, we do not need the broader category of dispositions to
provide possibility for us. We should note that when Bird (2018) discusses this topic he
assumes that gaining an explanation of modality in general cannot serve as an argument
for assuming macro-powers. The idea that powers can provide an account of possibility and
necessity was the third point in his argumentation for assuming powers at the fundamental
level. Just as the two other arguments, the assumption that powers do provide an account
of modality does indeed only support the idea that powers exist at a fundamental level.
For what is possible or not regarding things with non-fundamental properties
supervenes on what is possible or not regarding things with fundamental prop-
erties. There are no possibilities left unaccounted for by fundamental powers,
to account for which we would have to posit macro powers.214
As was the case with both the argument from the laws of nature and the argument
from property identity, which were examined in chapter 2, the argument from modality
too shows powers to be a feature of fundamental metaphysics. However, this last argument
from modality seems to have unsuspected consequences for the more general accounts of
modality in terms of dispositions as well. If we take the statement from Bird at face value
it does in fact suggest that these accounts are not needed in order to explain modality,
because there are no possibilities left for which we would need dispositions to provide an
explanation.215
At the same time we should make sure to ask whether we lose something valuable if
we state that there is no need for dispositional accounts of possibility. One of the positive
features these accounts have is that they provide a clear and simple way of explaining
how and why ordinary happenings at the macro level are (seen as) possible. Possibility,
understood as the manifestation of a disposition, is entailed in the properties of objects
because they are disposed to behave in this way. It is a wonderfully simple idea, but what
if this explanation is not needed?
It seems that, on a purely metaphysical level, dispositional essentialism gives us ev-
erything we need. The dispositional essences of fundamental properties and relations, in
addition to the way they are further structured is what gives us the macro-properties,
macro-relations, and so on. Vetter (2018) is presenting an idea which seems to resonate
well with my thoughts regarding this topic when she states the following:
Given dispositional essentialism as a thesis about the fundamental properties,
it would seem that all it takes to explain macro dispositions is there within the
disposition-bearing object itself: its categorical properties plus the dispositions
of its parts. Where those parts are themselves complex, we may then go on
214Bird (2018, p. 251f.)
215They might still be useful for explaining a wide range of other phenomena in non-fundamental meta-
physics, of course.
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to explain their dispositions in terms of the nature and arrangement of their
parts; but the same reasoning will apply again. And thus we may, in principle,
go on until we reach the fundamental level. Given dispositional essentialism,
that level is itself dispositional; it’s dispositions all the way down.216
However, Vetter goes on to argue that this implies that we should reverse the order of
explanation between laws and dispositions at all levels. That is, she argues that disposi-
tionality comes first also beyond the fundamental level which is the concern of dispositional
essentialism. Rather than focusing on how the laws of nature limit the domain of the pos-
sible, as I am inclined to do, she suggests bestowing a special status upon dispositionality
in general. Following this, it is dispositionality which is the key explanatory factor at all
levels of complexity, and hence this should be our focal point. Therefore, where I propose
that we focus on the existence of particular properties, the powers, and the laws follow-
ing from these properties, Vetter suggests that the centre of attention be dispositionality
in itself. Hence, Vetter’s focus is more directed towards the explanatory characteristics of
dispositionality, whereas I argue from the existence of fundamental powers.
This is in line with (Vetter, 2018, p. 294) where she distinguishes between explanatory
dispositionalism and existential dispositionalism, and further argues that it is not obvious
how explanatory dispositionalism must go along with a concern about property existence
at all. This question, however, is crucial for the dispositional essentialist. Thus, we see yet
another clear difference between Vetter’s account and mine. Whereas she holds that dispo-
sitionality should come first, and be an explanatory foundation, at all levels, I argue that
dispositionality should come first at the fundamental level, and that explanations at other
levels will have to depend on laws and structural composition as well as dispositions. We
should note that these two views are compatible with each other, so we could for instance
argue that we have dispositions at non-fundamental levels as an explanatory add-on to dis-
positional essentialism. As per my earlier statements, I cannot advocate dispositionalism
as it now stands. Such a support would presuppose that we are able to repair the problems
raised by the stimulus condition of the dispositions.
Furthermore, we need to note that the dispositionality which Vetter wants to give
this explanatory role at the non-fundamental level is already limited by the laws at the
fundamental level, as well as other supervening laws of nature. And, as already noted, at
the fundamental level dispositions do come first—they are explanatory prior to the laws. It
seems that Vetter would like dispositions at all levels to have the same explanatory power
as the dispositions at the fundamental level do. But can mere dispositions take on this task?
Regarding this, we need to remember that the powers are not only dispositional, they are
essentially so. And it seems it is this idea of a particular kind of essence which is at the core
of the explanation here, not merely the fact that these properties are dispositional. Given
216Vetter (2018, p. 295)
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that we do not have essential dispositionality on other levels, I wonder whether dispositions
really do have the explanatory power that Vetter wants them to have.
If we go back to the question of what we eventually lose by discarding a theory of general
modality in terms of everyday dispositions, such as fragility, it seems that the greatest loss is
not at the level of metaphysics, but rather at the level of epistemology. We may ask, how do
we know that something is possible, and answer that we know about the dispositionality of
the objects interacting in the situation, and following this we will know about the related
possibility as well. The focus on everyday well-known and named dispositions such as
fragility and solubility suggests this is the case. As Vetter says, “If metaphysical modality
is based on dispositions, then our ways of knowing about dispositions are, in principle,
ways of knowing about metaphysical modality.”217 In addition, we remember that one of
her three main reasons for assuming dispositionalism was an epistemic point:
Dispositionalism, I said, avoids the drawback of a possible-worlds metaphysics
by anchoring possibilities in the right kind of objects: actual objects, with
which we have epistemic contact. By anchoring them in the dispositions of such
objects, dispositionalism promises a plausible story about the epistemology of
modality. We clearly have a great deal of knowledge about the dispositions of
the individual objects around us (as well as of our own). Such knowledge arises
from, and is used in, both everyday and scientific contexts.218
Thus, projects like Vetter’s are at its core not simply about what possibility, or modality
in general, is—that is, what constitutes the metaphysical grounding of possibility—but
also about our ways of knowing about these things. And from this perspective it is clear
that a more general dispositional account of possibility at all levels is preferable compared
with an account of dispositional essences which must rely on a relation of supervenience
in order to explain what goes on at the non-fundamental levels. As my interests are more
of a purely metaphysical nature I am not all that troubled by the fact that we might not
be able to directly explain every possibility at the macro-level, as long as we can say that
all genuine possibilities supervene on, and are limited by, the dispositional essences at the
fundamental level.
We should note that the suggestions aiming to connect dispositional essentialism with
dispositionalism more broadly presented here are all characterised by being preliminary
and vague.219 This landscape is mostly uncharted waters, and sadly, I will not contribute
to specifying a definitive link between the fundamental and the non-fundamental. What
I will settle for, however, is to focus on the clearest limitation of possibility we can find
at the fundamental level, that is, the fundamental laws of nature, and argue that given a
217Vetter (2015, p. 10)
218Vetter (2015, p. 11)
219Bird (2007) hints at the possibility at the very last page of his book, and Vetter (2018) admits she is
‘painting with a very broad brush’.
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dispositional essentialist account of the laws of nature, we do get the foundation for the
domain of the possible. Because of this, the subsequent chapters will address the laws of
nature, particularly the dispositional essentialist contribution to the understanding of the
laws.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I have shifted the focus from that of dispositional essentialism to disposi-
tionalism more broadly. My main concern has been to specify the domain of the possible,
and I have shown how dispositionalists, such as Borghini and Williams and Vetter, argue
that dispositional accounts of possibility can compete with the genuine modal realist when
it comes to accommodating happenings which may even go beyond the laws of nature.
Following this, I have aimed to show how the features of dispositional accounts which are
presented as responsible for making such results possible are highly questionable, and that
they do not seem to be up to the appointed task. Hence, the claim that dispositional ac-
counts of possibility can accommodate possibilities going beyond the laws of nature does
not seem to hold. In addition to this, I have demonstrated how the definition of possibility
solely based on the manifestations of dispositions opens for a set of ‘possibilities’ which
look unacceptable. Hence, if the definition of possibility based upon the manifestations of
dispositions is to be kept, it needs to be modified.
Rather than give my support to any dispositional account of possibility, however, I
contend that the possible might in fact be grounded in dispositional essences and laws
of nature. Having said that, I do note that this move from dispositions to dispositional
essences, firstly, entails a slight loss in the explanatory features of the account, and secondly,
entails endorsing an underdeveloped view in need of a substantial amount of work if it is
to match the dispositional theories of possibility currently on the market.





In chapter 2 I argued that assuming the existence of powers gives us two important advan-
tages. Firstly, we obtain an account of property identity, and secondly, we automatically
gain an account of the laws of nature as well. The laws, according to the dispositional
essentialist, are metaphysically necessary; moreover, in chapter 3 I argued that also the
more broadly dispositional accounts of possibility cannot give us genuine possibilities going
beyond the laws of nature. However, apart from specifying that the laws of nature, accord-
ing to the dispositional essentialist, will have to be a matter of metaphysical necessity, I
have so far omitted both the details pertaining to an account of laws of nature based on
powers, as well as details concerning laws of nature in general.
In fact the subject matter of laws is of such great importance for my overall argument
in this thesis that it will be the main focal point of the remaining chapters. In the present
chapter, I will start the project of accounting for the laws of nature, by discussing two of
the more traditional views of laws which my dispositional essentialist theory will later be
compared with. The goal is to show, in chapters 5 and 6, that a view of laws based on
powers is superior to these competing views. Note that chapters 4, 5, and 6 should be seen
as a unit of the thesis, where chapter 4 plays a preparatory role for the following chapters.
As one of my interests is to figure out what makes possible things possible, while explicitly
tying the notion of possibility to that which is not precluded by the laws of nature, we
need to specify these limitations. Hence, a discussion of the laws of nature is an inevitable
topic here.
We need to investigate different accounts of laws even if we agree with the dispositional
essentialist view of properties, and as such already are committed to a particular view of
the laws of nature. This is mainly because showing that the dispositional essentialist view
of laws is superior to the competing views gives additional weight to our argument that
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fundamental properties are powers. However, in order to be able to do this we need to
know what we are arguing against. This is the main motivation for including the current
chapter, which will, for the most part, be a discussion concerning accounts of laws which are
unavailable for the dispositional essentialist, but which nonetheless are competing views
regarding laws. Even though it might seem redundant to go into an additional debate
regarding the laws of nature if we agree with the dispositional essentialist, we nevertheless
still need to show that the account of laws based on powers can compete with the best
categoricalist alternatives.
In addition, if we want to use the available accounts of laws as further arguments for, or
to strengthen our arguments for, dispositional essentialism about fundamental properties,
we need an understanding of what laws of nature are more generally. This understanding
will in turn influence many other philosophical standpoints, as our other standpoints will
influence how we understand the laws. Because of this I will include some more general
remarks about laws and lawhood in this chapter. Roughly speaking, when discussing the
metaphysics of modality, we see that this field is a very tight-woven web of related ideas,
where our understanding of the other modal features of the world (say our view on the
eventual essential features of certain properties), will be very closely linked to our under-
standing of the laws of nature. This is the case for all the accounts of laws presented in the
current and the following chapters.
The chapter is structured as follows. I will begin in section 4.2, by presenting a brief
general discussion relating to what laws of nature are, and why they are so important in the
context of this study. In section 4.3 I will discuss the categoricalist’s need for accounts of
laws, as well as presenting Lewis’s best systems view of laws of nature. Section 4.4 discusses
an alternative view of laws which is also compatible with the assumption that categoricalism
about fundamental properties is correct, Armstrong’s account of nomic necessitation.
4.2 What are laws, and why are they important?
We know that there are lots of regularities in the world, but not all regularities are the same.
The set of all regularities can in general be divided into two groups. Some of them are seen
as laws of nature, while others are just regularities. In order to see what is at stake here,
we can have a look at a rather well known example, used in for example (Van Fraassen,
1989, p. 27) as part of his discussion of universality. We may suggest that laws concern
“only what is universal and invariable”, as Bas van Fraassen phrases it, but universality in
itself is simply not enough to make something a law, in the same way that the fact that
something is a regularity is not in itself enough to guarantee lawhood. We need something
more. Consider the following example meant to illustrate this problem.
1. All solid spheres of enriched uranium (U235) have a diameter of less than one mile.
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2. All solid spheres of gold (Au) have a diameter of less than one mile.
Both statements are true. Both are also, to the best of our knowledge, universal regu-
larities. But it is not the case that both statements represent laws, or lawful connections
in nature. There is nothing preventing the existence of a solid gold sphere of this size, save
the scarcity of gold, but there is something in the very properties and structure of uranium
which prevents this element from exceeding a certain mass, and hence also a certain size or
volume. Following this, we see that both statements are actually true, but the second one
only accidentally so.220 The first statement, on the other hand, is both true and necessarily
so, because of the properties of uranium, and it is as such an example of a law concerning
uranium.
These kinds of examples point towards the importance of investigating what accounts
for this alleged difference, but we can also ask whether it is correct to see this as something
which presents an important ontological divide at all. That is, we may ask whether it
really is the case that there are such great differences between laws and regularities. Might
it perhaps instead be the case that laws are just privileged regularities, that is, exceptionless
regularities, of which are more certain?
In this thesis I argue the exact opposite. There are important differences between laws
and regularities, and we should strive to develop an understanding of the difference between
things that are always the case, but still are accidental, and things that not only are always
the case but are also laws.
There are two reasons for which questions regarding laws of nature are important when
dealing with modality. Firstly, because the laws tell us something about which things can,
or might, possibly happen—they point towards what we might call the modal space of
the world—shedding light on the aforementioned question of what makes possible things
possible. Secondly because reflection on the laws give rise to questions concerning their own
modal nature. Especially important is the question whether laws themselves are contingent
or necessary, and if necessary what kind of necessity this is. The answers provided to this
second question will in turn influence the aforementioned modal space of the world; that
is, the grounds from which possibility rises. To be able to answer these questions however,
we must first have an understanding of what a law of nature is taken to be, according to
the different views.
As mentioned briefly earlier, the concept of law debated in this thesis is a philosophical
one, and will as such not be exactly the same as a scientific law. This is an important point
to note, as it entails that the terms law of nature and scientific law are not coextensive.
I will however argue that they are overlapping at least to some degree.221 The reason for
220Of course, the scarcity of gold is given by the way gold is actually made in nuclear reactions, and as
such that too is a nomic fact, and there will be certain limitations to just how big a solid gold sphere could
be if we collected all the gold in the universe. However, the point the example refers to has to do with the
structure of the elements, and the fact that uranium has a critical mass, so we may set this complication
aside.
221This corresponds to a view of laws of nature stating that we can figure out what the laws are, even
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distinguishing between these two notions of laws is that while scientific laws can be revised,
proved wrong or be inaccurate in some way or another, this is not the case for the genuine
laws of nature. These genuine laws are the underlying laws we through science strive to
discover and understand. As such, they are metaphysical and not epistemic entities. This
means that when I speak of possibilities going beyond the laws of nature I am not speaking
of the discovery of better, more fitting laws in the sciences. Nothing in the laws of nature
changed when we realised phlogiston played no role in the process of combustion; our
knowledge about the world and its laws changed, not the laws themselves.
This is a view which requires that we in some sense be realist about laws. The laws of
nature are not just convenient labels for the regularities we observe around us, but in some
sense genuine patterns in reality, and central building blocks in the ontological structure
of the world. However, even if the terms are not coextensive, we may use the notion of
the scientific laws in order to understand what the laws of nature may be.222 In addition,
one can note the following perhaps self-evident but important feature of laws. The fact
that something is called a law does not entail that it is a law, and something not being
called a law does not entail that it cannot be a law.223 Thus, we open for the fact that
we may both incorrectly label something as a law, and that there are laws at play in the
world of which we have incomplete or indeed no current knowledge. Again, we see that
there is this tension between our epistemic access to features of the world we deem to be
lawful, and the underlying metaphysical necessities in nature. Thus, when discussing laws
of nature as a metaphysical feature of the world, we need to make sure we do not confuse
these potentially different entities.
Because of our fallibility when it comes to figuring out what the genuine laws of nature
are, I will follow several contemporary accounts of laws in arguing that it will not be
particularly fruitful to look at all the propositions that are generally referred to as laws,
and then try to find some particular unity among them, in order to figure out what it
means to be a law of nature. A better suggestion is to have a look at the circumstances
that led to these statements being called laws in the first place, to see which criteria were
involved, and subsequently use this to find a unity to what people call laws. From this the
following picture of unity regarding what may be called a law emerges:
[People] are willing to regard a proposition as asserting a law if, as far as
they then know, the proposition correctly states a general and non-accidental
relationship among properties, where that relationship plays a fundamental,
explanatory role in the relevant scientific domain.224
Not all philosophical theories of laws of nature define laws like this, preferring, for
though this might not be the case for all of them. I support this view.
222Bird (2007, p. 190) even argues that the fact that many areas of science employ talk of laws gives us
a reason to believe that laws exist.
223Bird (2007, p. 198), arguing against Stephen Mumfords position of lawlessness.
224Bird (2007, p. 203)
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example, to understand them just as well defined regularities in the world (and little
more than this). And even if one sees laws in an ontologically more substantial way, there
are still many different explanations and ways to gain understanding of what laws truly
are available. The aim of this chapter is, as already mentioned, to outline two different
categoricalist answers to the questions presented in the introduction. The next chapter will
consist of a specification of the version of dispositional essentialism I find most promising.
This means that I will present three main views in these chapters of the thesis.225 They
differ greatly in both their account of what a law is, but also in the degree they accept
that a law of nature is necessary.
The two accounts discussed in the present chapter, though both being firmly in line
with the categoricalist assumptions about the fundamental properties, diverge substantially
when it comes to both the question of how laws are grounded, and the question of the degree
to which they are necessary. In fact, the metaphysical commitment to the necessity of the
laws will be steadily increasing throughout this and the next chapter. The regularity view
of Lewis is the weakest, Armstrong’s contingent necessity is a bit stronger, and then come
the strongest, the different versions of dispositional essentialism we shall meet in chapter
5.
4.3 Categoricalism and the best systems approach
4.3.1 The categoricalist need for accounts of laws of nature
If we argue for some form of categoricalist account of properties226, the accompanying
account of laws will typically have an element of Humeanism in it. The main motivations
for these theories seems to be twofold. First, to account for laws without locating modality
in the properties or objects. Second, to provide an understanding of laws that goes hand
in hand with the very common intuition that the laws of nature are contingent. It is easy
for us to conceive that the laws could have been different, and these theories capture that
intuition. This starting point does, however, give us a substantial amount of manoeuvring
space, something which entails that the categoricalist is in a more complicated situation
than the powers theorist because they have several possible accounts of laws to choose
from. As a consequence, a categoricalist has the option of viewing laws as little more than
regularities, but they can also embrace accounts which see the laws as something more
substantial than this.
In this section of the chapter, and the next, I will present categoricalist views of laws
which may be characterised as either fully Humean or semi-Humean. To begin with, I
will introduce a regularity-based view of laws grounded in what is commonly known as
225Where the dispositional essentialist view presented in chapter 5 also comes in two varieties.
226Referring back to chapter 2, the categoricalist holds that the fundamental properties of the world are
not essentially dispositional.
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Humean supervenience. This understanding of laws is largely tied to Lewis, with inspiration
going back to Ramsey and Mill. It is also defended, with certain modifications, in later
publications, notably by Loewer (1996), Earman and Roberts (2005), as well as Psillos
(2014).
I will mainly stick to Lewis’s original formulation of the view, partly because it is fairly
straightforward and hence easier to use as an example, but also because certain features,
and hence certain consequences of the original account, are prevalent for most or all of the
different modifications of the theory. All accounts which have Humean supervenience as
the starting point will have to recognise the laws as something which supervene on the sum
of particular facts in a given world. In addition, all proponents of these accounts depend on
possible worlds, which now have to do quite a lot of metaphysical heavy lifting. They will
also need a concept of closeness of worlds, of similarity between both worlds themselves
and the inhabitants of worlds, and also to propose some idea of what a possible world is.
As mentioned in the introductory chapter of this thesis, these are not trivial problems to
face. In addition, arguing for a Humean view of fundamental properties entails that you
need a theory of laws in addition to an account of properties.
In line with my discussion in chapter 2, the arguments related to fundamental proper-
ties alone are enough to abandon categoricalism and to consider dispositional essentialism
instead. When we move from a debate centred on properties to one concerning laws, the
categoricalist picture becomes even less tempting to defend. If we are ready to accept the
consequences a powers-based theory of fundamental properties comes with, such as the
fact that the laws of nature will have to be seen as absolutely (metaphysically) necessary,
it does seem like the better overall choice. To spell this picture out clearly, the situation is
as follows. Either
1. we accept a theory of properties which is also a theory of the laws of nature, or
2. we have a theory of properties which entails the need for a theory of laws in addition.
If we care about parsimony, and are willing to accept the consequences of postulating
dispositional essences at the fundamental level, the choice seems easy, and we should settle
for option 1.
4.3.2 Lewis’s Humean supervenience
One of the more common answers to the questions regarding laws draws much inspiration
from Hume and his views on regularities. Because of this the laws become what I have
already referred to as ‘privileged’ regularities, hence these theories may be referred to as
regularity theories. Hume wrote little on laws, but his views on cause and effect have been a
great influence for Lewis. The inspiration from Hume is both explicitly expressed and also
visible in most of his work concerning modality and possible worlds, particularly through
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the way he in general makes a point of explaining the modal concepts by way of a non-
modal, or categorical, mosaic of particular facts. We should of course make it completely
clear that defending Humean supervenience in no way implies commitment to other aspects
of Hume’s philosophy. Rather, it is described by Lewis as follows.
Humean supervenience is named in honor of the greater denier of necessary
connections. It is the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic
of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another. We
have geometry: a system of external relations of spatio-temporal distance be-
tween points. Maybe points of spacetime itself, maybe point-sized bits of matter
or aether or fields, maybe both. And at those points we have local qualities:
perfectly natural intrinsic properties which need nothing bigger than a point
at which to be instantiated. For short: we have an arrangement of qualities.
And that is all. There is no difference without difference in the arrangement of
qualities. All else supervenes on that227.
According to Lewis, all there is to the world is this vast mosaic—an arrangement of
qualities—distributed and related to each other spatiotemporally. The thesis of Humean
supervenience states just this, that the whole truth about the world, everything we know
and can know, supervenes on the spatiotemporal arrangement of local qualities throughout
history. Hence, in worlds like ours, the fundamental relations that exist are the spatiotem-
poral relations: distance relations, both spacelike and timelike and “perhaps also occupation
relations between point-sized things and spacetime points”.228 This is in line with Hume’s
formulation that “[a]ll events seem entirely loose and separate”.229 We may picture the
world as a mosaic floor, or as Maudlin (2007) does, we can compare it to the relationship
between pixels in a photograph and the whole picture. Just like these pixels, the small
parts of the world have their own properties. Just like the whole picture, composed of a
collection of pixels with particular properties and particular placements, so the whole world
is made up of these small bits laid out in space and time.230 The fundamental relations in
a Humean world are those that are spatiotemporal. As Lewis puts it,
[w]e may be certain a priori that any contingent truth whatever is made true,
somehow, by the pattern of instantiation of fundamental properties and rela-
tions by particular things.231
The picture that Lewis draws by reference to Humean supervenience is, as he admits,
inspired by classical physics, even though the world does not behave according to classi-
cal physics.232 Lewis addresses these problems, both in his article ‘Humean supervenience
227Lewis (1986b, p. ix-x)
228Lewis (1994, p. 474).
229Hume (2007, section VII, part II)
230Maudlin (2007, p. 51)
231Lewis (1994, p. 473)
232Lewis (1994, p. 474)
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debugged’ and also in the introduction to his Philosophical Papers volume II, where he
claims that the point of defending Humean supervenience in no way is to support a reac-
tionary view of physics. Rather it is “to resist philosophical arguments that there are more
things in heaven and earth than physics has dreamt of.”233 He makes it clear that what he
wants to defend is the philosophical tenability of Humean supervenience, and assumes that
this thesis then can be adapted to any better supervenience thesis that might arise from a
future physics.
Lewis does, however, state that Humean supervenience in itself is a contingent matter,
and as such it is an empirical issue. It holds in this world, and in worlds like ours, but it
need not hold. This means that in worlds like ours there is no difference between possible
worlds at all without there being some difference in the arrangement of qualities. With the
focus on the empirical as a background, one would perhaps assume that he should care
more about the fact that the thesis seems stuck in a physics that is not up to date. But
as stated above, what is most important for Lewis, it seems, is to fight the specifically
philosophical arguments against it, and not first and foremost “to take lessons in ontology
from quantum physics”, as he says.234
We should note, however, that certain newer formulations of Humean supervenience
avoid the reference to point-like entities entirely, and thus this particular issue becomes
less problematic. We find this for example in (Earman and Roberts, 2005), where it is
presented and defended as a way of avoiding the problems related to locality in physics.235
Even though these problems might be avoided by modifying the proposal somewhat, the
rest of the issues connected with Humean supervenience remains problematic.
The main thesis of Humean supervenience I will focus on is the idea that the totality of
the universe consists of the distribution of fundamental categorical properties and relations
throughout all of spacetime.236 When we move from speaking of Humean supervenience in
itself to speaking of accounts of laws which are compatible with this view, it is clear that
the most relevant feature of Humeanism in this respect is the idea that worlds which agree
on matters of fact—the Humean mosaic—also agree on laws.
233Lewis (1994, p. 474)
234Lewis continues: “First I must see how [quantum physics] looks when it is purified of instrumentalist
frivolity, and dares to say something not just about pointer readings but about the constitution of the
world; and when it is purified of doublethinking deviant logic; and—most of all—when it is purified of
supernatural tales about the power of the observant mind to make things jump.”(Lewis, 1986b, p. xi)
235I will not go into the details regarding the question of the relation between Humeanism and mod-
ern physics, mainly quantum mechanics, but Tim Maudlin’s article “Why Be Humean?” (published in
(Maudlin, 2007)) offers a critique of Lewis and other supporters of Humeanism which is well worth read-
ing. Maudlin focuses on how Humean supervenience completely collides with certain results in quantum
mechanics, and contends that the view should be rejected because of this. Lewis (2004) deals with this is-
sue, and proposes an interpretation in line with Everett’s no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics
as a solution.
236Loewer (2012, p. 116)
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4.3.3 Laws as best systems
There are three key ideas shared by philosophers who want to argue for a neo-Humean
perspective on metaphysics, as follows:
1. There are no necessary connections between distinct and separate existences.
2. There are no universals as distinct from classes of resembling particulars.
3. There are no powers as distinct from their manifestations.237
When discussing these points, Psillos (2014) agrees with these general claims, and is
explicit in his arguments against a powers-based metaphysics—of the kind that I advocate,
or indeed any other view deemed to be ‘ontologically inflated’. One common way of keeping
the commitments to a Humean view of the fundamental entities and relations of the world
is to base an account of laws on the notion of regularities. Such views will, as Psillos points
out, be ‘metaphysically light-weight’ but they will still be robust enough to ground “at
least some of the features/functions attributed to laws in scientific practice”.238 That is,
they will be able to ground things like their role in explanations, and the fact that they
support counterfactuals.
This is exactly what Lewis does. According to him, the laws of nature are regularities
and only through the observation of regularities do we get our ideas of causation or of
the laws. But, as mentioned earlier, not all regularities are laws, and Lewis agrees with
this claim. Hence, it is obviously an important point for Lewis and other supporters of
regularity theories of laws to figure out exactly what separates the laws from the accidental
regularities. Something can always be the case and be a law, and something can always be
the case and be an accidental regularity. But how do we tell the difference between these
two things?
A response to this problem in line with seeing laws as regularities, ties the notion of a
law to deductive systems, more specifically the true deductive systems. This is what Lewis
argues we should do. In addition to tracing the view back to Hume, a reference to F. P.
Ramsey’s take on laws is also needed, where laws are explained as the ‘best deductive
system’ available.
I adopt as a working hypothesis a theory of lawhood held by F. P. Ramsey in
1928: that laws are ‘consequences of those propositions which we should take
as axioms if we knew everything and organized it as simply as possible in a
deductive system’.239
237Psillos (2014, p. 12)
238Psillos (2014, p. 13)
239Lewis (2001a, p. 73). Because of this the view is in some cases referred to as the Ramsey-Lewis view.
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According to Lewis, to find this best system we consider two virtues—strength and
simplicity—and strive to find as good a balance as possible between them. If we look at
all deductive systems with true theorems, we’ll see that some of them can be formulated
with very few basic principles, are easy to grasp, and better systematised than others,
while some include many particular facts and thus are more informative. Of course we can
have simple systems that have very little information, and also informative systems that
are rather messy. Because of this, we must strive to get as good a balance between these
factors as truth will allow. This means that a contingent generalisation of some sort is in
fact a law of nature if and only if it appears as a theorem in each of the true deductive
systems that achieves the best balance of simplicity and strength. The same goes for every
other possible world; a generalisation is a law at world w if and only if it appears as a
theorem in each of the best true deductive systems at w.
This account is able to explain quite a few issues regarding laws. It does, for example,
give us an explanation of how and why lawhood is a contingent property; one world may
make some generalisation a law, while the very same generalisation is not a law in another
world. This is simply because it is a theorem that alongside other theorems make up the
best system in one world, but this is not the case in the other world. By tying the laws
explicitly to systems, we also see that no regularity by itself can be regarded as a law.240
Regularities which are outside the best systems are accidental, and thus we also get an
explanation of the difference between the laws and the accidental regularities as well.
In addition, the account provides an explanation of how we may know that something
is a generalisation, but not yet know if it is a law. Also, it gives us tools to see that
being regarded as a law is not the same as being a law, as we might make mistakes by
taking something wrongly to be a law. Lewis claims that the best systems account also
explains why we have good reason to take theorems of well-established scientific theories
provisionally as laws, as the aim of science is to approximate laws as defined here, that
is to move towards the true deductive systems, with the best combination of simplicity
and strength. It also gives us an explanation of why lawhood has seemed such a vague
and difficult concept—it seems vague because it is vague—that is, because our standards
of simplicity and strength are only roughly fixed. With this definition and explanation
of laws at hand, we are equipped to conclude that the laws in a given world are the
generalisations that are highly informative about the very world they are at work in. It
makes a tremendous difference which generalisations have the status of laws in the different
worlds, and this is especially important for Lewis since it affects the overall similarity of
worlds, which is an important concept for his general theory of modality.241
By explaining laws in this way Lewis is not violating the metaphysical assumptions that
240Psillos (2014, p. 17). Psillos goes on to refine Lewis’s regularity view by putting additional weight on
the notion of a pattern, such that a law of nature, for Psillos, is a regularity that is characterised by the
unity of a natural pattern (p. 24).
241See e.g. Lewis (2001a)
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lie in Humean supervenience. As we have seen, a Humean based ontology greatly restricts
what kind of properties may be seen as existing, so we have no reference to essentially modal
properties in objects. The modal features of the world, for example which dispositions
certain objects possess, or the way certain properties act, are not essential features of
the world; properties cannot themselves bring about change, or have essences that can do
modal work.242 The Humean restrictions mean that we have nothing that can make laws
necessary, except in a rather weak sense, which seems to be what Lewis is interested in.
The fact that the regularities that are laws are distinguished from other regularities by
the roles they play in our theorising entails that there is no metaphysical reality over and
above the mosaic of the world that Lewis describes; the laws are just the theorems of the
best system, nothing more than this. These theorems underlie causal explanations, they
support counterfactuals, and they and their consequences are, in Lewis’s own words, in
some good sense necessary.243
4.3.4 Problems tied to the regularity view of laws
This is clearly a metaphysically thin picture of laws. Even though we are supposed to gain
a distinction between laws and accidental regularities by focusing on the simplicity and
strength of the best systems, it might be argued that the human component in this picture is
far too great, that is, that we are not able to single out what is genuinely simple and strong,
only what appear to us to be simple and strong. Problems tied to this anthropocentrism are
presented by John W. Carroll (1994), who worries that the relational nature of simplicity,
strength, and best balance might be troublesome precisely for this reason. It seems that
we have to be the “persons the judgments of simplicity, strength, and best balance are
relative to”.244 Lewis is aware of this, and he suggests in his (Lewis, 1994) that it does
indeed appear that the standards of simplicity, strength, and balance come from us.
However, this need not be as bad a problem as it could be portrayed to be from the
opponents of the view, Lewis holds, if nature is kind to us. That is, if nature is kind, the
best system will be robustly best. This entails, for Lewis, that this system is so far ahead of
all the rival systems that it would come first under any standards of simplicity, strength,
and balance. Lewis admits that we have no guarantee that nature is kind in this way, but
that it is a reasonable hope that it should be. Because of this, our standards of simplicity,
strength, and balance are “only partly a matter of psychology”.245
Both the view that the laws are only ‘in some good sense’ necessary, and the fact that
their lawhood is ‘only partly a matter of psychology’ are pretty substantial problems in
242This is one of the reasons why reference to possible worlds are indispensable for Lewis.
243Lewis (1994, p. 479)
244Carroll (1994, p. 53)
245Lewis (1994, p. 479). I fail to see how Lewis’s hope that nature is kind is to be a valid philosophical
argument, but I will not go into details regarding this issue in this thesis. See for example (Massimi, 2017)
for a suggestion of how the Humean can provide a better answer to this challenge.
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my opinion. In addition, we find several other problematic aspects of this account of laws
debated in the literature. Among these Carroll’s thought experiment The Mirror Argument
(which is rephrased and simplified in (Bird, 2007)) is of particular importance. This thought
experiment aims to show that Lewis’s account will allow for worlds which are alike in
matters of fact to still differ when it comes to the laws of the worlds. Hence the thought
experiment is meant to be a counterexample to the thesis of Humean Supervenience, that
the laws in a world supervene on the totality of local matters of particular fact, and
that these local matters of particular facts are depending on the totality of instantiation
of categorical properties.246 Let us, briefly, look at Bird’s reformulation of this though
experiment.247
• We have two worlds: U1 and U2. Both have x-particles and y-fields in them. X-particles
move steadily in one direction until they meet a y-field.
• These have laws L1 and L2
• L1 in U1: When the x-particles meet the y-fields, they go spin-up
• L2 in U2: When the x-particles enter a y-field, they go spin-down
• In U1 the y-field exists in an experimental set-up where the access to the region is
controlled by a door, and when the door is open (which it is) the particles will go
through the field.248
• The same is the case in U2
Now, consider two additional worlds: U1* and U2*. These worlds are just as the first
two worlds, that is, U1* is just like U1 and U2* is just like U2, except the doors are closed.
Now, compare U1* and U2*
• As regards matters of particular fact, they are the same.
• U1 and U2 differ from each other because of the different spin of the x-particles when
entering y-fields
• But in U1* and U2* both doors are closed and no particle enters any field.
• Now consider the laws of U1* and U2*:
– U1* is like U1 except for the closed door and its consequences. Hence, it seems
likely that it shares the same laws as U1, that is L1.
246Bird (2007, p. 82)
247See (Bird, 2007, p. 82ff.) and (Carroll, 1994, 60ff.), but see also (Beebee, 2000) for arguments that
the thought experiment rests upon certain wrongful presuppositions regarding the Humean laws.
248This is where Bird diverges from Carroll
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– U2* is like U2 except for the closed door and its consequences. Hence, it shares
the same laws as U2, that is L2.
• Conclusion: U1* and U2* are alike when it comes to particular facts, but differ with
respect to their laws.
• This is meant to be a counterexample to an account of laws based upon Humean
supervenience.
At this point, what needs to be noted, from the perspective of a dispositional essentialist,
is that the starting assumptions in the argument are in fact not genuine possibilities.
Carroll’s argument clearly presupposes the laws being contingent as well as external to the
properties of the particles and fields, an assumption I hold to be mistaken. This means
that for the dispositional essentialist, the possibility of worlds differing in the manner that
U1 and U2 do is not available. Carroll’s assumption is that the same particle and the same
field can be governed by different laws in different worlds, and hence give us the differing
spin as a result.
The dispositional essentialist cannot accept this condition, but we can still, however,
regard Carroll’s argument as a reductio of the categoricalist regularity account of laws,
such that it highlights what we may call “a counterintuitive commitment of that thesis.”249
That is, it seems the regularity theories would deem both worlds like U1 and U2 and U1*
and U2* to be possible, since they hold laws to be contingent, and since there are no
intrinsic properties of the particles or fields preventing the experimental set-up being as it
is. However, this entails that the example allows something which is contrary to the main
tenet of Humean supervenience, that the laws supervene on the totality of the instantiation
of categorical properties in the world. Is there any answer the regularity theorist can give
in this case? One possibility is to deny that U1* is like U1 and that U2* is like U2 when it
comes to their laws. It is this which leads to the counterintuitive result:
If the laws are contingent and supervene on the distribution of matters of
particular fact, then altering (across worlds) the distribution of matters of
particular fact ought on some occasions to alter the laws. In particular a law
can be removed just by preventing certain interactions. This seems to be a
damagingly absurd consequence of a theory of laws.250
Furthermore, it seems clear that supporters of the regularity view of laws have a hard
time showing how it may be the case that laws explain. The laws are supposed to explain
the regularities we find in the world, but how can laws do this if they themselves are
regularities? We find a criticism of this shortcoming of the regularity account of laws in
(Armstrong, 1983, p. 40f). Here he asks us to assume that a number of Fs have been
249Bird (2007, p. 84)
250(Bird, 2007, p. 84)
112 4. Categorical properties and contingent laws
observed, and that all of them are a G. We have not observed any F which is not a G.
One plausible explanation of this situation is that it is a law that Fs are Gs. But what if
laws are merely regularities? In this case we are trying to explain the fact that all observed
Fs are Gs by appealing to the hypothesis that all Fs are Gs, Armstrong states. And this
hypothesis cannot have such an explanatory function. Let us see why. ‘All Fs are Gs’
is a complex state of affairs which is partly constituted by the fact that all Fs are Gs.
Armstrong specifies that we can rewrite ‘All Fs are Gs’ as ‘All observed Fs are Gs and all
unobserved Fs are Gs.’. Thus, the explanation we are trying to give contains that which is
supposed to be explained. We are trying to explain a fact by, partly, referring to that very
fact. Armstrong goes on to present a view of laws of his own which is also consistent with
seeing the fundamental properties as categorical. Let us turn to his view now.
4.4 Categoricalism and nomic necessitation
4.4.1 Contingent necessity
We now move to a position which we may describe as viewing laws to be contingently
necessary, a term which may in itself seem slightly strange as it refers to something being,
in a sense, both contingent and necessary. The view discussed in this section represents some
form of middle ground between Lewis’s fully Humean view of laws, and the anti-Humean
view I argue for. The accounts falling into the landscape between the Humean and the
anti-Humean are, as already mentioned, referred to as being semi-Humean, because they
keep the Humean spirit, while they at the same time manage to insert a more robust sense
of necessity than what is found in the regularity based views. The view in question is often
referred to as the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong view (sometimes abbreviated to DTA) in the
literature, as these three have provided rather similar accounts that construe laws as being
contingently necessary.251 I will focus mainly on Armstrong’s description of the account,
primarily from What is a law of nature?
We should note that Armstrong’s account is according to some (e.g. Helen Beebee),
referred to as being anti-Humean, as it rejects the idea of Humean Supervenience, and
sees laws as capturing a sort of necessity working between universals.252 Hence, it is clear
that everything is definitively no longer ‘loose and separate’ when we move from a general
Lewisian view to a view along the lines of Armstrong’s. The contingent necessity in question
refers to the imposing of a relation of necessity upon the universals which are related in a
particular law. This is a second-order relation which is such that even though it bestows
necessity on a relation between universals the relation itself need not be imposed in all
251Armstrong, as well as both Fred Dretske and Michael Tooley, see (Dretske, 1977) and (Tooley, 2004),
published works on this very subject in the 1970’s, but they arrived at their conclusion independently of
each other.
252Beebee (2000). This classification is also found in (Shumener, 2019).
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possible worlds, and hence the necessitation in itself is contingent.
Nonetheless, it is clearly the case that there are Humean assumptions lurking in the
background of Armstrong’s account. If we think of the properties which are governed by
this second-order relation, those properties are, just as for Lewis, the categorical ones,
that is, properties which are not essentially dispositional. This means that there are no
necessary relations between properties, and that, in turn, entails that properties are free
to be combined in ways which far outstretches what is possible according to dispositional
essentialism. Hence, even though Beebee stresses that Armstrong rejects the complete lack
of necessary connections of Lewis’s best systems account, the necessity imposed on the
laws according to his own view is not strong enough that we may safely refer to it as anti-
Humean. The necessity accepted by Armstrong is still a very restricted form of necessity,
located outside the properties themselves; moreover it is still distinctly Humean-flavoured.
Hence, the classification of Armstrong’s view as semi-Humean seems appropriate.
There are two important points that make this view quite attractive, both of which are
related to letting us keep what seems to be important intuitions regarding laws. We both get
a sense of the necessity of laws that seems more satisfactory than what regularity theory
can provide, and at the same time, we may keep the idea that the laws could possibly
have been different. However, we need to ask whether it really is the case that we can
cater to these two seemingly conflicting intuitions at the same time, and in addition get
a satisfactory account of the laws of nature. In order to answer this query, we turn to the
details of the account.
4.4.2 Universals
Compared to Lewis’ account of the laws of nature, we note that Armstrong’s understanding
is radically different in several ways. The most notable difference is perhaps the fact that
the sense of necessity attributed to the laws is substantially stronger, but it also differs
because it is an account that not only allows, but in fact needs the concept of a universal
to take an essential place in the explanation.
What we seek to understand is still the same. Why and how is it the case that the truth
of a statement like ‘it is a law that Fs are Gs’ can be distinguished from the mere accidental
regularity that all Fs just happen to be Gs, as in our example with gold and uranium. We
cannot just analyse ‘It is a law that Fs are Gs’, as equivalent to ‘All Fs are Gs’, although
this is about as far as regularity theory can get us. To have a law, according to Armstrong,
we need to have some sense of necessity involved, either physically or logically. That is, we
may understand it as
1. It is physically necessary that Fs are Gs, or
2. It is logically necessary that Fs are Gs253
253Armstrong (1983, p. 77)
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Statement 1) is what we may refer to as a contingent necessity, Armstrong claims,
because it is limited to the physical domain, and to the physical properties existing in a
given world. It is clearly stronger than the statement ‘All Fs are Gs’, while at the same
time being weaker than the logical necessity of statement 2). To attribute logical necessity
to it is to say that it is true in all possible worlds (so to speak), and this seems too strong
for the formulations of this theory. Hence the relevant notion for Armstrong is that of a
physical necessity, that is, the first interpretation.
However, he does remark that in order to argue for any of these two, we need to recognise
the reality of universals. That is, in order to tie the purported necessity to reality, this
necessity needs to be grounded in something, and universals are fit for this job. We get the
connection through the notions what it is to be an F and what it is to be a G. This does,
of course, demand that we accept universals as a respectable metaphysical entity. If we do
not, perhaps because of a strong belief in nominalism, it seems the only available solution
is to resort to some form of regularity theory, or as Armstrong puts it, to be “nailed to
Hume’s cross”.254
Thus, we see that even though Armstrong’s view is rooted in certain Humean as-
sumptions about the world and its properties, there is also substantial criticism of Lewis’s
Humean Supervenience to be found in Armstrong’s work. With the introduction and ac-
ceptance of the concept of universals we are going beyond the individual Fs and Gs, and
over to more general considerations; we may say to F-ness and G-ness. To be able to do
this, we must realise that there is something that is identical in every F, that which makes
it an F, and this is of course the case for every universal. They all have something which
makes them the universal they are. In addition, we should note that the universals that
Armstrong is willing to accept are what we may refer to as ‘Aristotelian’; they must obey
a principle of instantiation, and thus be either a property of real particulars, or a relation
that holds between real particulars.
This means that I agree with Armstrong when it comes to both the idea that we need
universals as a crucial ingredient in our ontological toolbox, and that these universals
should in some sense be Aristotelian. However, the way these universals are further char-
acterised in my account will differ considerably from Armstrong’s account. The discussion
of what it is to be a certain universal, in terms of a specific description of the property, will,
for Armstrong, have to be limited to the particular world of which we speak. The universals
will be the repeatable features of the possible worlds, but the identity of said properties
between worlds is still the primitive form of identity discussed in chapter 2. That is, these
properties are not in any way precluded from differing substantially between worlds, be-
cause they are quiddities.255 Armstrong’s universals will, as a result, not have the essential
modal properties I argue they have. As I have specified earlier, this does not entail that
254Armstrong (1983, p. 78)
255Armstrong (1989, p. 44, 59)
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dispositional properties do not exist in Armstrong’s account. The restriction regarding the
universals has to do with the essential features of these properties, and Armstrong will
not allow dispostionality to be an essential feature of universals. For him it is rather the
case that the ontological grounds for any attribution of dispositions or powers to any parts
of the world must be found in the categorical properties of the objects involved.256 For
Armstrong, dispositionality does not go all the way down.
When we move from the idea that there are universals to the thought that there are
laws of nature which in some sense are necessary, we are introducing some kind of relation
which binds these universals together in lawful ways, such that we will be able to speak of
statements along the lines of ‘being an F necessitates being a G’. It is this kind of statement
which we can view as a prototype of such a lawful connection. When we start speaking
in this way, we are clearly moving beyond the realm of simple regularity theory, and far
beyond the realms of Humean Supervenience. The necessitation involved in the natural law
‘being an F necessitates being a G’ is a relation between universals and hence a relation
of a higher order than the relations which exist between the things in the world. At the
same time we see how this relation between universals secures that the properties involved
in the relations are not themselves the sources of this necessity. As the relation is added on
from the outside, so to speak, it ensures that the universals do not display any unwanted
dispositional features.257 The related properties are ‘respectable’ categorical properties.
To make formulations of the principles behind this account easier both to write and to
comprehend, we introduce the following convention for notation. The phrase ‘being an F
necessitates being a G’, will be symbolised N(F,G). This expression means that it must be
the case that each F is a G, but the holding of the necessity relation, N, is a contingent
matter, as it depends upon the actually existing laws of nature in the given domain.
Formulated in terms of possible worlds, this just indicates that even though N(F,G) is
true in one world, there will exist possible worlds where N(F,G) does not hold. Due to
this necessitation existing between universals we may also refer to this view as nomic
necessitation.
4.4.3 Armstrong’s laws
Now that we have the framework of nomic necessitation in place, we may proceed to the
question of how we should advance in order to acquire an account of the laws of nature
with this relationship between universals as a starting point. The basic idea that Dretske,
Tooley and Armstrong arrived at can be summed up as follows.
• We are supposing that ‘Fs are Gs’ is a law.
• We also assume that F-ness and G-ness are universals.
256Armstrong (1983, p. 9)
257That is, unwanted from Armstrong’s point of view.
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• In order to make the relationship between Fs and Gs a proper law rather than just
a generalisation, it is postulated that a second-order relation of necessity, N, holds
between F-ness and G-ness.
• This relation of necesitation is of a non-logical or contingent kind (described as phys-
ical necessity above).
• Given that the holding of the relation N is an contingent matter, there will be possible
worlds where this relation does not hold between these universals.
• Hence, we ensure that our intuition that the laws of nature could have been otherwise
can be upheld.
When the N -relation holds between universals, it entails what Armstrong calls the
corresponding Humean or cosmic uniformity all Fs are Gs, that is, the generalisation
which we also get from regularity theory. If we were limited by the restrictions of regularity
theory, we would start out with this generalisation but not get much further than that.
Now, however, the regularity in itself is coming from the nomic necessitation. This entails
that Armstrong’s explanation includes the generalisation which is offered by the regularity
view. It also means that his account is moving beyond the space that the fully Humean
theories are confined to. Because of this, the assumption is that we get an additional layer
of explanation of what laws are.
If we read the arrow as ‘entails’, we have:
N(F,G) → ∀x(Fx ⊃ Gx)
This guarantees that whenever we have N(F,G) we also have the corresponding regu-
larity, but the entailment does not hold the other way around. If we have the case that all
Fs are Gs—that this is some kind of regularity present in our world—this does not entail
that F-ness and G-ness are related by N :
∀x(Fx ⊃ Gx) ↛ N(F,G)
Through this postulated asymmetry between regularities and lawful relations, the ac-
count is supposed to clearly distinguish between those regularities that are lawful and those
that are not; we are precluded from wrongfully concluding that something is a law simply
because it is a regularity without exceptions. Lawhood demands there to be something
more in place, something that separates the laws from the accidental regularities, and this
is the relation N.
By the introduction of the necessity relation, N, in the explanation of laws, it is hoped
that we get some advantages, particularly in comparison with Lewis’s regularity theory. As
we saw, it was arguably the case that even with the inclusion of strength and simplicity as
markers of the set of lawful regularity, Lewis’s account does not really give a satisfactory
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answer to the question of how to properly distinguish laws from regularities. According to
Armstrong, this problem is solved by the introduction of N, and by viewing laws as links
between universals, as follows.
[I]t is very natural to think of laws as linking properties. It seems natural
to say that all Fs are Gs because being an F necessitates being a G. (...)
distinguishing between ‘accidental’ cosmic uniformities and those which are
genuine manifestations of a law, is automatically solved.258
If we accept this, we seemingly have a solution to one of the most pressing problems
faced by regularity theory, the question of whether or not such regularities really explain
the laws. We can say that since laws are something else than simply generalisations on this
view, the problem of whether or not the laws are able to explain also seem to disappear if
we adopt the account based upon nomic necessitation. The laws postulated by Armstrong’s
and other similar accounts are such that they have sufficient ontological distance from the
things they are supposed to explain, so we are not in danger of having something explaining
itself.
Additionally, we see that the relation of nomic necessitation, as proposed by Armstrong,
manages to give answers to further aspects which were problematic for the regularity the-
orist to answer. We remember that there was a worry that strength and simplicity, as well
as the balance between them, were too closely tied to our standards of strength, simplicity,
and balance on Lewis’s view. Contrary to this, Armstrong’s account is definitively mind-
independent. Hence, the lawhood is not something which might be imposed upon relations
by us. In addition, the problems raised by Carroll, and later by Bird, regarding the way
lawhood is supervening on local matters of particular fact, can no longer be an issue here,
as Humean Supervenience is denied.
Unfortunately this view is not without problems of its own, and particularly with regard
to the N -relation’s own identity. It is unsettling that the very relation which is supposed to
ensure that we are able to distinguish between laws and regularities seems so mysterious.
Because of this, we simply cannot accept this view without asking what N itself is, and this
question needs a satisfactory answer if the account is to be helpful at all. In his ‘Laws and
symmetry’, van Fraassen refers to the issue concerning the N -relation—what exactly this
law-making relation holding between universals is supposed to be—as the identification
problem. Coupled with what may be referred to as the inference problem—the question
of what information the statement that one property necessitates another gives us about
what happens and what things are like—these two issues are at the core of van Fraassens
critique of Dretske, Tooley, and Armstrong’s view of laws.259 Van Frassen thinks that these
problems are related to each other in such a way that solving one of them renders the
258Armstrong (1983, p. 86)
259Van Fraassen (1989, p. 96)
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other one insoluble. Particularly the question of the identity of the N -relation is so serious
that if we are not able to satisfactorily answer it this should point to the need for another
account of laws.
Armstrong states in an answer to van Fraassen that a uniformity, like ‘all Fs are Gs’,
holds because something’s being F brings it about that something becomes a G—that is, we
can hypothesise that this is the case. If so, this is supposed to be an ‘atomic fact’ (though
a higher order atomic fact) which holds between the universals F and G. This, Armstrong
claims, solves the identification problem.260 He goes on to state that the relation at play
here is the usual causal relation, the very same relation which is at play when one billiard
ball hits and causes to move another billiard ball. The difference is that the relation is
now hypothesised to relate types rather than tokens. Armstrong concedes that there is no
available proof showing this to be the case, but holds that we should go along with this
resolution because of its explanatory power. He further contends that if we find this answer
satisfying, then we will also have a solution to the inference problem.
For if a certain type of state of affairs has certain causal effects, how can it not
be that the tokens of this type causes tokens of that type of effect?
That may well be the case, but Armstrong is in this case in need of an explanation of
this causal relation, which cannot be grounded in the properties themselves, as these are to
be categorical. In addition, his explanation of the identity of the N -relation seems circular,
like little more than what has been said before, albeit in slightly different worlds. It seems
justified to say that this relation itself is still unclear after the explanations provided in
(Armstrong, 1993). Another option, however, may be to focus on the idea that this relation
is perhaps theoretical.
(...) theoretical statements, though not analyzable in terms of observation state-
ments, are analyzable in terms of statements that contain nothing beyond ob-
servational, logical and quasi-logical vocabulary.261
Can this specification contribute to N becoming less mysterious and problematic? I do
not think so. Even if we may analyse N as some kind of theoretical entity, it is important
to note that this theoretical entity is thought of realistically. This entails that it has to
have a nature of its own, and that the theory should provide some understanding of what
this nature is. The relation’s inexplicability seems to be something we are simply forced to
accept, and this is an obvious problem with the account.
We note that, there is a problem tied to the notion of necessity when it comes to relation
N. It is clear that Armstrong wants to capture the fact that laws appear to have some modal
force and that this should be reflected in the account proposed. The question is whether the
260Armstrong (1993, p. 422)
261Tooley (2004, p. 674)
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‘soft’ necessity compatible with the laws of nature being contingent really does work in this
respect. Can we have worlds with no real modality in the basic components, but which still
have some kind of modality tied to the laws? Lewis solves this problem by allowing possible
worlds to take a central place in the explanation of the laws of nature, but Armstrong rejects
any but the actual world, subscribing instead to a version of fictionalism.262
If we reject an ontology of powers but take the modality associated with laws seriously,
and we are at the same time reluctant to employ a notion of non-actual possible worlds,
in one form or another, then the proposed ‘soft’ modality of Armstrong is not really a
genuine option.263 Remember that both the modality of the laws and the modality related
to the proposed causal relations which are supposed to explain the N -relation needs to
be grounded in something, but the properties of the actual world cannot provide this on
Armstrong’s view, as they are explicitly stated to be categorical. Hence, the available solu-
tions is to either agree with the dispositional essentialist that there is something providing
this modality existing in the properties of the actual world, in which case the relation N
is superfluous, or you need to allow for a framework of possible worlds. I will briefly ad-
dress some of the problems associated with the latter choice before turning to dispositional
essentialist accounts of laws in the following chapter.
Having to adopt a framework of possible worlds can be seen as yet another reason to
consider other accounts of laws of nature than the categoricalist alternatives presented so
far. This is a reason which goes beyond the specific inadequacies connected with each of
these accounts. It would be preferable if we left the assumption that fundamental properties
are categorical behind, because this assumption entails that the accompanying accounts
of modality and laws demand additional possible worlds in order to work, and as the
discussion in chapter 1 revealed, there are several reasons why modal metaphysics without
possible worlds would be preferable. Remember that I argue that Armstrong’s account
cannot find support even for his limited nomic modality in the actual world, given that
the properties of this world are seen to be fundamentally categorical; his account needs
possible worlds, in some form or another, in order to provide the correct modal status to
the laws of nature.
If we look at some commonly held views about modality and laws from the categoricalist
viewpoint, it becomes clear that if one agrees with these points, one needs, as Vetter says,
to ‘outsource’ modality to other possible worlds.
a) Modal features of the world is something that needs to be accounted for, and
b) we want well functioning theories of laws, and
262In (Armstrong, 1989, p. 49) he argues that what is needed is an ‘Actualist, one-world account of
fiction’. An interesting question to ask in connection with this is whether the fictionalist understanding
of possible worlds advocated by Armstrong is capable to deliver a satisfying explanation of the modal
features of the world he needs explained, but I will set this question aside for now.
263Bird (2007, p. 96) argues that nomic necessitation actually contradicts categoricalism.
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c) there are no modal features essentially tied to the objects or properties of the actual
world.
Agreeing with the above points leads to the need for something outside the given world’s
domain in order to capture the modal features of reality. That is, the categoricalist needs
possible worlds in order to make sense of the modal features the world clearly seem to have.
Both accounts of laws presented here are built upon properties which are categorical, and
any dispositional elements a world would be seen to have are in turn grounded in those
categorical properties. Thus, at the most fundamental level, there is no modality located
in properties, and hence no fundamental modality in the world as such. Because of this,
Vetter argues as follows.
If the Humean is to find modality at all, she must look beyond the mosaic, to
other possible worlds. The anti-Humean has no need to ‘outsource’ modality
in this way; she will find it in the features of this world.264
We remember from the very first chapter of this thesis that one of my main goals is to
make a contribution to the project which centres around the idea that removing possible
worlds from its duty as provider of metaphysical facts would be a positive thing. As specified
there, this entails that the possible worlds should no longer do what we may refer to as
important metaphysical work, such as providing truthmakers for modal claims. However,
the possible worlds are destined to have to keep doing this work if we are to argue that the
fundamental properties of the world are categorical. Furthermore I maintain that if the
possible worlds are to do the metaphysical work the categoricalists want them to do in a
satisfactory way, we need to know what a possible world is. And that debate is, as we saw
in chapter 1, not settled.
If we, on the other hand, deny that the fundamental properties are categorical, we will
find ourselves in a position where we are also able to deny the possible worlds playing
an important role in metaphysics. The possible worlds can in this case retain their role
as a useful heuristic tool, in the sense that we may still use them to create examples, to
illustrate, and to make things easier to grasp. If we deny that the fundamental properties are
categorical, when categorical is understood as not essentially dispositional, this will entail
that we view the fundamental properties as essentially dispositional, that is, as powers. In
the following chapter I will discuss accounts of laws which take precisely this assumption
as a starting point. We remember how one of the main reasons to assume a powers based
account of fundamental properties is that this gives us an account of the laws of nature
‘for free’, and without the need for additional possible worlds as parts of the explanation.
264Vetter (2011, p. 743)
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4.5 Conclusion
If we are persuaded that the fundamental properties in a world are categorical, that is,
that they lack dispositional essences, our options regarding accounts of laws are limited to
those which are in some sense Humean. I have presented two such options here; one fully
Humean account attributed to Lewis, and one which has Humean roots, but which at the
same time invokes a stronger sense of necessity (Armstrong’s). I have tried to keep this
presentation brief in order to give more space to the positive arguments of the dispositional
essentialist, while at the same time trying to offer enough background and detail to set the
stage for the next chapter.
I have already acknowledged that the most important battleground for the dispute
between the categoricalist and the dispositionalist will be in the domain of the fundamen-
tal properties, while the discussion regarding laws will hopefully be able to give further
arguments for our preliminary conclusion. If we are able to show that the dispositional es-
sentialist understanding of properties is superior to that of the categoricalist, much of the
motivation for Humean theories of laws disappear. If the fundamental properties themselves
are not categorical, but rather powers—essentially dispositional, sparse properties—an ac-
count of laws automatically follows. In that case, coming up with other theories of laws in
addition is superfluous. From my starting point as a dispositionalist regarding fundamen-
tal properties, the accounts of laws presented so far do not provide arguments which will
weaken my initial standpoint. In fact, they may instead be used to weaken the belief that
a categoricalist view of fundamental properties is a good starting point, once we are able
to show that the accounts themselves, or their consequences, are unfortunate.
In this chapter I have started the important discussion about laws of nature by, firstly,
looking at some more general remarks about laws and lawhood, and how these concepts are
typically understood. Secondly, by looking at two accounts of laws of nature open for the
categoricalist (because they are compatible with the fundamental properties of the world
being not necessarily dispositional). I have argued that the regularity view proposed by
Lewis is problematic. This is so both because the account is based upon Humean Superve-
nience, and because, according to this view, the laws are simply too close to being just as
other regularities; that is, the explanation of lawhood is unsatisfactory. Armstrong’s view
fares better when it comes to the distinction between laws and regularities, but depends
on a relation, N, which seems mysterious and hard both to satisfactorily explain and to
grasp. In addition, I have argued that categoricalist views of laws seem to depend on a
notion of possible worlds in order to bestow the, albeit limited, nomic necessity upon the
laws. I have pointed to some of the issues a possible worlds based view of modality and
laws are faced with both here and in chapter 1, and I hold that if we are able to explain
the metaphysics of modality without resorting to possible worlds, this will be a positive
contribution to these debates.
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Chapter 5
Dispositional essentialist accounts of
laws of nature
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter I will take a few important steps towards establishing the positive argument
regarding the laws of nature based on powers. The powers based accounts differ greatly from
the two preceding examples, both in regard to how the laws are grounded and regarding the
degree to which the laws are necessary. We recall from chapter 2 that one of the arguments
for accepting a powers based ontology was that it gave us an account of laws of nature as
well as of property identity. But, as I mentioned in chapter 4, if the fact that we get an
account of laws ‘for free’ is to be one of the reasons for accepting fundamental powers as a
part of our ontology, we should make sure that the explanation of laws on offer is able to
compete with the main contenders we have just examined. To show this is the goal of the
present chapter.
The main point of the powers based account which I will argue for here is that the
fundamental laws of nature are grounded in the dispositional essences of fundamental
properties. That is, in what I have defined as powers earlier in this thesis. As a result,
dispositional essentialism entails an even stronger sense of necessity than the contingent
necessity of Armstrong’s theory, while it is at the same time a view that is realist about laws.
Even for Armstrong, the necessity bestowed upon the laws is something which relies on an
understanding where their modal properties—their necessity—is imposed on the properties
related in the laws from the outside, so to speak. Hence, the properties themselves have
no modal powers, no essential modal features. Armstrong’s view is clearly realist, but I
have argued that it is still deeply entrenched in Humean assumptions about the world,
such as the need for explaining the laws in terms of something which itself is non-modal
in character. That is, his view does not allow for necessary connections in nature. In what
follows, however, I will depart completely from the Humean assumptions, and argue that
the laws stem from properties which are essentially modal.
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If we already hold that dispositional essentialism is the preferred way of understanding
fundamental properties, the theories of laws of nature already presented are not really
available, or at least not particularly attractive accounts for us to argue for. Still, it should
be noted that if the account of laws based upon dispositional essences is deemed not good
enough, this should make us revise our view of properties, because a viable explanation of
the laws of nature has been promised to be a significant part of the reasons why we would
want to accept a powers theory of properties to begin with.
The chapter will proceed as follows. Firstly, in section 5.2, I will outline the general
view of laws following from assuming dispositional essentialism, focusing in particular on
the necessity of the laws—a consequence which we have to accept if we are to have a
powers theory of laws, but which is often seen as counterintuitive. Section 5.3 focuses on
Bird’s account of laws, where the laws follow directly from the dispositional essences of
the fundamental properties. Apart from some important discrepancies when it comes to
the understanding of the universals, this is the account of laws I will argue for. Section 5.4
examines Ellis’s view of laws, as well as the distinctions between his account and Bird’s,
focusing mainly on the fact that Ellis’s account depends on the concept of a natural kind
in addition to the assumptions included in dispositional essentialism already presented. In
section 5.5, I will examine recent criticism from within the dispositionalist camp. Jennifer
McKitrick (2018) argues that the assumption that the laws are necessary need not be
accepted even when dispositional essentialism is postulated. I argue that her critique might
to some degree affect Ellis’s version of dispositional essentialism, but not the version I
defend.
5.2 The laws of nature are truly necessary
5.2.1 Letting go of intuitions
Holding a dispositional essentialist view of fundamental properties entails holding that the
laws of nature are necessary. This is an inescapable and explicitly stated feature of the
view, and at the same time perhaps the feature which is most problematic to accept. Since
this part of the account is controversial—the laws of nature are commonly assumed to be
contingent—we need to make sure that we are able to present a coherent explanation of
laws based upon dispositional essences which is able to compete with the best categoricalist
accounts of laws of nature. In chapter 3 I briefly discussed a point found in (Vetter, 2015,
p. 247) which is articulated even clearer by E. J. Lowe, that if we are to argue against, or
depart from, our intuitions, we need good reason to do so:
[W]e would need to be given good reasons for thinking that these intuitions
are mistaken, as well as some explanation for our possession of those intuitions
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despite their being mistaken ones.265
Thus, we see that when arguing for dispositional essentialism, we have to depart from
the intuition that the laws of nature are contingent, and hence we are in one of those
situations when we need to respond to the claim from Lowe. It is clear that in the case of
the laws the categoricalists have got the most common intuition on their side. However,
if we are able to present a superior account of the laws of nature this will be a further
argument for accepting a powers view of fundamental properties. Let us first look at the
background assumptions underpinning my view.
In line with my earlier arguments, I will in the present chapter explicitly argue that the
world is not consisting of just a vast landscape of separate entities that are being pushed
and pulled around by some external laws of nature that work upon the (otherwise passive)
physical entities in the world, a description which is particularly fitting for Armstrong’s
account of the laws. The world is rather essentially active. It is full of entities with properties
that make them act and react to and with each other. What we refer to as a law of nature
is not some obscure entity working in-between things, but rather something which is driven
from the things themselves—the laws are embedded in the very fabric of the world, mainly
in the essences of the fundamental properties themselves. With this as my starting point, I
will also have to argue that the laws are not contingent, but necessary, and that the version
of necessity involved here is stronger than what most theories advocate. This means that
we cannot truthfully claim that the laws of nature could have been otherwise, even if this
is a strong intuition.
My argumentation in the present chapter follows directly from the discussion in chapter
2 centred on the domain of the powers. Whereas Bird has departed from his earlier view,
and now holds that powers may be found also at certain non-fundamental levels, I argue
that a restriction of the domain of the powers, in line with Bird’s earlier account still
has merits. That is, I hold that a restriction of the powers to the fundamental level of
metaphysics, in line with that of (Bird, 2016), is still defendable (contrary to what Bird
now seems to believe), and this restricted domain will be the foundation on which my
account of laws will be built. Such a restriction is also automatically an argument against
the mixed view, and, following this, also an argument against Ellis’s optimism regarding
what plausible work powers can do. (This is so because Ellis’s assumptions regarding the
usefulness of powers demand that powers exist also at certain non-fundamental levels.266 )
The fight against categoricalism is not only of importance when discussing fundamental
properties, but will also be an important issue when discussing laws. We remember that
the categorical properties are those which are not essentially dispositional. The view of
laws following from such an understanding of properties is explained by Bird as follows:
Categoricalism about properties goes hand in hand with the view that the laws
265Lowe (2006, p. 142)
266See for example (Ellis, 2002, Chapters 7 and 8).
126 5. Dispositional essentialist accounts of laws of nature
of nature are contingent and tell the properties what to do (or describe the
patterns of regularity they happen to be a part of).267
Assuming a categoricalist view of properties—which implies that laws and properties
are clearly separated entities and that the former somehow control or influence the latter—
makes it easy to picture that the laws that happen to govern our world could have been
different. The very properties and things that exist could just as well be pushed and pulled
around by other forces than the ones we actually have, and, in addition, the forces we do
have could have been altered. It is perhaps even easier to imagine the laws being different
if one holds some form of regularity view of laws, where it can be discussed whether the
laws govern at all. Regardless of which particular account of laws is advocated, it is clear
that assuming the laws to be contingent is a very common view to have. Ellis actually
goes as far as to state that “[t]here is probably no more deeply entrenched philosophical
thesis than that the laws of nature are contingent.”268 I would probably not express this in
such strong words myself, but it is clear that the assumption that the laws of nature are in
some sense contingent is generally seen as a common intuition to have, and that this is an
intuition which it is valuable to keep when we are moving from pre-philosophical thoughts
to a philosophical account of laws and lawhood. In chapter 3 I discussed how keeping this
intuition is seen as so important that even certain dispositional accounts of possibility are
either actively accommodating it (Borghini and Williams, 2008), or at least not excluding
it (Vetter, 2015).
We should note that accepting this account of properties and laws does not only entail
having to accept that the laws of nature are necessary, but it also entails a substantial
rewriting of the standard way of viewing the different kinds of modality and their relation-
ship to each other. It is common to assume that the metaphysical possibilities encompass
more than the physical or nomic possibilities. That is, the prevailing view is to assume
that what we are dealing with when it comes to the different kinds of possibility is a
nested structure with (at least) three categories which may be envisioned as circles encom-
passing one another, where the innermost one is the circle which includes the physical or
nomic possibilities. The next circle is usually taken to be the metaphysical possibilities,
which includes the nomic possibilities as a proper subset but which also adds some further
possibilities which go beyond the laws of nature to its domain. Outside the metaphysical
possibilities we find the logical possibilities which encompass these possibilities, and more
still.269
I reject this understanding of the relationship between different kinds of possibility.
Opposing this, I will claim that the dispositional essentialist view of laws (and ideally
all dispositional views of properties and laws) has as a consequence that the category
267Bird (2007, p. 44)
268Ellis (2002, p. 4)
269See for example (Vaidya, 2016) for a useful illustration. I will not discuss logical possibility in this
thesis.
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of metaphysical possibility collapses into the category of nomic possibilities. I will argue
that this is not a bug or a ‘bullet to bite’, but rather an attractive feature of my view.
Nevertheless, we need to be aware of the fact that accepting dispositional essentialism
entails a willingness to make the sacrifice of parting with some of our intuitions regarding
laws. This is such a substantial issue that I will devote a whole chapter to the debate
regarding what impact our intuitions may be seen to have. This means that the current
chapter will deal only with the question of which theories of laws are available to us as
dispositional essentialists, while the question of the role of intuition, and which part it may
be permitted to play, is saved for chapter 7.
In this chapter I proceed to give an account of the dispositional essentialist view of
laws, or rather, the dispositional essentialist views of laws. Because even if we do agree on
the powers based view of fundamental properties, we still have important choices to make
when it comes to the specifics of our explanation of laws. There are two main options to
choose from: Bird’s more direct explanation, and Ellis’s view which involves in addition
the concept of a natural kind. This is perhaps the most striking difference between the two
positions, but we should also note, as already mentioned, that Ellis’ account also differs
from Bird’s in that it invokes the mixed view and that it remains far more positive regarding
the usefulness of dispositional essences in other areas of philosophy.270 Given my arguments
for the restriction of the powers ontology to the fundamental level of metaphysics, it seems
clear that it is the first point—either the rejection of, or inclusion of, natural kinds in our
explanation of these laws—which is the most relevant for the current topic. Both Bird’s and
Ellis’s accounts are quite correctly seen as dispositional essentialist accounts of properties
and laws, but because of this classification the differences between them are often, perhaps
inadvertently, glossed over and not given sufficient attention.
If we already accept a powers-based account of fundamental properties, our choice of
which explanation of laws to endorse will depend both on the importance we are willing to
give to a categorisation in terms of natural kinds, but also on our views about fundamental
properties—whether we endorse dispositional monism or some form of the mixed view. Even
though the take on the importance of the natural kinds is the most relevant distinction
between Bird and Ellis in the context of the present chapter, it is clear that our view of
properties more generally will also be of importance. That is, our choice when it comes
to the role played by the natural kinds will also be related to the discussion of sparse
fundamental properties from chapter 2. As such it should be clear that our stance on the
metaphysical status of fundamental properties influences our choices when it comes to most
other debates in the field of modal metaphysics. As I advocate dispositional monism, and
since I restrict the powers to the fundamental level only, it seems that an account of laws
which is not invoking the additional concept of the natural kind will be most beneficial. As
we shall see, the view based upon natural kinds entails that there are dispositional essences
270See for example (Ellis, 2013) and (Bird, 2016)
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also at non-fundamental levels, that is, we need to argue for a form of the mixed view, or
at least accept macro-powers, in order to give the natural kinds this explanatory role. I will
suggest that natural kinds, even though they are an important ontological category, are
not vital to the explanation of laws.271 Hence, when it comes to this, I will follow Bird’s
version of the dispositional essentialist view of laws.
5.2.2 The explanation of laws
By now it should be clear that when we depart from categoricalism and want to explain laws
by arguing that they are intimately related to the dispositional essences of properties, the
assumption that there could have been different laws of nature is no longer a viable option.
This is due to the fact that we ground the laws in just those properties that could not have
been different. If we subscribe to this form of essentialism, the properties in the world, and
thus the objects having these properties, can no longer be seen as passive things that the
laws are affecting—the properties themselves are active, and they are essentially so. Things
behave as they do, not because of laws that are external to them and which could have been
otherwise, but because they (the objects) are intrinsically disposed to behave in certain
ways under certain circumstances. Hence we see why it is the case that thought experiments
like Carroll’s mirror argument, discussed in the previous chapter, start with assumptions
which are illegitimate to make from the dispositional essentialist starting point. For us, the
particles and fields of the example cannot be controlled by different laws of interactions
in different possible worlds, not if they are supposed to be the same particles and fields
we have in this world. The properties that exist in the actual world, and the essential
relationships between different properties, determine the laws, rather than laws dictating
how these things must behave. Thus, the main claim of the dispositional essentialist should
be that the laws of nature are those fundamental, general explanatory relationships which
are supervening upon the essential natures of the fundamental properties.272
Talking about the essential natures upon which the general explanatory relationships
will supervene is another way of referring to what I have labelled as powers in this the-
sis. That is, essentially dispositional sparse properties existing at the fundamental level of
metaphysics. My position when it comes to the laws of nature depends on the claim that
there are real powers at work in the world, and that these powers represent the features of
the fundamental level of the world which could not have been otherwise, given the properties
that actually exist. Furthermore, given that these essential properties are dispositional—
they are in some sense pointing towards some possible action for the property—the re-
lationships between properties at the fundamental level will also be absolutely necessary.
We need to include the relationships between fundamental properties as parts of their es-
sential features. Hence, the fundamental properties existing in a world will—through their
271I will return to this question in chapter 6, section 6.2.2.
272Bird (2007, p. 201)
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relations with other such properties—give the fundamental laws of that world, which are,
in turn, the laws that all other laws supervene on. I find Bird’s description of the laws of
nature understood in this way useful:
If properties have a dispositional essence then certain relations will hold of
necessity between the relevant universals; these relations we may identify as
the laws of nature.273
If we accept this, we need nothing more than what the properties themselves provide
in order to have an explanation of the laws. As argued in chapter 2, by assuming these
dispositional essences we are able to explain how and why things behave as they do,
but we are also able to explain how things will behave, or how they would behave, given
certain circumstances. This means that we are equipped to explicate two important features
of laws; the fact that they make us able to both make predictions and to talk about
counterfactuals. Given the assumption that dispositional essences exist at the fundamental
level, we are afforded a much more substantial notion of laws than what is provided by
a regularity theory. At the same time we avoid having to resort to a notion of external
laws of nature which are in some sense added on, and to which the properties are obedient.
External laws of nature—something beyond the powers of the properties themselves—
become obsolete on this view. Accepting dispositional essentialism means we automatically
have an account of laws without accepting any further entities, different from the ones we
already have in our ontology.
There are several positive features related to such an account of laws. For example,
it is clear that by avoiding laws that are external to the properties related in them, we
also avoid the problems related to the laws’ identity conditions presented in chapter 4.
Where Armstrong’s theory is struggling with a notion of laws depending on a relation of
necessitation which is seemingly quite mysterious, the dispositional essentialists have no
such problems. The fundamental laws are those laws which are entailed by the dispositional
essences of the fundamental properties. In addition, I will argue that the higher-order laws
supervene on the fundamental laws as well as on the structural compositions of the objects
involved in the laws. This entails that the dispositional essentialist view of laws I defend
is not committed to argue that we are able to derive laws from dispositions at every level
of complexity. This is so because I hold that non-fundamental dispositions cannot play
such a role. And, as argued in chapter 2, I do not accept non-fundamental powers. The
explanation of the higher-level laws is, as we shall see later, one of the points where my
account differs notably from Ellis’s view of laws.
I have already argued that the dispositional essentialist view of property identity is
superior to the categoricalist one. Now, I will proceed to show that the account of laws
273Bird (2007, p. 43). This is not a novel idea. A proposal seeing laws as involving necessary relations
between properties was, for instance, proposed by Swoyer (1982).
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which is promised ‘for free’ if powers are accepted is not, like many cheap offers, too good to
be true, but rather a viable explanation of laws. This means it has sufficient strengths of its
own to compete with the best categoricalist accounts. Its perhaps most attractive feature
has been addressed several times in this thesis already: compared to its rival accounts,
dispositional essentialism is remarkably parsimonious. The fact that an account of laws
follows directly if powers is assumed, means that the dispositional essentialists have no
need for a theory of laws in addition to their theory of fundamental properties, in the sense
that we need no additional assumptions about the world, in order to express what laws are.
Hence it is more parsimonious than the competing views. A second attractive feature of this
view is simultaneously also what has been seen as its most problematic feature. Accepting
it entails that we also have to hold that the laws of nature are absolutely necessary. As is
clear, however, I embrace this feature wholeheartedly.
5.3 Laws as relations between powers
5.3.1 Universals
In (Bird, 2007) Bird presents the most comprehensive version of his view of laws based
upon dispositional essentialism. So far we have seen how the assumption that there are
powers—the essentially dispositional sparse properties at the fundamental level—entails
the additional premise that there are necessary relationships between these powers, and
that these relationships are what we know as the fundamental laws of nature. If essences—
what could not have been different— also depend on, and influence, relations, then these
relations cannot fail to hold, and so the necessity of the laws is guaranteed. The only way
these laws might fail to hold is if the properties themselves did not exist; and this is a
possibility I will return to in the next section. Given these properties and these essential
relations, we cannot have any other laws of nature than the ones we in fact have. It is this
necessity that I define as metaphysical necessity. As we have already seen, this is not an
option if one is of a categoricalist persuasion, because in that case the properties related in
lawful ways could have been related in other ways. That is, these very properties could have
been radically different and played very different roles given a categoricalist understanding
of fundamental properties. I have already argued that this is an unsatisfactory way of
understanding properties, and that the accounts of laws available for the categoricalist are
also problematic.
The dispositional essentialist view of laws is a theory about universals. The laws are
certain relations that will hold of necessity between the relevant properties, and the prop-
erties in question are universals. Hence, as for Armstrong’s theory, we must be willing to
accept universals as entities in our ontology, but these universals have slightly different
roles to play for Bird than they have for Armstrong. We remember how the universals for
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Armstrong mainly were a way of pinpointing the repeatable features of a world, whereas
the identity between worlds was of a more primitive kind. For Bird, however, the universals
will have certain essential features necessarily, that is, also across possible worlds (if one
prefers talking in those terms).274
Because of this, we can clarify why it is the case that the dispositional essentialist
is in a better shape than Armstrong when it comes to specifying the identity conditions
of the laws, as already mentioned. If we subscribe to dispositional essentialism, we can
be, to borrow Bird’s words, reasonably relaxed about the question of what exactly the
laws of nature are.275 Specifying exactly what the laws are is obviously a problem for any
philosopher claiming that laws are something which control what happens in the world. The
reason why this is not a problem for us is that we do not claim that laws impose external
control. What does the heavy metaphysical lifting is not external laws of nature telling the
properties what to do in this particular world, but rather the dispositional nature of the
properties themselves. Given how the fundamental properties themselves are, and how they
are related, the laws of nature stem directly from this. This entails that the dispositional
nature of the fundamental properties is ontologically prior to the laws.276 Let us look at
some additional details of the relationship between the fundamental properties and the
laws of nature.
As discussed in chapter 2, I accept an understanding of dispositional essences specified
in terms of the counterfactual conditional, as follows.
2(D(S,M)x ↔ SxMx)277
The main claim of dispositional essentialism, that an object possessing the power P
is disposed to yield M in response to stimulus condition S is specified as the following
statement.
2(Px → D(S,M)x)
Taking these two statements as a starting point will make us able to derive the universal
generalisation ∀x((Px∧Sx) → Mx), and given the existence of the related properties, this
generalisation will necessarily be so.278 This means that we have a universal generalisation,
which seems to express a law of nature, derived from a claim about the essence of the power
274Thus, when it comes to this particular point, Lewis seems to be better off than both Armstrong
and the dispositional essentialist in terms of parsimony, given that he does not need universals. However,
as discussed in chapter 4, Lewis’s account of properties and laws has other issues which makes it an
unsatisfactory choice, even though it is certainly parsimonious in this respect.
275Bird (2007, p. 47)
276That is, the laws stem from the essential features of the properties, rather than assuming that the
properties behave in particular ways because they are connected by particular laws; the laws depend on
the dispositional essences, not the other way around.
277Bird (2007, p. 45). Where D(S,M)x expresses ‘x is disposed to manifest M in response to stimulus S’,
and  is understood to be the subjunctive/counterfactual conditional
278Bird (2007, p. 46)
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P, and the general truth of the conditional analysis of dispositional essences. Starting with
the dispositional essence of a property we are able to get to a non-accidental generalisation,
that is, a generalisation which is such that it expresses a lawful connection in nature. This
is the core of the dispositional essentialist explanation of laws.
Given the aforementioned collapse of the metaphysical into the nomic, we also see why
it is the case that this view automatically identifies metaphysical possibility and necessity
with nomic possibility and necessity. As mentioned, this is in general seen as a disadvantage
of the view because it goes against our intuitions that the laws of nature could have been
different. Contrary to this, I have stated that this feature can be seen as an advantage
instead. But how can something counterintuitive be turned into a positive feature of a
philosophical view? Firstly, I claim that there is no real need for more than one kind of
possibility and necessity, the logical modalities aside. Hence, there is not need for a further
specification of the distinctions between nomic and metaphysical modalities. We have no
need to classify something as being, for example, metaphysically but not nomically possible;
something is either possible or it is not.279 We do not have any reason, intuition aside, for
admitting several different notions of modality regarding what may or may not happen in
the world; and our arguments based on intuition are, I hold, simply not enough.280
Secondly, as is often presented as an argument for assuming dispositionalism in the first
place, tying the view closely to the physical sciences makes metaphysics less mysterious.
By explaining laws in the way it is done here, the laws are closely related to the actual
properties existing in the world (studied by science), and at the same time these laws are in
themselves nothing over and above what the properties themselves contribute. The identity
conditions of the laws are given by the identities of the properties and their relationship
to each other. Hence, we also see that the laws are not identical to the powers, but they
are absolutely dependent on these properties.281 In order to get access to an account of the
laws of nature which requires no further theoretical assumptions than the ones we have
already made about the fundamental properties, there is really only one thing we need to
do; we need to recognise that those fundamental properties are essentially dispositional.
This assumption entails the additional advantage that—given that metaphysical possibility
is nothing over and above nomic necessity—we are also left with a notion of necessity which
is easier for us to deal with. We disregard the notion of nomic necessity, and are left with
the more familiar notion of metaphysical necessity.282
Thus I suggest that we, by advocating a powers based view of laws, are getting rid of
279This is in line with (Bird, 2007, p. 48) where he also concedes that he does not, in fact, regard logical
necessity as a kind of necessity. I will not address this question in my thesis.
280For details pertaining to this claim I refer to chapter 7 of this thesis.
281This is in contrast with Mumford (2004) and his claim that once we have accepted the existence of
powers, there is no real need for laws of nature in addition. See (Williams, 2019, p. 217ff.) for a discussion
of the disagreement between Bird and Mumford.
282I briefly discuss the choice between nomic and metaphysical necessity and possibility also in chapter
3, section 3.3.3.
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a surplus notion of possibility and necessity. Nomic necessity is, I argue, a notion we did
not need in the first place. In addition, it might also be maintained that this notion had
created a good deal of confusion already.
5.3.2 Necessity specified
Regarding the question of the necessity of the laws of nature, I argue that this should be
formulated as follow.
NECESSITY Given that the fundamental properties of this world are what
they are, its laws could not have been different.
I contend that this claim entails that if the fundamental properties had been different it
would no longer have been ‘a world like ours’—not a way for our world to be, and as such
not something which is relevant for modal questions regarding things happening in our
world at all. It would be an alien world.283 It seems to me that prohibiting the existence of
such worlds is too strong a statement to make, because it would entail that the universals
which exist in our world, in some way or another, must have necessary existence. I am not
willing to accept that as a consequence of my view. An important point which is related to
this is that even if we, like I do, opt in for a view which is compatible with the idea that
universals may or may not exist in different possible worlds, this does not mean that we
can allow change in the fundamental properties of a world, and hence have contingent laws.
Rather, the qualification of the statement is made to avoid that we pose the universals as
necessarily existing entities.
However, we cannot avoid this topic, and I hold that there is a further question to
address which should be asked in relation to this issue. Do we really need the qualifica-
tion ‘given the fundamental properties we have’? Or could the laws in fact be necessary
simpliciter? This question can, as I have already hinted, be rephrased as a question about
universals, their instantiations, and whether they (according to some understanding of dis-
positional essentialism) may be said to have necessary existence. If the universals are not
necessarily existing, it does indeed seem that there might be worlds where the universals
related in the laws of our world do not exist, but of course none where they do exist but
are otherwise related. Following from this complication we see that we may, also in the
context of dispositional essentialism, speak of a somewhat weaker and stronger sense of
necessitarianism, as argued by Bird (2007, p. 49ff.). The form of necessitarianism we are
willing to defend will depend on whether or not we are willing to accept universals which
are allowed some kind of necessary existence. Importantly, it does seem like Bird is willing
283Chapter 6 explores how the concept of being a world like ours can be a part of an explanation of
global laws of nature. At the present moment, however, I use this expression as a way of separating modally
relevant worlds from those which are modally irrelevant.
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to accept universals of this sort. As a consequence, when it comes to laws, this is where
my view and Bird’s depart from one another.
I hold that it would be preferable to refer to these versions of necessitarianism as
something other than them being ‘weak’ and ‘strong’. I suggest that using the expressions
conservative and radical necessitarianism might be more beneficial. The ‘weak’ variety
makes it seem like the necessities described as such are somehow less necessary than those
advocated by the strong necessitarian, something which is not the case. By changing the
vocabulary we might avoid these kinds of misunderstandings.284 The big issue is in this
case not the strength of the necessity of the laws, but rather something which concerns
our ontological commitments to universals, and to a degree whether we interpret them in
a largely Aristotelian or a Platonic way. My understanding is of the Aristotelian kind; the
universals will have to be instantiated in order to be seen as existing.285
The view I will defend, namely that laws do indeed depend on universals, but that the
universals do not have necessary existence, takes a lot of inspiration from Kripke, and can
be explained by analogy with the way he speaks about identity and his way of explicating
rigid designators. We may say that Kripke’s famous example of the identity between Erik
Blair and George Orwell, and the specification of how the statement 2(Erik Blair = George
Orwell) is consistent with there being worlds where this particular individual does not exist
is at the core of this understanding. At the same time, we need to point out that worlds
where the individual does not exist are not counterexamples to the statement 2(Erik Blair
= George Orwell). The same is the case for laws, so the argument can be used in much the
same way in order to argue for conservative necessitarianism.286 If we have the power P,
and L(P) is a law concerning this property, then a world without P is no counterexample
to the claim that L(P) is necessary. 2L(P ), on the other hand, rules out there being any
worlds where P exists but is not related to the law L. This view of metaphysical necessity is
what I will be referring to as the conservative variety of the view, and it requires only that
L(P) holds in all worlds where the property P exists.287 Following this, the accompanying
view of the necessity of the laws may be referred to as conservative necessitarianism. Bird
(2007, p. 51ff.), on the other hand, argues for something which may be referred to as the
radical necessitarian view of laws.
It is important to note that the conservative view is implied by dispositional essentialism,
while the radical view is not something we must agree with as dispositional essentialists.
However, it is still clearly consistent with the view. If we hold the radical view, we have to
say that all universals exist no matter what, or in all worlds. And, following from this, that
all actual laws of nature hold in absolutely all possible worlds. This entails that there are
284Bird mentions both pairs, but he uses weak and strong most of the time.
285Bird (2007, p. 51ff.) recognises this and briefly discusses the Aristotelian versus the Platonic view of
universals. This topic is outside the scope of my thesis.
286Bird (2007, p. 49)
287Bird (2007, p. 49)
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no possibilities of other properties existing (in other worlds), and no possibility that some
properties may fail to exist either. All possible worlds are nomologically identical. Thus, if
we borrow the terminology of possible worlds, the distinction between the different kinds
of necessitarianism would mean that the proponent of radical necessitarianism argues for
the nomological identity of possible worlds, whereas the conservative necessitarian argues
for the nomological compatibility of possible worlds.288 This latter case entails, as argued
above, that we will never have a case of counterexamples to the laws of nature. Accepting
dispositional essentialism does not automatically give us an answer as to which one of these
we should support. So, in order to settle this question it is not enough to simply consider
our support for dispositional essentialism.
Bird evaluates radical necessitarianism and shows it to be consistent with his overall
view. He argues that the strongest reason why we are unwilling to accept the radical view
is that it is colliding violently with our intuitions about universals. I disagree. Rather,
the strongest reason for not holding this view at the present moment is that we do not
have enough information about the world we live in. Pending answers from science, I hold
that the best choice as of now is to refrain from taking a stand regarding this. That is,
we should accept the conservative view, but remain agnostic when it comes to radical
necessitarianism.289
The way I see it, the main argument against the strong view is not its relationship
to our intuitions, but rather the following. As contended earlier in this dissertation, the
existence of sparse properties, and hence of universals, seems to be a contingent matter
(at least for some of them). If this assumption is correct, we have to settle for conservative
necessitarianism. Of course we may claim that this is just another intuition we have about
universals, and that intuitions should not be given significant philosophical weight. I note
that Bird seems to think we have already departed from intuition by accepting dispositional
essentialism in the first place, and that we basically can just ‘keep going’. But this is not
a good argument. What we are doing when we settle for conservative necessitarianism is
not giving arguments based on intuitions inappropriate amounts of weight, rather it is
stopping at a point where we still have strong independent arguments for our claims. We
have independent and convincing arguments for accepting weak necessitarianism. That is,
we have arguments for accepting a dispositional essentialist theory of properties. But this
only entails the weak version, as mentioned. So, if we are to accept radical necessitarianism,
we need good independent arguments for it, too.
288But see (Bostock, 2003) for an argument that necessitarianism actually is committed to take all
possible laws to be actual laws.
289Even though we should acknowledge that for now it is better to await further results from science
before concluding, it is not clear whether this is something we will be able to answer conclusively, given
that we are now moving towards topics involving entities (like multiverses) whose existence are untestable.
136 5. Dispositional essentialist accounts of laws of nature
5.3.3 Non-fundamental laws
The discussion of laws according to the dispositional essentialist has so far remained firmly
placed in the area of fundamental metaphysics, but there are clearly important laws of
nature which are not fundamental in this sense, and these laws still need explanation.
However, it is not the case that an account of the laws of nature is committed to explain
every single law of nature in the same way, which for my part would have been the way
described in section 5.3.1. This description tells us how the fundamental laws of the world
come to be. We have to assume that the non-fundamental laws supervene on the funda-
mental laws described. Another, and related, question we should ask is connected to the
fact that the laws are seen as something which concern universals; the question is whether
this connection with the laws is something which will pertain to any universal (that is,
to any sparse property), or whether there will be universals which do not generate laws.
Following my argument from chapter 2, it seems to be the case that there exists sparse
properties which are not essentially dispositional, given that we hold the scientific con-
ception of sparse properties.290 Such universals may surely participate in laws, but what
generates these laws are not the dispositional essences of, say, the elements of the periodic
table, because as I have argued earlier in this thesis, these entities do not seem to have dis-
positional essences, although they clearly have dispositional features. The non-fundamental
laws are supervenient laws; they supervene, firstly, on the fundamental laws, and secondly,
on the structural composition of the non-fundamental properties. This structure does not
seem to contribute with anything ‘new’, ontologically speaking, given that the composi-
tion of these non-fundamental entities will be dependent on the fundamental laws.291 Chris
Swoyer states the following in this regard:
Necessary connections among properties are most plausibly thought to exist, I
think, at very fundamental levels involving properties of elementary particles or
the like. But since such particles constitute all physical things, then unless there
are genuinely emergent properties, the properties and relations of fundamental
particles are responsible for all other physical properties and relations as well.292
Thus, our account of the non-fundamental laws will depend on our view of emergent
properties. As mentioned in chapter 2, I am committed to a view stating that there are
no possibilities left to be accounted for by entities like macro-powers, or other entities
at non-fundamental levels.293 Thus, it might be the case that the structural features are
relevant for us, that is, for our understanding of the laws, but they are not relevant from
an ontological point of view, because they supervene on the fundamental properties. Thus,
290See e.g. (Schaffer, 2004) for a survey.
291This kind of dependence does not entail reductionism, but this debate is outside the scope of my
thesis.
292Swoyer (1982, p. 215)
293Bird (2018, p. 251f.)
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we may say that it is not the case that the laws of, for example, chemistry depend on
chemical powers, that is, the dispositional essences of the different chemical elements. I am
not claiming such powers exist, in line with my arguments in chapter 2.294
This is in stark contrast to Ellis’s view which we shall turn to shortly. It means that
we cannot look at a law of, say, chemistry, and claim that it is the dispositional essences
of e.g. the chemical elements which are doing the work, simply because we do not seem
to have dispositional essences at that level of complexity. Again, I argue that it is useful
to look to Vetter’s argument in (Vetter, 2018) as inspiration for a view about properties
and laws at the non-fundamental level. She claims that “all it takes to explain macro
dispositions is there within the disposition-bearing object itself: its categorical properties
plus the dispositions of its parts.”295
Vetter’s claim is not only relevant in order to explain dispositional features of macro-
objects and macro-properties, but this could also be a way for us to understand macro-,
or non-fundamental laws. If we stick to the example of chemical laws pertaining to certain
molecules as an example, the molecular structure and the dispositions of the elements
of that structure explains the disposition of that molecule. But the disposition is not
the essence of these macro-objects, or the property of being such an object; we need the
particular structure the element has as well. Following this, we get that laws of nature at the
non-fundamental level supervene on lower-level laws, that is, relations between fundamental
powers, as well as the structural properties of the macro-entity at play.
We have to take into account that Vetter uses this to propose a view of dispositions and
laws (and the order of explanation between them) other than mine, but I still hold that we
can use her idea here to argue for a view which is otherwise in line with the dispositional
essentialism found in Bird’s earlier work. My general view does not support his later work
nor Vetter’s general view of dispositions and laws.
5.4 Essences, natural kinds, and laws
5.4.1 Introducing kinds
As we have seen, a simple account of laws of nature based upon dispositional essences is
available if we assume powers as part of our ontology. However, as I have mentioned already,
Ellis argues that the laws of nature should not be explained in the way just described, and
that an account of laws making use of natural kinds in order to derive laws directly at each
294When it comes to the question of non-fundamental laws it is important to bear in mind the reflection
presented earlier, that not everything referred to as laws are in fact laws, and that some ‘laws’ (rather,
rules or theorems) in certain fields even though they are referred to as laws, are not possessing the features
necessary for actually being laws. Thus, certain features of the world which are accidental may still be
referred to as laws, for example Benford’s law, or ‘the law of anomalous numbers’, stating that the leading
digits in collections of numbers are likely to be small.
295Vetter (2018, p. 295)
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level of complexity where they occur is preferable.
This might be accomplished by denying dispositional monism about fundamental prop-
erties, the thesis I argue for here, and rather advocate the mixed view, because if laws are to
be explained more directly at each level of complexity—while the explanation is to remain
dispositional essentialist—we need to assume the existence of macro-powers. The mixed
view allows for powers and categorical properties to be present both at fundamental and
non-fundamental levels of metaphysics, and it is advocated by Ellis (and more recently by
McKitrick (2018)). When it comes to explaining the laws of nature he adds yet another
feature—the natural kind—which makes us able to explain the laws directly at the level
where they occur, be they fundamental or not. The advantage of this approach is that we
no longer have a problem relating to the explanation of non-fundamental laws—we have
direct explanations of all laws at all levels, from the most basic laws to laws which take
the whole world as their object. An obvious disadvantage now is that the view is a less
parsimonious version of dispositional essentialism, because we need yet another ontological
category—the natural kind—in order for it to work.
In relation to this introduction of additional entities in the explanation of laws, we
have to ask the following two questions. Firstly, are natural kinds necessarily involved in
the laws of nature? Secondly, is the cost of introducing yet another concept in out analysis
outweighed by the benefits? I will argue that the answer to both questions is no. Introducing
natural kinds seems ad hoc, and we are not able to claim that natural kinds are necessarily
related to laws in a successful way. I will return to the critique of Ellis in the next chapter,
as a part of the examination of some of the problems the dispositional essentialist will have
to solve. Let us first have a closer look at how this explanation of laws is supposed to work.
When we speak of dispositional essentialism as presented by Ellis, the notion of an object
becomes important again after having been basically absent both in the chapter so far, but
also in the thesis in general (especially when presenting dispositional essentialism). That
is, dispositional essences have been introduced as something which relates to properties
only, through the notion of a power understood as a sparse, fundamental property with a
dispositional essence. However, if we want to explain laws in a dispositional way following
Ellis, we need additional conceptual apparatus. We need to speak of objects belonging to
natural kinds. Whereas Bird thinks the laws stem from the powers of the fundamental
universals, Ellis holds that we need something additional in our framework, because the
laws are not tied to essences of universals, according to him, but rather to the essences of
the natural kinds.296 In order to understand Ellis’s position, we need to specify his notion
of a natural kind.
296As will be addressed in the next chapter, it might seem like the natural kinds and powers are more
closely connected than they are. That is, it might be tempting to ask whether we could demand that every
natural kind should pick out a sparse, fundamental property. In such a case the introduction of natural
kinds would seemingly just be an additional way of seeing the powers we already have accepted as parts
of our ontology. Sadly this is only seemingly the case; if we look at, for example, the property of negative
charge, even the class of all negatively charged objects is far too diverse to be a natural kind.
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5.4.2 Strict natural kinds specified
If we think of the concept of a kind, it is easy to picture that at least the idea of a biological
species will be included. However, we need to note that Ellis’s concept of natural kinds is
more restricted than most, and in order to highlight this I will refer to his conception as
strict natural kinds. He is for example explicit in his exclusion of biological classifications as
natural kinds. This entails that when I am describing Ellis’s theory of a relationship between
natural kinds and laws, I am excluding all biological cases. There is disagreement in the
literature whether biological species should be seen as natural kinds or not. Seeing biological
entities as outside the strict scope of natural kinds is in line with Ellis’ argumentation, while
Bird accepts biological kinds.297
The reason biological species are excluded lies in the definition and criterion specified
by Ellis for the existence of these kinds. He specifically holds that “Natural kinds exist
if and only if there are objective mind-independent kinds of things in nature” that are
“divided naturally into categorically distinct classes”.298 The important words are mind
independent and categorically distinct. The classifications that are natural kinds are such
that they would exist as distinct entities no matter what. They are not relative to our, or
anyone’s, epistemic perspective. This, alongside the discreteness of these kinds give us a
natural borderline between what may be seen as natural kinds and what may not, and this
border lies between the chemical and the biological kinds. Both the requirement of mind-
independency and of the discreteness of the natural kinds are not met when we speak of
biological kinds. Even if we could free the biological classifications completely from human
influence, both the evolution of species over time, and also the lack of borders between
them, lead us to believe that biological classifications are not clear and absolute.
There are largely two possible ways to construct an explanation of laws where natural
kinds are of importance. Either the natural kinds are taken as an additional primitive,
or the essences are seen as primitive, and hence the natural kinds are defined in terms of
these essences. Option two seems the most promising one. If we assume the dispositional
essences of properties, the natural kinds can be assumed to automatically follow from this.
If we settle for this option, there is no need for something additional to be able to speak
of natural kinds really existing, and there is also no need to take them as primitives.
Different natural kinds are distinguished from one another by their intrinsic properties.
Just as there is a set of properties that makes you you, there is a distinctive set of properties
in virtue of which a thing is of the kind it is. This is referred to as the objects real essence.299
A real essence refers to what it is to be that particular kind of thing. Some important points
regarding the modality in question, of particular interest to our topic are the following.
297See for example (Bird, 2015) and (Ellis, 2002), but note that since Bird’s account of laws does not
give natural kinds a central part in the explanation, accepting certain biological divisions as kinds will not
have the same consequences for him as they would for Ellis.
298Ellis (2009, p. 57)
299Ellis (2009, p. 58)
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1. It is grounded in the properties of the objects in the real world, and given that the
objects exist and given that they have certain essential properties, what follows from
this will be necessary.
2. An essence has to be discovered by us, by scientific exploration, this means that it is
an a posteriori necessity.
3. It is a metaphysical concept, rather than an epistemic one, so we may be mistaken
about what essence a given object has. The fact that our knowledge of the essences
are revisable does not make them any less necessary.
These three points are in agreement with my view as presented so far. The crucial
difference between my view and Ellis’s is that, for him, it is the essences of the natural
kinds which gives us the laws of nature. From Ellis’s point of view, the lawful patterns in
the world are, in short, determined by the natural kinds. But we still need to ask whether
we actually need natural kinds in order to have laws. In order to answer that question
in a satisfactory way we should give some additional details of Ellis’s account of laws. Of
particular interest is the way he sees the world as a hierarchical structure which reflects
the hierarchical structure of the laws. This is what gives his account a rather elegant way
of explaining laws on every level of complexity.
5.4.3 Hierarchies of natural kinds and laws
In order to present the complete hierarchy of natural kinds, and further tie these natural
kinds to the laws, or vice versa, Ellis needs more than just the substantive kinds—those
which exist as substances. He also needs natural kinds of processes, which are referred to as
dynamic natural kinds. Ellis is, I believe, correct in assuming that both natural kinds and
laws of nature have hierarchical structures. However, I highly doubt his claim that there is a
hierarchy of natural kinds—where each kind has a distinctive dispositional essence—which
corresponds to, and which explains or grounds the laws of nature.300
The dynamic natural kinds are crucial to Ellis’s understanding of the processes which
lies behind the laws of nature. As there are clear limitations to the way that the natural
kinds of substances can act and interact with each other, and as this behaviour is essential
to the kinds, we see that there must also be restrictions regarding what kind of processes or
events may happen in the world. That is, in order to understand the laws in this way, there
must also be a dynamic structure of the world. Instead of seeing this dynamic structure of
the world as something which is given by the essences of fundamental powers, as I do, Ellis
needs to introduce the category of dynamic natural kinds into his account, to be able to
explain the same thing. These natural kinds of processes, for example the many different
chemical processes, are absolutely distinct from all other kinds of processes, and they also
300I will return to this in chapter 6, section 6.2.2.
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have a hierarchical structure. The importance of these notions is seen when these structures
are tied together with a corresponding hierarchy of laws of nature. In the presentation of
this hierarchy of kinds, I will use Ellis’ description of what the most general and most
specific kinds are.301
The most general substantive kind is the class of all physical systems. This is what we
may call a global kind, and it includes all other substantive kinds as species. The most
general dynamic kind is the class of all physical events or processes. This is also a global
kind, and it includes all other dynamic kinds as species. These global kinds are supposed to
unify all of the other natural kinds in its category. Generic natural kinds in every category
are ontologically more fundamental than the species it contains. This indicates that it
would be logically possible for the natural kind to exist without the particular subgroup
or species, but that this does not hold the other way around.
At the other end of the scale, at the base of each hierarchy, we have the most specific
substantive and dynamic species. These are kinds without subkinds, and Ellis refers to them
as the infimic species. Examples of infimic substantial species are fundamental particles,
like the electron or the photon. The class of electrons is, as far as we know, such an infimic
species among our fundamental particles, while the class of fermions is not infimic, as
this includes further species of particles — it can be divided into smaller classes, and is
therefore a generic substantive kind. The class of all fundamental particles would be a
further generic natural kind. The same sort of structure is supposed to be found among
the dynamic kinds. Infimic dynamic species may be exemplified by the electron-positron
annihilation, and this would be a subspecies of the dynamic kind ‘annihilation process’.
Other such infimic dynamic processes will be the different kinds of radioactive decay, while
such decay in general will be a more encompassing kind in this hierarchy.
One important thing to note when we look further and further down in our hierarchy,
is that we go from objects having a clear structure—they are built up of smaller parts—to
a level where we find no relationship between parts any longer; in fact, there seems to be
no structure at all at the most basic level. This is in line with my earlier description of
fundamental properties, which in the same manner are devoid of structure. This absence
of known structure has one very important consequence, which is also in line with what
has been discussed earlier, namely that substances like the elementary particles are not
essentially distinguishable by their structural properties, because there is no such structure
to be distinguished by. Rather we state that they are distinguishable by their dispositional
properties. This in turn indicates that the essence of an elementary particle is not some
structural or categorical property, but that it rather depends on what it does, and what it
is able to do: how the particle acts and reacts in different situations.
But where there is similarity between Ellis’s account and the one I favour when it
comes to how the most basic elements of reality are described, the difference between the
301See (Ellis, 2002, Chapter 5) and (Ellis, 2009, p. 57-62)
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two essentialist positions emerges when Ellis argues that at every level in the hierarchy
there is a distinctive real essence, and that this essence is dispositional. This means that
for each and every generic natural kind there is a unique set of intrinsic properties and
structures that makes these objects the kinds of things that they are.
Let us exemplify how this hierarchical distinctive essence is supposed to work by look-
ing at one of the chemical elements. Fluorine, as any element, has some specific ways of
behaviour that is unique to it, and the things that a fluorine atom can do are constrained
by the essential properties it has. This means that properties like having nine protons,
being very light, and being very electronegative, in combination with other essential prop-
erties, leads to behaviours particular to fluorine. Moving further up in the hierarchy, we
see that fluorine is part of the halogens, along with for example chlorine and bromine, and
this natural kind also has particular behaviour that is determined by the kind essence. The
tendency to bind in such a way that different salts are produced may be seen as one such
behaviour. If we move even further up (perhaps skipping some steps) to the kind that is all
the chemical elements, the whole periodic system, there are also particular behaviour that
separates these entities from all other kinds of entities. This even though the elements are
very different from each other. The constraints on behaviour is much weaker at this level
than on the level of the essence of each and every element.
Whereas I argue that the dispositional essences of fundamental powers ground the
fundamental laws of nature, and that other laws will supervene on this, Ellis takes the
dispositional essence to be something which refers to the dispositional properties of natural
kinds at any level. If we want to make a description of a dispositional essence following
Ellis, we must be able to describe what the entity having the essence as a kind is disposed
to do in different possible circumstances. Another, and even more important, assumption
which has to be made at this point is that the essences, at any level of a hierarchy of natural
kinds, are dispositional. This is the key property which is supposed to tie the hierarchy of
laws to the hierarchy of natural kinds. But, as I argued in chapter 2, it is far from trivial
to assume that the essences at higher levels of complexity really are dispositional. Recall
that this would entail that the identities of all these natural kinds would be what they
are disposed to do. If we go back to our fluorine atom and its behaviour, I note that this
behaviour will be determined by the parts of the atom, their dispositional essences, as
well as the way they are combined to form the atom. However, for Ellis the dispositional
essence of fluorine would include how this element is related to other chemical elements
and other structures, and how other things are related to the fluorine. To make such a
description complete we will include the relevant intrinsic properties and structures of the
objects interacting with the given atom, and also the spatiotemporal relations between the
different objects in question, where this is relevant. This is radically different from the view
advocated by Bird and myself.
When the concept of a natural kind is analysed in the way I have presented here, it is
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done under the assumption that it may be used to expand our understanding of the laws
of nature, and that it may also be used to explain the hierarchical structure of these laws.
To be able to do this however, we must assume that natural kinds and their essences can
be taken as more basic than laws, and that the laws are in fact grounded in the essences of
the natural kinds. To be able to tie the laws to the natural kinds, we go back to look at the
hierarchical structure that the natural kinds falls into. As we have already seen, natural
kinds may be very general and include a lot of subspecies, or they may be very specific.
The same is true of laws, Ellis claims; they are not all of the same kind. Some laws apply
to all things or all processes, and some that are more specific and apply only to some kinds
of things or processes. To distinguish between the different kinds of laws, we need to look
at their scope and their generality.302
According to Ellis’s framework, laws are straightforward descriptions of the essential
properties that things must have in virtue of being the kinds of things they are.303 Since
the laws are supposed to be correlated with the hierarchies of the natural kinds, we get
distinctions along the following lines:
1. The most general symmetry principles. They apply to all things in the global category
of substances, and to all processes and interactions. An example may be different
conservation principles.
2. The most general structural principles. These laws define the spacetime structure
of the world. They say something about what kind of states must exist, and which
states that cannot coexist. An example may be principles of special relativity, and
principles of quantum mechanics, such as Pauli’s exclusion principle.304
3. Laws that are concerned with the essential natures of more specific kinds of substances
or fields. They concern the properties of things like particles, chemical substances and
the electromagnetic field.
4. Causal and statistical laws. These tell us how various kinds of things are disposed
to behave, or disposed to interact with each other. They apply to specific kinds of
events and processes. These laws will for example be the ones involved in various
chemical interactions, where the interactions are limited by just which chemicals are
involved in them.305
Of these categories, the first and the second are clearly the most problematic. If we
think of a framework based upon natural kinds and their essences, it is very hard to
figure out which natural kind is responsible for these global laws, although I will return
302Ellis (2001)
303Ellis (2001)
304That two identical fermions cannot occupy the same state.
305Ellis (2001, p. 67-76) Ellis (2002, p. 81-88)
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to one proposed solution in chapter 6. However, it is equally hard to see how these laws
may be seen as manifestations of powers. This entails that when it comes to global laws
we seemingly run into problems no matter which version of dispositional essentialism we
subscribe to.
The problems tied to the most general laws of nature are of such size and complexity
that I will use the next chapter to consider whether the proposed solutions to these problems
are satisfactory, or whether the global laws and related issues present complications so
great that they are endangering the whole project of giving an account of laws in terms
of dispositional essences. I will, however, suggest that these global principles might not,
rightfully, be seen as laws, and if this is the case we are under no obligation to account for
them in the same way as we account for the ordinary laws of nature.
In addition, I will delve into the discussion of whether adding natural kinds to our
account is something which can be defended successfully. If, for example, explaining laws
in terms of the essences of natural kinds gives us an account of laws which is able to
provide a unified account of all laws of nature, even the problematic global ones, adding
this extra notion seems a small price to pay. However, to do this, we need to show that
natural kinds are needed in order to have laws at any level, and this does not seem to be
the case. In chapter 6, I will go on to argue that the natural kinds resemble more and more
an unnecessary add on to our theory.
5.5 Dispositional essentialism without necessitarian-
ism?
Even though dispositional accounts of several different features of the world have become
increasingly popular lately, it is still the case that the dispositional essentialist demanding
that the laws of nature be necessary is in a considerable minority even inside the dis-
positionalist camp. We recall how both Vetter and Borghini and Williams present their
accounts of possibility in such a way that these accounts are at least compatible with the
contingency of the laws of nature. However, none of them accept dispositional essentialism,
and even though I have argued (in chapter 3), that dispositional accounts of possibility
too become problematic when they assume contingent laws of nature to be a real pos-
sibility, the necessity of laws is not an explicit feature of their accounts. An even more
recent example, attempting to reconciliate dispositional essentialism with the contingency
of laws is found in (McKitrick, 2018). Now I want to respond to some of her criticism of
the necessitarian attitude, although this is also relevant for my discussion in chapter 7.
McKitrick acknowledges that powers are sparse, fundamental dispositions, and she
agrees that at least some properties are essentially dispositional.306 Thus, it seems we
306McKitrick (2018, p. 211). She does hold that powers, dispositions, potentialities, all these dispositional
features of the world, are instantiated by objects, not properties, but this does not seem too relevant in
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have at least some common ground. Nevertheless, she argues that it is possible to have
this dispositional essentialist general attitude while still rejecting necessitarianism of any
sort, conservative or radical. In addition, she argues that the necessitarianism advocated by
the essentialist is less revisionary than what we portray ourselves to be, and that in some
cases the difference between our necessary laws and her contingentism is merely a verbal
dispute. In her chapter ‘Against Necessitarianism’, McKitrick lists five ways of being a dis-
positional realist—which (on McKitrick’s account) seems to entail accepting that at least
some properties are essentially dispositional—without being a necessitarian at the same
time. I will only address two of these; the two which are relevant for the topics discussed
in this chapter.
First of all we have an objection coming from the standpoint of property dualism.
Property dualism is the same as what has been referred to as the mixed view above, the
view that essentially dispositional and categorical properties exist at both fundamental
and non-fundamental levels. Hence, this criticism will be pertinent for Ellis, but not for
advocates of Bird’s view. If we claim that some properties, even at the fundamental level,
have no dispositional essence this will have certain consequences for what may be seen as
possible or not according to the view. Armstrong has pointed out the following problem
with this view.
Either every factor involved in a causal action is a power, (...) or else there are
non-powers involved. If non-powers are involved, then their causal contribution
is contingent. And the effects will not be necessary.307
Because of this it seems not entirely clear that Ellis’s property dualism is consistent
with his necessitarianism. In addition it seems that assuming the mixed view to be correct
may be a way of sneaking contingent laws into the essentialist picture.308
Another way of incorporating contingent laws into a general essentialist picture, is
by allowing some form of loose essentialism.309 This view shares some similarities with
Vetter’s concept of near-maximality discussed in chapter 3, and entails that there could be
variation, or ‘wiggle-room’ in the precise nature or magnitude of either the manifestation or
the stimulus condition of the dispositional essence, and that because of this slight possibility
for difference, the laws could also have been somewhat different.
I think this objection seems just as ad hoc as Vetter’s notion of near-maximality, but the
idea that essentialism need not be absolute points forwards to McKitricks more substantial
criticism of necessitarianism as being less revisionary than we make it out to be. In Ellis’s
case, the critique in relation to this is tied to his way of presenting the metaphysically
possible worlds in line with those worlds which are deemed (or ideally deemed) possible
relation to the topics I am discussing here.
307Armstrong (2001, p. 170)
308McKitrick (2018, p. 219)
309McKitrick (2018, p. 222)
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by science. He states that “[s]cientific essentialists hold that one of the primary aims of
science is to define the limits of the possible”.310 Thus, McKitrick notes, other worlds
become “irrelevant to his project”.311 Because of this, it seems that Ellis’s view might be
seen to reflect little more than his decision to use ‘metaphysically possible’ where most
philosophers use ‘physically possible’.312 This entails that what seemed at first to be a
substantial metaphysical disagreement can, seemingly, be reduced to a mere verbal dispute.
Before I answer McKitrick, we should note that she thinks the situation is much the same
for Bird as well, and given that my view of the laws is inspired by Bird’s, this is also a
direct critique of my view. Let us see if this objection can be met.
First of all, it should be noted that when I speak of the dispositional essences at the
fundamental level, there is no such ‘wiggle-room’ allowed. Nor will it be the case that, since
these essences are on the fundamental level only, there might be room for dispositional
essentialism being consistent with different laws of, for example, chemistry, as McKitrick
suggests.
If we have yet to discover fundamental properties, then all of the properties
and laws discovered so far are derivative. If these laws and properties are con-
tingently derived from the true fundamental properties, then other possible
worlds could differ quite drastically from the actual world, and the sense of
contingency about the accepted natural laws will largely be preserved.313
It is clear that if the laws were contingently derived, we would be able to preserve the
‘sense of contingency’ McKitrick describes. However, there is no talk of non-fundamental
laws being contingently derived according to any version of dispositional essentialism.
In addition to this, it seems that McKitrick goes back to the aforementioned ‘wiggle-
room’ when arguing that some of the consequences of assuming dispositional essentialism
to be the way I have described them in this thesis are problematic as well as counter-
intuitive. Hence we, as dispositional essentialists, apparently hide behind language which
is necessitarian while at the same time allowing possibilities which would be in line with
accepting loose essentialism. These are assumptions which are at the core of the claim that
there is little more than verbal dispute between McKitrick’s view and mine. She notes that
a dispositional essentialist arguing the way I do will have to say that an entity which is like
an electron, but with a slight change of mass, is not an electron, or that a particle travel-
ling slightly slower than the speed of light (through empty space) cannot be a photon. For
McKitrick these entities are just slightly different electrons or slightly different photons,
leading to their respective worlds being nomically slightly different worlds, a possibility se-
cured by the contingent laws of nature. For the dispositional essentialist, these worlds will
310Ellis (2001, p. 241). Ellis refers to his branch of dispositional essentialism as scientific essentialism
311McKitrick (2018, p. 227)
312What I have mostly referred to as nomically possible in this thesis.
313McKitrick (2018, p. 225)
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have to be seen as alien worlds, and those entities also have to bee seen as alien entities.
Hence, where McKitrick sees a world where the speed of light is only slightly different, I
see a world where nothing can correctly be referred to as ‘light’ or as a ‘photon’. Thus,
the dispositional essentialists are in a situation where the laws we postulate as existing
will never be violated because we (illegitimately according to McKitrick) pose that worlds
where the fundamental properties are only slightly different are modally irrelevant worlds.
This might, at first glance, seem like a predicament for my account of laws.
The main problem with McKitrick’s argument in this case is her assumption that the
changes she postulates really are small because they seem small to us. However, I doubt
that this is a correct assessment of the situation. I argue that McKitrick does the following
problematic manoeuvres in her argument.
1. She overestimates how similar to our world these alternative worlds would be.
2. She does not take into account the interconnectedness of the dispositional essentialist
world.
Let us begin by looking at the second point. Recall how the laws, as described in this
thesis, arise from necessary connections between powers. This entails that changing one
of them will influence many or indeed all of the others. The main thesis of dispositional
essentialism is not only that there are essences at the fundamental level making the laws
absolutely necessary, but also that these necessary laws are grounded by a web of necessary
relations, such that no change can be made to a single part of it without there being
consequences for the rest of this web.
When it comes to the first point, the overestimation of the similarity of the result-
ing worlds, the response I will give is closely related to some of the arguments against
conceivability-based accounts of possibility, which are the main topic of chapter 7. The
gist is this. Changes to the nomic structure of the world, also small changes, must come
from somewhere. Thus, in order to have the change we postulate, whatever makes this
thing the way it is must also be adjusted. And not only that. Everything depending on
the changed entitiy will also be modified. It seems highly unlikely that a world with an
otherworldly electron—otherwise identical to our electron, but with a different mass—will
be only a slightly adjusted version of our world. I argue that the result of such a change
will not be something the dispositional essentialist mistakenly and misleadingly pose as an
‘alien world’. It will truly be an alien world.
As discussed in section 5.3.2, I do not take a stand regarding the question of whether
or not there could be such worlds existing, but rather argue that we at present do not have
enough knowledge to disprove their existence.314 What I do argue, however, is that such
worlds, whether they exist or not, remain modally irrelevant, in the sense that they do not
314The answers we are waiting for would be coming from cosmology, not from philosophy.
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contain anything which has an effect on the modal status of the entities in our world. And
this is a far more substantial statement than the proposed verbal dispute of McKitrick. I do
not attempt to sneak contingency back into my account hidden by my vocabulary. When
I claim that the laws of nature are absolutely, metaphysically, necessary, that is exactly
what I mean.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have presented two versions of dispositional essentialist accounts of laws of
nature. One of these, Bird’s version, is describing laws as something which follow directly
from the dispositional essences of the fundamental properties existing in the world. Ba-
sically, the fundamental laws spell out the necessary relations between such fundamental
properties, whereas the non-fundamental laws supervene on this fundamental structure of
interrelated powers. The second alternative, Ellis’s version, adds an additional feature, the
natural kind, to his account of the laws. This means that at the cost of simplicity, we
are able to explain laws directly at the level of reality where they occur. This entails that
rather than seeing the laws of chemistry as based upon the dispositional essences of the
relevant fundamental powers plus the structures at the level of higher complexity, we see
these laws as reflecting irreducible essences of the chemical kinds. Ellis’s view, I argued, is
problematic for at least a couple of reasons. Firstly, we add another element, the natural
kind, into the theoretical foundation of our account, and we need to show that this is a
necessary feature of laws. Secondly, we need to argue that there are dispositional essences
also at non-fundamental levels. That is, powers exists not simply as a feature found in
fundamental metaphysics, but also at the levels of, for example, atoms or molecules. I have
earlier argued that the existence of powers, as defined in this thesis, is a feature of funda-
mental metaphysics; thus, Ellis’s explanation of laws is not readily available for me, and
I thus embrace, by and large, Bird’s view (despite some important reservations). I have
also addressed the fact that for the dispositional essentialist like me, the laws of nature are
absolutely, metaphysically necessary. This is the case even though we might have strong
intuitions to the contrary. In relation to this I have argued that the recent criticism from
McKitrick poses no challenge to my overall project.
Chapter 6
Global laws, fundamental constants,
and resistance to nomic change
6.1 Introduction
Laws which have the whole universe as their scope, and which apply to all events and
all processes may be referred to as global laws, and the most common examples are the
conservation and symmetry principles, such as the conservation of mass-energy and of
angular momentum, and the fact that all inertial frames are equivalent in special relativity.
In this chapter I will go through some of the problems such laws create for the dispositional
essentialist, as well as explore two different approaches to such laws. The main question is
the following. How are we supposed to understand global laws if our goal is to remain firmly
rooted in dispositional essentialism? Another problematic aspect tied to the dispositional
essentialist understanding of laws is how we are to understand the fundamental constants,
and whether these constants might open the door for contingent laws after all.
In chapter 2 I argued that we get mainly two advantages from assuming fundamental
properties with dispositional essences. Firstly, this gives us a theory of property identity.
Secondly, we gain a theory of the laws of nature. However, the laws classified as being,
in some sense, global do not seem to fit the description of laws offered in the preceding
chapter of this thesis. It is not obvious how we are supposed to tie them to any particular
essentially dispositional properties existing in the world. Following this, we are left with
three main options. First, we can admit that it appears we cannot give an adequate account
of global laws given the dispositional essentialist framework, and because of this we may
reject the theory. This is a last resort, if no other solution is found. Another option is to
state that we can operate with separate theories of laws at different levels. This is not
a particularly satisfying solution either. The third option is making our theory fit the
landscape, particularly by understanding the landscape better. This is the route I intend
to take, and it inevitably leads to the question of whether the global laws are correctly
understood as laws.
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Proponents of dispositional essentialism have already been trying to solve this problem
in various ways, depending on their general understanding of how dispositional essentialism
works. There are, for example, suggestions that the global laws may be understood as laws
governing the whole world, maybe even, as proposed by John Bigelow, Brian Ellis, and
Catherine Lierse, as properties of the world understood as a member of a natural kind.315
Another option is a solution presented by Bird, which involves redefining these global
laws as symmetry principles, which are then seen as meta-statements about laws, not
as proper laws in themselves. Both suggestions have problematic aspects, or problematic
consequences.
This chapter will proceed as follows. I will start by discussing the conservation laws,
and the problems we face when we interpret them in a dispositional essentialist framework.
I will argue that the suggestion from Ellis, that we ought to see the world as belonging to
a natural kind is less than ideal, given that I have already contended that we do not need
natural kinds in order to have laws. The approach presented by Bird is more in line with
my overall understanding of laws, but with an important difference: where his suggestion
involves interpreting symmetries in an epistemic way—primarily as reformulations of con-
servation laws—I suggest interpreting them in an ontological way. That is, as something
substantial in the structure and fabric of the world. Section 6.3 deals with problems tied
to fundamental constants, which in my opinion is the most underdeveloped part in the
literature on dispositional essentialism. In section 6.3.2 I consider the room for manoeuvre
in the nomic structure of the world, and I will argue that this room is substantially smaller
than what has commonly been assumed, given that we accept the conditions given by dis-
positional essentialism. I also propose, in section 6.3.3, an understanding of the relational
aspect of dispositional essences in terms of graphs. By explicating the power-based account
of properties in this way, the restrictions on the possibility of change made in the nomic
structure of the world becomes even more apparent.
6.2 Conservation laws and symmetry principles
We may take conservation laws as a clear example of the problematic cases which will be
discussed in this chapter. These principles tell us something about which events or processes
that are possible, because it is the case that some particular quantities (energy, angular
momentum etc.) must be conserved in all self-contained events and processes. Bigelow et al.
(1992) presents a general form of a conservation law, formulated negatively, as “[e]vents
and processes which are not x-conservative are impossible”.316 They go on to state that the
conservation laws have a special kind of universality tied to them:
They are universal in the sense that the antecedent or reference class is a
315Bigelow et al. (1992)
316Bigelow et al. (1992, p. 385)
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broad ontological category. They do not apply to particular kinds of events
or processes, but (when compensation is made for external influences) to all
events and processes.317
Such a relationship is not naturally seen as a relationship between powers, as it is diffi-
cult to see which universals one would be referring to in that case. It is deeply problematic
to try to explain these cases by referring to either of the versions of the dispositional es-
sentialist frameworks as they have been presented so far in this thesis, that is, it is hard
to see them as describing essential properties of parts of the world. Whether or not we are
putting additional weight on the concept of a natural kind does not initially seem to make
a big difference here.
It does actually seem like making sense of conservation laws is easier if you have,
say, an Armstrongian view of laws. It is not overly problematic to picture some extra
principle which controls the way N is permitted to relate the Fs and the Gs. This situation
is radically different for the dispositional essentialist. We have already argued that the
laws are necessary, and that this necessity stems from the properties themselves—that
is, from their dispositional essences. This means that there is, in reality, no room for an
additional necessity on top of this. However, the question remains; how are we supposed to
explain what seems to be an extra layer of necessity on top of something which is already
necessary? In addition to the fact that such global laws are problematic for the dispositional
essentialist, it should be mentioned that laws which are only tied to and applicable on the
universe itself might be seen as a problematic idea per se. This is explained by G. F. R.
Ellis as follows:
[A]ccording to the usual conception of a law, a law is a generalization that
applies to all members of some class of entities, with a variety of different
members. If a law applies only to one thing, it’s not a law, it’s a description of
one specific instance.
and further
[I]f such laws do exist, there is no conceivable way we can test them: how do
we prove they are a law (whether descriptive or prescriptive) that is applicable
to different entities, rather than just the way things turned out to be? They
will remain hypothetical untestable laws forever, no matter what we do.318
It is obviously problematic to refer to laws governing one single object, but as we have
seen earlier, essentialistic accounts of laws does not focus on single objects, but rather on
either universals or on kinds of objects, kinds of properties and processes and so forth.
317Bigelow et al. (1992, p. 384f.)
318Ellis (2014, p. 18) I will in general refer to G.F.R Ellis as just that, to distinguish him from Brian
Ellis.
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This entails that we need to examine whether such entities may be used to ground also the
global laws.
6.2.1 The world as one of a kind
In what follows I want, firstly, to focus on the proposal presented by Bigelow, Ellis, and
Lierse, which depends on natural kinds in order to solve the conundrum of global laws.
Secondly, I will investigate whether it is possible to gain a proper understanding of such
laws if we are unwilling to accept natural kinds as an important part of our ontology when
it comes to laws.
If we want to explain laws by reference to the essences of natural kinds, we are still
faced with considerable problems when we turn to these global laws or principles, because
it is very unclear what natural kind they might be referring to. Bigelow, Ellis, and Lierse
argue in much the same fashion as Ellis does in his later works. They see laws of nature as
being concerned with natural kinds, in the sense that they in some cases even just describe
the essential properties of the natural kinds. It is argued that this is true even for the most
fundamental laws there are, which means that what we refer to as global laws or global
principles are concerned with the kind of world this is. When discussing conservation laws,
Bigelow, Ellis, and Lierse make it clear that global principles are not best understood as
pointing to essential properties of particular parts of the world:
It is not essential to the category of events that they should be energy-conservative,
or angular-momentum-conservative, or conservative in any other respect.319
This means that these conservation principles are not grounded in events happening
in the world, and that happenings which are not in accordance with these conservation
principles would still be events. But if we move on to look at the universe as a whole, this
is no longer the case:
A universe in which the forbidden changes did occur sufficiently often would
not be our kind of universe.320
With this in mind, Bigelow, Ellis, and Lierse conclude that conservation laws should
not be seen as describing properties of parts of the world, but rather as ascribing properties
to the world as a whole. Hence, the statement ‘the world as one of a kind’, used in Bigelow
et al. (1992), does not refer to our world being special or unique, but rather to the idea that
the world is of a specific world nature; it is a specific kind of world. They are expanding the
idea of natural kinds so as to include the whole world, with the result that it is possible for
us to speak of world natures and world properties. This means that in the same way that
the specific laws are tied to the more specific natural kinds—such as the laws related to
319Bigelow et al. (1992, p. 385)
320Bigelow et al. (1992, p. 385)
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Fluorine is tied to that specific natural kind—there are some laws that are tied to the kind
that is the world. The global laws are thus also grounded in the world, but their concern
is with the kind of world it is.321
Ellis also argues for a similar view in his later works, for example by stating the follow-
ing.
In the case of the global kind, the distinctive properties will be those that
distinguish how the substances of this world, as opposed to those of any alien
worlds (if such worlds should exist), are intrinsically disposed to behave, and
the distinctive structures will include all those that are possible in worlds like
ours.322
One potential worry with the view of the world as one of a kind is that it is seemingly
sneaking the possible worlds back into an ontology which was supposed to be explicitly
based on the actual world only. However, as we see in the quote above, and generally when
this account of global laws is discussed, the existence of eventual other worlds are never
presented as a commitment behind this expansion of the natural kinds based view of laws
of nature. The suggestion is that the world should be seen as a member of a natural kind
even if there are no other worlds existing. It could be the only member of its kind, and
there might not be other kinds of worlds, but our world would be a member of a natural
kind none the less. We may as such keep the assumption that other possible worlds are
either non-existent or modally irrelevant. As Bigelow et al. (1992) states:
We are not asserting that there are any such disconnected worlds. Nor do we
assert that there are none. There is at least one world; and it’s a member of a
natural kind whether or not there are any others of its kind.323
In line with the above quote, we may remain agnostic regarding the question if there
are several worlds or just this one. The account is not depending on this. In line with
what I have argued so far in this thesis, I hold that modality is not best understood or
explained by reference to other worlds, of any kind, and that the existence of other worlds is
irrelevant to the understanding of modality. This attitude may be kept while still agreeing
that, firstly, the world is one of a kind, and, secondly, that this explanation of the global
laws is in line with the idea of grounding the laws, and the necessity associated with them,
in the actual world, while at the same time avoiding having to bring in causally inaccessible
possible worlds. Ellis is in general dismissive of the possible world-centred approach, and
argues that an understanding of necessity grounded in possible worlds, of the categorical
type, like the Lewisian worlds, is not providing necessitation:
321Bigelow et al. (1992, p. 373) do not present a complete theory of what a natural kind is, but they aim
to show the consequences that will follow given the ontological priority of essences and natural kinds over
laws.
322Ellis (2002, p. 36)
323Bigelow et al. (1992, p. 371)
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What does it matter how the actual world is related to other possible worlds
if all the possible worlds are in themselves non-modal? If natural necessities
exist, then they must be grounded in the actual world, and this world must
itself have modal properties.324
When it comes to the question of what kind of world we live in, we may be able to tie
down some of the essential properties that our world has. Being conservative with respect
to several quantities has already been mentioned; its causal structure and certain global
symmetries may also be seen as such essential properties. These properties are all related
to the laws of our world, and they put significant restrictions on the kinds of changes and
happenings that are possible; they also limit the kinds of things that may exist in the
world. With this in mind, the restrictions on the laws are perhaps more severe than what
intuition may tell us:
A law of nature is not just something which is true of the actual world but
which could have been otherwise in this very world; rather, it is something
which could not have failed to hold of this world without this world ceasing to
be, and another world altogether existing instead – another world of a different
natural kind with a different nature from the one we are in.325
The important question to ask at this point is the following. Are the arguments for
seeing the global laws as reflecting the essence of a world-wide kind sufficiently strong that
we should accept that laws of nature are closely related to the natural kinds, even though
I have so far argued otherwise?
6.2.2 Do we really need natural kinds?
In line with my arguments so far, I hold it to be an advantage if we were able to obtain a
workable account of all laws of nature without having to resort to natural kinds. Hence, my
goal is to be able to explain also the problematic global laws without introducing natural
kinds as a supplementary entity. The most important reason for this is that, in addition to
being a less parsimonious account, an account of laws based upon natural kinds is radically
different than the view I have given my support to, based upon powers. It is not an option
to keep the framework as presented this far, and add natural kinds on top. The difference
between the two dispositional essentialist accounts of laws discussed in this thesis is far
greater than it seems at first glance. Hence, an attempt to combine them in order to solve
the problem of global laws would presumably fail. Let us look at why this is the case.
One particularly striking difference between the two views is the distinction between
the entities responsible for there being laws in the world; the powers on the one hand, and
324Ellis (2002, p. 118)
325Bigelow et al. (1992, p. 373)
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the essences of the natural kinds on the other. Perhaps this difference could be overcome
if we demanded that every natural kind was picking out a sparse, fundamental property?
In such a case the introduction of natural kinds would seemingly just be an additional way
of seeing the powers we already have accepted as parts of our ontology. I argue that this is
only seemingly the case; if we look at the most typical example of a sparse property which
is also in general seen as a power, the property of electric charge, and more specifically
that of negative charge, such a property does not form a natural kind.326 The class of all
negatively charged objects is far too diverse to be a natural kind. Thus, we see that even
if we do concede that every natural kind correspond to to natural properties, we still end
up facing problems.
If we let go of the question of the connection between sparse properties and natural
kinds, and move on to the question of whether the natural kinds really are connected to
the laws in the way Ellis claims them to be, we find problems here as well. Instead of
considering the case of charge, we may focus on one of the entities having such a property,
for example, the electron. It does indeed seem like ‘being an electron’ would qualify as being
a sparse property, and it is definitively a natural kind, even by Ellis’s strict standards. But
does it generate laws? It does not seem like that is the case. The laws which we associate
with electrons are not only derivable from the given entity, the electron, because they can
also be derived from more basic laws which have to do with, for example, their negative
charge and other powers. That is, the property of charge, and other fundamental properties
which are essentially dispositional are responsible for the behaviour of the electron, not for
the fact that the electron belongs to a particular natural kind.
It is part of the essence of the electron that it is negatively charged, surely. However this
is not a law of nature, it is just an essential fact about electrons. Just in the same way that
there is no law stating that ordinary table salt is NaCl—this is just an essential fact about
its constitution—it tells us simply what table salt is. Hence, even the laws concerning
things like electrons are derivative laws, not fundamental ones. They are grounded in
more fundamental properties, not in the natural kind the given entity belongs to. For the
derivative laws, say the laws of chemistry, Ellis ties these to the essences of the chemical
kinds, but, as discussed in chapter 2, we do not need to pose dispositional essences at
this level of complexity. We can explain these higher-level laws because they supervene
on underlying laws which hold in virtue of the properties they relate to. Hence, it seems
disadvantageous to introduce yet another entity, the natural kind, in order to directly
explain the laws we can already account for through supervenience.
Nevertheless, we might still ask ourselves whether these more fundamental laws could
be grounded in fundamental natural kinds. If this was the case, we could introduce the
natural kinds at the fundamental level, and subsequently refer to natural kinds both at
326Quine (1969) however, holding natural kinds to be sets, has a view which is consistent with the set
of all negatively charged particles being a natural kind.
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the fundamental and the global level. However, stating that natural kinds are fundamental
is problematic in itself, and we find quite forceful arguments claiming natural kinds to be
some form of complex universal rather than just a simple universal.327 Instead of asking
whether fundamental laws could be explained by fundamental natural kinds, let us ask the
following question. Do we need natural kinds in order to have laws? What if we picture a
world in which there is just one uniform substance; a gunk world. Presumably, such a world
would still have laws—perhaps several different laws depending on how the gunk behaves.
The division of substances into natural kinds is not a necessary condition for there being
laws.328 In the gunk world case, it is solely the essentially dispositional properties of the
gunk which leads to there being laws also in such limited worlds.329
6.2.3 World properties or pseudo-laws?
Thus, we are back where we begun; if we do not need natural kinds in order to explain
the laws of nature in general, how are we supposed to understand the global laws, such
as conservation and symmetry principles? If we reject natural kinds as a source of laws in
general, it seems strange to reintroduce them in order to get an explanation of a set of
particularly problematic laws, while denying them this role elsewhere. Hence, we are in a
situation where it is clear that these laws do not appear to reflect dispositional essences
of fundamental properties, and if we deny the suggestion by Bigelow et al. (1992) as well,
which options are left?
A possible alternative to arguing that the world is the (perhaps sole) member of a
natural kind, is to propose that there is a property which is corresponding to the proposed
kind. This would entail claiming that there exists a property of being a world with certain
essential dispositions, such as being energy conserving in response to any event.330 If this
is the case, the global laws simply reflect the possession of this property.
This solution is, in my opinion, a non-starter. Simply rephrasing the solution presented
in (Bigelow et al., 1992) such that we speak of properties rather than natural kinds while
keeping the rest of the proposed solution is ad hoc. It might of course be argued that the
solution provided by Bigelow et al. (1992) is already ad hoc, and reformulating it in this
way certainly does not improve this impression. It only glosses over the fact that we do
not have a good answer. In addition, these laws seem to be working on a ‘system level’
and hence the property they eventually would correspond to have to be some sort of macro
property, which is not the kind of property that generate laws according to dispositional
327See for example (Hawley and Bird, 2011).
328Bird (2007, p. 209)
329Saying that natural kinds are not needed in order to explain the laws of nature is not the same as
saying natural kinds are not important of course. They are an important part of our ontology which we
probably cannot do without, but they are not needed in this context.
330Bird (2007, p. 213) presents this suggestion, but he does not endorse it, and even states that it is not
a good solution.
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essentialism. Let us leave this approach behind.
There is yet another problem at play when we consider things like conservation laws.
Quantities are not only conserved at a global scale, they are conserved at all scales, hence
the suggested solution tying these laws to either world kinds or world properties does not
capture every aspect of these laws. Does this mean that we might not find a satisfactory
answer to these questions? That we just have to settle for the idea that these things
are mysterious indeed? As Bird states “[t]here is no reason why the fundamental nature
of universe should be even comprehensible, let alone intuitive.”331 But even though that
seems to be correct, it seems unsatisfactory at the present moment to simply conclude that
this is something we might never get a proper answer to, or that we have to await further
answers from science before concluding. In some cases this would be the correct way to
conclude, but in this case there are other options to consider before eventually going back
to this option.
In the final sections of ‘Nature’s Metaphysics’, Bird points towards a plausible way
of understanding conservation laws and symmetry principles without making compromises
regarding how dispositional essentialism explains the laws of nature, something which en-
tails that we can get at least a bit closer to an acceptable answer to this problem. Rather
than accepting world natures or world properties, we need to scrutinise the proposed laws,
and ask whether they are correctly understood as laws. What if this is not the correct way
to perceive them? Bird suggests that it is not, and that they should more correctly be
viewed as pseudo-laws.332 This assumption is based on certain aspects of the global laws
which we have not yet touched upon; the relationship between the conservation laws and
the symmetry principles.
6.2.4 The relationship between conservation laws and symmetry
principles
So far, the proposed solutions to the conundrum of global laws have been deemed unsatis-
factory. Both the argument from world natures and the one from world properties rely on
something we add to our theory without there being sufficient reasons for doing so (apart
from trying to solve the problem at hand). Maybe it is time to seriously consider why these
global laws seem so diferent from the other laws of nature. Could it be the case that they
seem different because they are different? If this is the case, what we have considered to be
global laws are in fact something which is slightly different than the other laws of nature.
This is an important point, because if the global laws are not correctly seen as laws, we
are no longer committed to account for them in the same way we account for other laws
331Bird (2007, p. 213)
332Bird (2007, p. 214). We should note that Bird’s treatment of this issue in ‘Nature’s Metaphysics’ is
short and introductory in style, as it is a part of the section of the book which points towards the need for
more research.
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of nature.
An important feature of conservation laws and symmetry principles not yet touched
upon is the way they are closely connected to each other. This is a point which is missing
from the account of Bigelow et al. (1992), but it is briefly mentioned in (Bird, 2007).
According to Noether’s theorem, the conservation laws may be derived from the symmetry
principles.333 This is convenient because it means we can change our focal point from
speaking of ‘conservation laws and symmetry principles’ to concentrating solely on the
symmetries, as these may be seen as the more fundamental principles. This makes our
account more parsimonious.
However, as Livanios (2010) points out, we should be careful not to imply that conser-
vation laws and symmetry principles are equivalent. The way Bird addresses these things,
it seems the symmetry principles are simply alternative formulations of conservation laws,
and that symmetries perhaps most of all say something about our way of understanding the
world. That is, he holds what Livanios refers to as the epistemic viewpoint of symmetries,
formulated as follows:
[T]he presence of symmetries in physical theories is related to general conditions
of physical knowledge or to some limits inherent in our way of describing the
physical world.334
However, simply saying that conservation laws may be formulated as symmetry princi-
ples does not seem to give us entities which are easier to handle as dispositional essentialists.
If the symmetries are laws in some sense or another, we still need to be able to ground
them in some dispositional essence, something which does not seem doable. This is the
starting point Bird is arguing from when he asserts that the symmetry principles are per-
haps not best viewed as laws in themselves, but rather as meta-statements about laws. This
understanding entails that these law-like background structures are something we should
aim to eliminate, as being “features of our form of representation rather than features of
the world”.335
Distinguishing symmetry principles from laws seems in line with how they are spoken of
in general; they are described more as properties of laws than as laws themselves. This could
be seen as pointing us in the direction of not viewing these principles as laws, although
the fact that we tend not to speak of these features of the world as laws is not conclusive
evidence for anything.336 Bird’s suggestion is to view the symmetries as pseudo-laws. This
might be correct, given that I assume that the term pseudo-law is supposed to say something
333Noether (1971). It is Noether’s first theorem which is of relevance here, the fact that for every con-
tinuous global symmetry of the Langrangian there is a conservation law. I do not go into details regarding
symmetries here, but see (Bangu, 2013) for an introduction to this topic.
334Livanios (2010, p. 296)
335Bird (2007, p. 214)
336In the same way as our everyday use of dispositional phrases might not be overly relevant for our
philosophical understanding of dispositions, as argued in chapter 3.
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along the lines of the following: Even though symmetry principles behave nomologically,
they are not really laws after all; even if they seem to us lawlike, their identity is not the
same as the laws. This is a fair point to make, but it does not give us any information
about what the symmetry principles are, just what they are not. We are not offered any
positive explanation by accepting them being pseudo-laws. Hence, something more must
be provided.
We also need to note that it is not unproblematic to argue that the conservation laws
might be reformulated as symmetry principles. If they are simply alternative formulations
of conservation laws they cannot really ground any explanation of the existence of the
conservation laws, they are just stating their existence in a different vocabulary. We need
to ask how plausible the epistemic viewpoint of symmetries really is, that is, how plausible
is it really that symmetry principles are simply alternative formulations of conservation
laws? If this is supposed to imply equivalence, this seems to be far too strong a claim:
[S]ymmetry principles are conceptually related to (and constitute an explana-
tory basis for) a lot of issues that are entirely independent from conservation
facts. So, the alleged equivalence with the conservation laws does seriously
downgrade their significant role.337
6.2.5 Symmetries and the identity of fundamental properties
For the dispositional essentialist, the problems tied to symmetry principles unfortunately do
not end there. Recall how the identity of fundamental properties is explained exhaustively
by their powers, and that this is one of the two main reasons to accept dispositional
essentialism. What if the identity of fundamental properties can be explained by taking
an alternative path, that is, by way of symmetries? Livanios points out that symmetries
actually can be used to identify things like fundamental properties.
[T]wo fundamental properties, rest mass and spin, that according to dispo-
sitional essentialists are dispositional features of elementary particles, can be
identified via a symmetry-based procedure independent of their causal role.338
Such a symmetry-based determination of the identity of fundamental particles might
be used as arguments against the identity-thesis of the dispositional essentialist, Livanios
claims. That is, according to Livanios, there is a serious conflict between symmetry-based
explanations of property identity and the dispositional essentialist’s explanation of that
same thing.339 This seems, at first glance, like an even bigger problem for my account
than the fact that the symmetry principles are hard to account for from the dispositional
337Livanios (2010, p. 304)
338Livanios (2010, p. 300)
339Livanios (2010, p. 301)
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essentialist viewpoint. I do believe this critique can be met, though, particularly by pointing
out that Livanios fails to recognise the important difference between ‘being able to identify’
something, and ‘being the identity’ of the same something. What he addresses is the ability
to identify something as a fundamental property, that is, an epistemic concept. What I,
and other dispositional essentialists, address when speaking of a property’s identity is its
essence, and that is an ontological concept. Being able to identify and being the identity of
do not have the same meaning. Hence, I cannot see that Livanios’s critique is as damaging
as he intends it to be.
The symmetry principles in themselves remain problematic though, and we have to
ask ourselves which other options are available. I suggest that we should acknowledge that
the connection between conservation laws and symmetry principles entails we should focus
more on symmetry principles, but nevertheless not go along with Bird’s epistemic route. In
this case, we can argue for an ontological understanding of the symmetry principles—rather
than an epistemic one—in which case they are viewed as real aspects of the world. Both the
suggestion from Bigelow et al. (1992) and the initial world-property suggestion from Bird
(2007) already seem to interpret symmetries as features of the world, but as already stated,
both of these suggestions may be classified as ad hoc.340 The fact that symmetry principles
have a much wider scope than simply being other ways of formulating conservation laws
seems to support the ontological interpretation. If we are to adopt this position, and deny
Bird’s epistemic interpretation, we need to find better ways of incorporating this alongside
dispositional essentialism than the existing alternatives already discussed.
Livanios argues that viewing symmetries in this ontological way might be an interesting
way to proceed for the dispositional essentialist. He also notes that much further work is
needed in order to figure out what exactly the relationship between the symmetries and
the dispositional essences are, and what influence the fundamental symmetries actually
have on our theory. If we are to argue that an ontological understanding of symmetries
is superior to the epistemic version, we should at least make a proposal regarding what
symmetries are.
One possible approach is to consider symmetries as meta-properties of a special kind.
That is, to view them as properties of all properties, relations, and processes. If that is
the case, it seems like the existence of these symmetries is a precondition for the world
being like it is, or maybe even for there being a world at all. These principles are at work
no matter what is present, whereas the actual laws of the world are conditional on things
like charge, mass, spin, and so on. According to this understanding, symmetry principles
are unconditional. Hence, by assuming this to be the case, we would also obtain some
information about the difference between laws and symmetry principles.
340Livanios goes as far as to call them poor, but he also presents Bird’s world properties approach as a
more substantial suggestion than what was intended from Bird, it seems. Bird (2007, p. 213) classifies the
explanations based on both world kinds and world properties as ‘somewhat ad hoc’. Still, it is presented
as a serious contender by Livanios.
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Is something gained by viewing these principles not as pseudo-laws but rather as meta-
properties? It seems that if they are properties in this sense, they are not simply background
structures, but rather something which is potentially active and reactive. This is positive,
as contemporary physics in general seek background free theories, and it might be argued
that philosophers should follow the lead of the physicists here.341 This will entail that
certain features of the world, such as spatial and temporal properties, which we intuitively
view as the ‘stage’ where things happen, are rather seen as participants in the happenings
themselves.
Over the years, people have realized that the great lesson of general relativity
is that a good theory of physics should contain no geometrical structures that
affect local degrees of freedom while remaining unaffected by them. Instead, all
geometrical structures—and in particular the causal structure—should them-
selves be local degrees of freedom. For short, one says that the theory should
be background-free.342
As mentioned in chapter 2, what initially seemed like static backgrounds for happenings
may themselves be subject to causes and effects. If we subscribe to this view, we cannot so
easily claim that such features are categorical. We may say that eliminating background
structures from physical theories in this way favours an account of physical quantities which
sees them as powers.
Regarding the symmetry principles, it seems that the solution is tied to accepting an
ontological view of symmetries. For the time being, this is but a suggestion; for the details
of such an account to be developed, further research is needed.
6.3 Fundamental constants, and resistance to nomic
change
6.3.1 Are fundamental constants really fundamental?
If we move from speaking of global laws to addressing fundamental constants, yet another
problem presents itself for the dispositional essentialist. If we think of the laws of nature
which involve fundamental constants, it seems fairly unproblematic to assume that it is
possible to have a world, very similar to ours, where these constants were altered slightly. It
seems intuitively right that very small differences in the fundamental constants would not
require that the properties related in the relevant law be any different. This is yet another
example where the dispositional essentialist, rather than adjusting the account to fit these
intuitions, should investigate whether there is a sensible essentialist explanation available
341See e.g. (Bird, 2007, p. 161-6).
342Baez (2001, p. 6)
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for the problem at hand, even if this means going against our intuitions. Let us first take
a look at what is at stake for the dispositional essentialist regarding this issue.
The fundamental constants create problems for the dispositional essentialist in two
separate ways. Firstly, I have already argued that the laws of nature are necessary in a
metaphysical sense, but if the fundamental constants could possibly change, this generates
a loophole which entails that the laws are not absolutely necessary after all. Secondly, how
are we to account for fundamental constants in a dispositional essentialist framework? If
these constants are truly fundamental, they are not dependent upon anything else, so they
do not depend on any powers, but they cannot easily be seen as powers in themselves
either. Hence, certain nomic facts about the world appear not to be justified according to
the framework presented.
Consider the following example. When we speak of the law of gravity, we say that
the force of gravitational attraction between two entities is directly proportional to the
product of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between
them. The facts about the proportionality in question can clearly be said to reflect the
dispositional nature of gravitational mass, but it does not seem to be an essential property
of gravitational mass that the gravitational constant G has the exact value it actually has.
If it is the case that what we speak of as fundamental constants really are fundamental, we
open for the scenario where the same properties that exist in our world may enter into a law
where the relevant constant is slightly altered. This option is only available if the constants
are indeed fundamental. Hence, the first question we should ask is whether what we refer
to as fundamental constants truly are fundamental, or whether this is an assumption which
is reflecting incomplete knowledge.
What would the consequences be if the law of gravitation was not a fundamental law,
contrary to appearances? If it is not fundamental but somehow dependent on deeper and
more fundamental laws, then it could turn out that G is constrained in a way we have yet
to figure out.343 This would have a crucial consequence for the dispositional essentialist,
because if this is the case, if such constants are truly constrained in some way, the value of
the constants would necessarily be precisely as they actually are; the necessity of the laws
would no longer be threatened. The situation is of course the same for other constants which
appear to be fundamental. If a constant appears to us as fundamental, but is not actually
fundamental, then changing this constant will in all likelihood have serious consequences
for laws existing at a lower level of fundamentality. This is an important point for both
the present chapter and the next. It is fairly easy to present thought experiments posing
minimal changes being made in the nomic structure of the world, and to claim that these
changes represent genuine possibilities, but I will argue that the result often is a far more
substantial change being made to the world than what was originally intended.
However, when it comes to the question of how the dispositional essentialist should
343Bird speculates that this might be the case in both (Bird, 2005, p. 365) and (Bird, 2007, p. 212).
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deal with the constants at play in current physical theories the situation is still unresolved.
It seems that the knowledge science can presently give us does not enable us to draw a
conclusion. This entails that when it comes to the dispositional essentialist understanding
of fundamental constants in general, our best move is not to make further speculative
and bold philosophical claims, but rather to wait patiently for more detailed answers from
science. When further scientific evidence is obtained, we can proceed and use it. This, I’m
afraid, is the case, even though it is not particularly philosophically satisfying.
6.3.2 Eliminating the possibility of the world being ‘just a little
bit different’
As mentioned above, if the fundamental constants are restrained in ways we have yet to
figure out, they pose no threat to the dispositional essentialist claim that the laws of nature
are necessary, in a metaphysical sense. This goes against the common intuition that fun-
damental constants are not essential features of the laws; that is, it seems intuitively right
that we may have a world with exactly the same fundamental properties as in our world,
but where the fundamental constants are very slightly altered. But is this intuition correct?
Let us take this assumption seriously, and see whether small alterations to fundamental
constants give the expected results—that is, that these very small changes in the values of
the fundamental constants have minimal changes for the world in general as a result.344
This discussion is related to my arguments against McKitrick (2018) in chapter 5, and it
also foreshadows the more general debate about the role of intuition and conceivability in
the following chapter.
Let us assume that at least some of the fundamental constants at play in the actual
world firstly, are fundamental, and, secondly, that they could have been altered very slightly.
What would happen? I will use an example from (Bird, 2007) in order to show that what
appears to be fundamental might not actually be so. His argument aims to show how
something which is not fundamental may still appear to be fundamental to us, in that it
resembles the way the fundamental constants behave. Thus, we get the idea that appearance
of fundamentality might perhaps reflect our knowledge of the world, rather than reflecting
the world itself. The same example may also be used to show how our intention of making
an incredibly small change to the world fails:
The intensity of light from a constant and uniform source falling on a unit
area decreases in inverse proportion to the square of the distance from the
light source. This law could have been discovered experimentally. One could
imagine someone thinking the exponent of the displacement, −2, is a funda-
mental constant. There might be a very similar possible world in which the
344Remember that the fundamental properties are supposed to remain unchanged through this, so the
expected change will have to be small.
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light intensity is proportional to d−2.000001. However, the fact that the intensity
is proportional to exactly d−2 is derivable from the law of the conservation of
energy. So a world in which the intensity is proportional to d−2.000001 is not
at all similar to ours; it is one where energy (or mass-energy) is not conserved
(and it is not clear to me that such a world is genuinely possible).
Bird continues.
Newton’s law of gravitation is also an inverse square law, and its similarity to
the law of luminosity encouraged many to think that it too must be explicable
as reflecting some deeper law that would show why the force of gravity is
proportional to d−2 rather than to d−2.000001. Einstein eventually showed that
they were right. It is thus an epistemic possibility that scientists will find that
G is not a fundamental constant either.345
In much the same way as was the case when the topic was global laws, when it comes
to the fundamental constants we are also in a situation where we do not have enough
information about the world to infer anything substantial about the fundamental constants’
metaphysical constitution based upon examples like this. In addition, we cannot, as will
be shown in chapter 7, conclude that something is metaphysically possible based on the
fact that it is epistemically possible. However, apart from opening at least the epistemic
possibility of G not being fundamental, such examples give us insight into the fact that
there might be quite a distance between the change we intend to impose on a world in
an example, and the result we get. Surely we did not intend to postulate a world where
mass-energy is not conserved when we claimed a small change in the proportionality of
light intensity.
Let us return, then, to the more general intuition that some nomic features—not only
fundamental constants—of the world could have been slightly altered, and the assumption
that the resulting world would have been a genuine possibility; a way the world could have
been. I have argued that given the fundamental properties and relations of the world, a
world where the laws of nature are even just a little bit different is not possible. However,
we are still able to speculate counterfactually about several things, and such speculations
might in some cases give us the impression that the given scenario is actually possible.
Some such counterfactual statements are clearly not statements of genuine metaphysical
possibility, but rather thought experiments seeking to give us increased knowledge about
a particular limited feature of the world. However, in some cases statements of the kind ‘if
we changed this thing, and the rest of the world remained (more or less) unchanged, what
would happen?’ are intended to express a counterfactual situation which is presented as a
genuinely possible scenario.
345Bird (2007, p. 212)
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Thinking that these kinds of counterfactual thought experiments represent genuine pos-
sibilities seems to me overly naive. However, we may still think that if we can consistently
imagine a scenario, then it is in some sense possible (we find this all the way from Humean
understandings of modality, to Vetter’s argumentation for extensional correctness). How-
ever, if we choose to take counterfactual claims about the nomic structure of the world
to entail possibility, the following is in general lacking. Firstly, a consideration of where
the change is coming from; we need to consider what produces the change, and what is
grounded in, that is, which currently existing properties would have to be altered for the
counterfactual situation to come about. Secondly, we need to recognise which effects this
change would have on the rest of the world (not just the small part of the world actually
mentioned in the scenario).
If we take those two points into consideration, we will see that most, if not all, coun-
terfactual statements pertaining to nomic features of the world are such that the clause
that the rest of the world be unaffected by the altering is all but impossible. This points
back to how the world according to the dispositional essentialist is not a collection of loose
facts, but rather an interconnected web of properties and relations. These kinds of thought
experiments might still be enlightening, meaningful, and easy to make, but this does not
entail that they represent real possibilities. Let us have a closer look at how this relational
structure may be understood.
6.3.3 Identity determined relationally
We remember from chapter 2 that for the dispositional essentialist, the essences and hence
the identities of the fundamental properties are not simply a matter of their intrinsical
dispositions, but also something which is essentially relational. These essential relations
between the fundamental properties are the fundamental laws of nature, on which the rest
of the nomic structure of the world supervene. Following the argument put forward thus
far in this thesis, the identities of fundamental properties is not a primitive matter, as it is
for the categoricalist. The categoricalist is free to argue that each property is primitively
self-identical but that there are no necessary relations at play in the world. Because of this
it is easy to postulate the change of one single property without this influencing the world
in the way it will for the dispositional essentialist.
If we think of the common illustration of Humeanism where the properties of the world
are represented by a mosaic floor, we can argue that changing one single tile in the whole
image does not influence the other tiles in the floor. In addition, the whole image is changed
only very moderately—perhaps not even noticeably. However, these kinds of changes are
not genuine possibilities for the dispositional essentialist. Our view of the fundamental
properties and how they are related to each other is a holistic view. We depend on a whole
pattern of manifestation relations, and cannot simply change one single property. In fact,
the structure of the set of fundamental properties is actually a part of what determines
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the identity of each property.346 If we take this claim seriously, we see that dispositional
essentialism comes as a whole package—a cluster of fundamental properties woven together
in a web—not just singular fundamental properties which could have been combined in
many different ways. Where Humean supervenience often refer to the Humean mosaic in
order to illustrate their view, dispositional essentialism can refer to their view as a web. If
you change one tile in a mosaic floor the rest of the floor remains the same. However, if
you remove a thread from a web, the whole thing unravels.
This kind of web-like structure is commonly referred to as a graph. And, if it is the
case that the whole structure of the graph can give or contribute to give the identity of the
singular elements—the nodes—we see the problem with thinking it unproblematic to allow
small changes in the nomic structure of the world. By changing one element, we change
the structure, and so we change most or even all other elements in it as well. This means
that on the fundamental level, the whole web contributes to the identity of the singular
properties.
We can find examples from cosmology pointing in this direction. That is, cosmologists
urge that there are clear cases where profound connections between properties demonstrate
the quite specific limitations at play in the world. Certain relations between different entities
are such that if we change their relation—and only it, disregarding for now the relations
to the rest of the fundamental structure of the world—we end up with a world which is
radically different. Two of G. F. R. Ellis’s articles, (Ellis, 2006) and (Ellis, 2014), discuss
the philosophy of cosmology, and present several such examples. His focus is on the laws
and lawful regularities which ensures a universe where life can potentially exist, but his
examples can also be used as a more general description of how the world is extremely
reluctant to change.
If we, for example, return to the question of gravity, and what would happen if gravity
was ever so slightly different, we first have to note that such speculations can be answered
in a number of different ways, depending on how the situation is interpreted. If we, for
instance, speculate about our experience of gravity on a celestial body with different mass
than the earth, this does not seem problematic in any sense, and we can get several inter-
esting answers. But if we ask how we would experience a world where gravity, or whatever
grounds gravity, in itself was altered in some way or another, the answer would in most
cases be that we would not be around to experience it. As G. F. R. Ellis points out, the
gravitational force must have certain properties in order for there to even be the possibility
that someone is existing and able to experience anything at all. It must be such that it
leads to the creation of planets, which potentially can be the habitat for life, and also the
stars. Without gravity being such that sufficiently large stars can be made we do not only
loose the potential for life, but also the means for creating most of the chemical elements.
For the creation of stars to be possible, the gravitational force must be very weak relative
346Bird (2007, p. 141)
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to the electrical forces; the ratio between them must be close to the observed value.347 From
this and similar examples, we see traces of great interconnectedness between the properties
of the world which the dispositional essentialist argues for.348
Even though this example speaks of the force of gravity in relation to conditions having
to be in place for life to exist, it is not unreasonably anthropocentric. Here is why. It is
clear that without the formation of stars we would not have a world with the means to
create most of the chemical elements, so the consequences are more substantial than solely
the absence of living beings, but this is not the main point. The point is that we need
to consider what changes would have to be made on a more fundamental level in order
for stars not to form. For the world to behave in this radically different way, something
on a more fundamental level must have changed. So, the question about gravity and the
formation of stars is not essentially a question of whether a world without stars is a way
our world could have been, it is the question of whether a world with whatever change is
made at the more fundamental level ensuring gravity to be different is a way that our world
could have been. And given my arguments so far, the answer will be no. Again, we should
remember that the considerations mentioned towards the end of section 6.3.2 should always
be taken into account when we discuss the possibility of changing the nomic structure of
the world. That is, we need to think about where the change comes from, that is, what
fundamental properties or relations would have to be different in order that the proposed
change could happen, and which consequences the change at the more fundamental level
will have for the rest of the world. I will return to this ‘down-and-up structure’ in chapter
7.
In addition to providing examples showing the likelihood that the entities of the world
are deeply connected with one another, we also need to show the philosophical tenability
of this thesis. That is, we need to ask whether the identities of individual powers really can
supervene on these kinds of patterns. If the relations between the fundamental properties
are essential, they at least contribute to the identity of the property. We may separate two
claims of different strength here. Either these essential relations contribute to the identity
of the powers (the weaker view), or these essential relations give the identity identity of
the powers (the stronger view). As dispositional essentialists we are committed to holding
at least the weaker view, and that is also what I will argue for.
The biggest problem with identifying properties by the relations they bear to other
properties is that we seem to end in regress. Since each property’s identity is determined
by relations with other properties, which again are determined by relations with other
properties and so on, there seems to be no way out of regress, or at least circularity, here.
347Ellis (2006). I am aware that the example is described in outdated Newtonian terms, and as such
not exactly correct, but describing it like this makes it conceptually easier to grasp. However, it should be
mentioned that the current view of gravity as a geometric effect, i.e., a change in the spacetime curvature
is more in line with the overall dispositional essentialist view that spacetime is not a stage where things
unfolds (a ‘background’), but rather something which is itself active.
348See (Ellis, 2006), (Ellis, 2014), and also (Rees, 2000) for more examples and more details.
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Hence, it is natural that we ask whether the identity really can be determined in this
way after all. That is, whether it is plausible to claim that a set of elements organised in
particular relations to each other can suffice to determine the identities of the elements
thus related.
Let me spell this out. We picture that we have a set of elements (the fundamental
properties) which are all related through a manifestation relation (which holds between a
property and its manifestation property), and ask whether the identity and distinction of
the elements of the set supervene on the instantiations of the relations between them. This
question can be reformulated as a question about graphs, which makes it easier to tackle.
Following Dipert (1997) we ask; can graphs depicting the fundamental structure of the
world be asymmetric? In asymmetrical graphs the identity of the vertices will depend on
the structure of the whole graph, hence these are the graphs which will be expressing the
structures we are after.349 Symmetry, in this context, amounts to graphs where there exists
a non-identical permutation of its vertices, and where this leaves the graph invariant. This
means that a graph is seen to be symmetric if the group of its automorphisms has degree
greater than 1. A graph which is not symmetric will be called asymmetric.350
We have two kinds of distinctness at play here. The first applies to graphs as a whole.
They are distinct if and only if they contain features that structurally distinguish them.
That is, an internal distinctness for each graph taken as a whole. The second applies to
the vertices themselves, as well as to subgraphs. The vertices have no internal structure,
so they will have to be distinguished by something external or contextual. That is, if they
are structurally related to other entities in a unique way, this is what gives them their
identity.351 Hence, we see that the similarities between the identification of the vertices in
these kinds of graphs, and the identification of the fundamental properties according to
the dispositional essentialist are substantial. Given the asymmetrical graphs, it is possible
to give unique, purely structural descriptions for each vertex, and this should entail that
we also have graphs that can represent possible structures of powers.
Given this relational understanding of the powers, the assumption that we can allow
even small changes in the nomic structure of the world while being dispositional essentialists
is shown to be even more problematic than it initially seemed to be. We recall from chapter
5 how McKitrick (2018) argues that dispositional essentialists can accommodate contingent
laws of nature, but given this relational web of powers at the fundamental level it seems even
clearer than before that holding a dispositional essentialist view of fundamental properties
and laws entails, absolutely entails, that the laws of nature are necessary.
This is good news for the dispositional essentialist, but one serious problem remains.
Are we supposed to simply disregard the fact that the laws of nature intuitively seem
to be contingent? Should we ignore what Vetter refers to as extensional correctness? We
349It seems Bird also leans towards the directed graphs picture.
350Erdős and Rényi (1963, p. 295)
351Dipert (1997, p. 346)
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remember from chapter 3 how Lowe argued that we need good reason if we are to depart
from theories which intuitively seem to be correct. Hence, I will have to address the problem
of the apparent contingency of the laws of nature in far greater detail than I have done so
far. I will devote the next, and last, chapter solely to this issue.
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I have addressed problems related to the global laws and fundamental
constants, and I have shown that the complications associated with the global laws cannot
be resolved by adding natural kinds to our framework. Hence I conclude that the natural
kinds are a redundant addition to a dispositional essentialist account of the laws of nature.
Not all issues connected with the global laws have been resolved, however, and there is
an obvious need for further research in this field. The situation is even more in need of
analysis when it comes to the dispositional essentialist understanding of the fundamental
constants, where our best option at present is to await further answers from science. When
it comes to these problems, dispositional essentialism is, at present, in a somewhat difficult
position, but not completely hopeless.
The positive results found in this chapter are tied to the notion of resistance to nomic
change, which, I argue, is at play in the world. I illustrated this briefly by way of graphs,
and suggest that the relationship between the fundamental properties should be pictured as
a web. We have seen that the actual world does not work in the same way as the theoretical
possible worlds might be expected to work; nomic change comes at costs far greater than
what we might intuitively picture when we present counterfactual situations as genuine
possibilities. This entails that if we aim to explain modality with the radical actualism I
begin with, we need to be ready to let quite a few intuitions go.
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Chapter 7
Intuitions, conceivability, and the
laws of nature
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter I will consider the relations between intuitions, conceivability, and possi-
bility, particularly when it comes to the case of the laws of nature. So far I have argued
that the laws as understood by the dispositional essentialist will have to be absolutely,
metaphysically, necessary. That is, there is no room for any genuine possibilities going
beyond that which is allowed by the laws of nature. This is perhaps the most controversial
feature of the dispositional essentialist account of laws, because it entails that we need to
accept that the consequences of our philosophical standpoint is not in line with the most
common, intuitive, attitide to have towards the laws of nature, namely, that they in some
way or another are contingent.
We remember from chapter 3, how even dispositionalists like Vetter refers to extensional
correctness—the ability of our account of modality to match our prephilosophical ideas
about what is possible and not—as something dispositionalists need to take into account
when crafting their view. Vetter has no explicit account of laws, but both she and Borghini
and Williams specify how the possibilities for which their views can account are seen to
go beyond the limitations the laws of nature impose.352 Borghini and Williams are explicit
in their dismissal of seeing conceivability as a guide to possibility, but they still want to
keep the intuition that the laws of nature could have been different. Following this, the
main issue at stake in this chapter is the question of whether or not the fact that we are
able to conceive of a state of affairs also implies it is possible. A related issue which is also
relevant is the question of how much weight our intuitions should be seen to have in our
metaphysical accounts.
352As specified in chapter 3, Vetter does not want to make any explicit conclusion about the laws
of nature, but keeps the door open for the idea that her potentiality based account of possibility can
accommodate possibilities going beyond the laws of nature.
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It is hard to exactly define what an intuition, or an intuitive judgement, is supposed to
entail, but we may follow (Gopnik and Schwitzgebel, 1998, p. 77) in at least specifying that
intuitive judgements are not made on the basis of some kind of explicit reasoning process
we can consciously observe. The intuitions rather grow out of an ‘underground process’, so
to speak, which cannot be directly observed. However, as (Kornblith, 1998, p. 130) notes,
even though it may be the case that any characterisation of the phenomenon, in one way or
another will be contentious, there is no difficulty in giving examples of the way intuitions
are used as parts of philosophical arguments.
For the purpose of this chapter, however, the topic should be narrowed down consider-
ably. We may specify these issues to the case of the laws of nature, as follows:
1. Is it the case that the fact that we can conceive of, or imagine that, the laws of nature
being different implies that the laws are contingent, that is, the possibility of the laws
being different?
2. Is it the case that the fact that our intuition that the laws of nature are contingent
should entail that our accounts of laws of nature and of possibility should reflect this
intuition?
There is clearly a substantial amount of distance between the more common view
that the laws of nature are contingent and my dispositional essentialist view, and hence
this is a question which needs to be addressed. I will argue that the connection between
conceivability and possibility is weaker than what it might seem to be, and also that
we should be careful when assuming that intuitions can be used as guidelines for which
philosophical position we should hold. I will argue that we cannot get knowledge of the
possible simply by considering what we are able to conceive of. That is, I will deny that
there is an implication going from conceivable to possible. I will, right away, also dismiss
the implication going the other way, that if something is possible we should be able to
conceive of it, that is, to visualise it. This idea may be dismissed by looking at almost
any example from modern physics at the micro-level. However, the idea that conceivability
implies possibility is harder to dismiss.
We should note that the notion of possibility in question is the same as in the preceding
chapters, that is, a form of metaphysical, or genuine, possibility, while the conceivable
is, I argue, a form of epistemic possibility.353 We may see conceivability as the ability
that each and every one of us have to picture some scenario, some situation, or world;
in short, to construct something in the mind which involves the appearance of possibility.
The central question regarding the relationship between conceivability and possibility is
whether what we may conceive of or imagine can point towards what is really possible. Some
353There is disagreement in the literature regarding this. Gendler and Hawthorne (2002, p. 4) argues
that conceivability is not a general guide to epistemic possibility, whereas David Chalmers (2002) claims
that conceivability is a guide to epistemic possibility.
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philosophers argue that there seemingly is an important connection between conceivability
and possibility, such that conceivability may give some evidence for possibility, or, the
strongest claim; that it will entail possibility. The relevant kind of possibility in question
may very well be metaphysical possibility.
In this chapter I shall argue, firstly, that some states of affairs, even if they are easily
imaginable, are still not possible. Hence, using conceivability or imaginability as a starting
point does not give us an answer to the question of what is really possible. It only tells
us what we are able to consistently imagine.354 Secondly, I will argue that intuitions,
for example about the laws of nature, do not indicate or give evidence for metaphysical
possibility.355 However, as Lowe has remarked, if we are to discredit intuitions as a source
of our knowledge about modality, we need to show both how it may be the case that our
intuitions are wrong, as well as showing how and why it may be the case that we are able
to conceive of things which are nonetheless impossible.356
The chapter will proceed as follows. In section 7.2, I look at how conceivability may
be seen as a guide to possibility by referring to Hume, and how these views have been
further adapted and developed in Lewis’ theory of possibility. Section 7.3 explores our
intuitions regarding laws. I focus particularly on how their epistemic contingency alongside
our ability to imagine them otherwise may be the source of our intuition that the laws
are metaphysically contingent. In section 7.3.2, I argue against Alan Sidelle’s claim that
a posteriori necessities are less interesting than they are seen to be in the tradition after
Kripke. Section 7.3.3 addresses the apparent need for a separate category of necessity tied
to the laws of nature.
Section 7.4 gives a response to Lowe’s remarks that we both need good reason to
depart from intuition, and that we need an explanation for why we have intuitions which
are mistaken. Section 7.4.1 looks at a concrete example aiming to show that our intuitions
when it comes to certain laws are not trustworthy. In section 7.4.2, I go into the details
which makes the example work. Section 7.4.3 argues that even though some of our intuitions
are clearly useful, this usefulness is limited.
7.2 Conceivability as a guide to possibility
7.2.1 A Humean approach
As discussed in chapter 4, when we look at the different accounts of the laws of nature
available there are certain philosophical views, such as those which are either fully Humean
354I will take the notions of imaginability and conceivability to be largely equivalent terms. Investigating
details in the distinction between them is outside the scope of this thesis.
355I will use the laws of nature as an example throughout this chapter. Recall that these laws are not
equivalent with the scientific laws, that is, the best laws of current scientific practice.
356Lowe (2006, p. 142)
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or inspired by Humeanism, which will allow the conceived contingency of the laws of
nature to be something which implies that the laws of nature really are contingent. That
is, that possibilities going beyond the laws of nature are seen as genuine possibilities by
these accounts. However, as noted earlier in this thesis, we actually find this tendency
in explicitly anti-Humean accounts of possibility as well. I want to focus on the Humean
reasoning behind this assumption first.357
Phrased in the language of possible worlds, the Humean will claim that there exists
possible worlds with laws of nature different from ours, because laws of nature are seen as,
for example, contingent universal generalisations about how things actually behave. The
inspiration from Hume particularly relates to the fact that we are able to imagine various
things, contrary to what really is the case. This is used as an argument to support the view
that causal connections are not strictly necessary, and that if the human mind is able to
conceive of something, we cannot assume this to be impossible.
‘Tis an establish’d maxim in metaphysics, that whatever the mind clearly con-
ceives includes the idea of possible existence, or in other words, that nothing we
can imagine is absolutely impossible.358
We note that the quote is parted in two by ‘in other words’, something which, according
to (Gendler and Hawthorne, 2002, p. 17), indicates that the two linked phrases are equiva-
lent. However they do differ in some important respects, and as Stephen Yablo points out,
“As often when Hume takes himself to be saying the same thing twice, he seems here to be
saying two quite different things”.359 The first part of the quote concerns conceiving and
something seeming to be possible, while the second part concerns imagining and something
being possible.360 As mentioned already, I will, as Hume seems to be doing, treat conceiving
and imagining as equivalent things in this chapter, hence I hold that that particular differ-
ence is not especially important here. However, something seeming possible and something
being possible are two very different things, something which makes the second part of the
quote the most relevant. Accepting this as a true statement entails holding that the laws
of nature cannot be absolutely necessary, since we are able to imagine other laws being the
case. What is necessary and possible is, according to this view, mind-dependent.
As we saw in chapter 4, one of the philosophers declaring his view to be Humean
is David Lewis, and through his thesis of Humean supervenience he is able to account
for a very wide understanding of possibility. We recall how the so-called Humean mosaic
underpinning his view can be described as “the doctrine that all there is to the world is a
vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another”,361
357Borghini and Williams (2008), as discussed in chapter 3, is an example of anti-Humeans who still
advocate a view of the metaphysically possible as something going beyond the laws of nature.
358Hume (2007, p. 26)
359Yablo (1993, p. 4)
360This too is pointed out by both (Gendler and Hawthorne, 2002, p. 17), and (Yablo, 1993, p. 4).
361Lewis (1986b, p. ix)
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and how this was the base for a particular view of laws. Now we need to specify further
details about how the room of the possible becomes so vast according to this view. This
might be done by giving two further principles which are presented and defended by Lewis
and which relate to possibility more specifically. He states that, firstly, absolutely every
way a world could possibly be is a way that some world is, and, secondly, that absolutely
every way that a part of a world could possibly be, is a way that some part of some world
is.362
These two principles seem to tell us that worlds are abundant in some sense, and that
we as a result of the principles will have ‘possibilities enough’, according to Lewis’s view.363
However, concluding this is too rash. The consequences of these principles are solely reliant
on the notion of possibility invoked. In fact they might very well be satisfied by just one
world existing, given that all other worlds are then impossible, which is basically what the
dispositional essentialist argues, after all. This point is also noted by Lewis, and it is one
of the reasons why these principles must be supplemented with something giving us what
we might initially have thought were entailed; possibilities enough. In addition to this we
also need the logical space to be complete, such that there are no “vacancies where a world
might have been, but isn’t”.364
7.2.2 The principle of recombination
Lewis suggests that we look to Hume’s denial of necessary connections of distinct existences
in order to get these results, and with this in mind he introduces what is called the principle
of recombination, a principle which follows from Hume’s view. By doing this Lewis takes
the Humean views about laws and causation, and subsequently use them to create a thesis
about possibility. The main point is this: Because any existence is completely independent
of any other, if we have any adjacent objects A and B, A can exist without B and vice
versa. Following from this we find that objects may also be combined in any way:
Roughly speaking, the principle is that anything can coexist with anything else,
at least provided they occupy distinct spatiotemporal positions.
And further:
Likewise, anything can fail to coexist with anything else.365
Even though Lewis operates with these very broad definitions giving us a notion of the
possible that is far wider than the understanding I argue for, he still explicitly states that
we cannot without problems infer anything about possibilities from what we can imagine:
362Lewis (1986a, p. 86)
363The question of whether we have enough possibilities is also what drives the expansions of Borghini
and Williams’s and Vetter’s theories of possibility which was discussed and rejected in chapter 3.
364Lewis (1986a, p. 86)
365Lewis (1986a, p. 88)
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We imagine a horse, imagine a horn on it, and thereby we are persuaded that a
unicorn is possible. But imaginability is a poor criterion of possibility. We can
imagine the impossible, provided we do not imagine it in perfect detail and all
at once. We cannot imagine the possible in perfect detail and all at once, not
if it is at all complicated.366
According to this passage, Lewis presents the fact that we may imagine impossibilities
as reason for the unreliability of imagination. He holds that there are cases where our
ability to imagine will be problematic for both possible and impossible scenarios, and thus
that arguing for a direct and complete link between the conceivable and the possible is
ill-advised. However, even though he is not referring to imaginability as a criterion for
possibility, he still argues that there is some kind of link between the conceivable and the
possible, and that this link is an important one:
We get enough of a link between imagination and possibility, but not too much,
if we regard imaginative experiments as a way of reasoning informally from the
principle of recombination.367
Thus we see that the connection between imagination and possibility is not obtained
by considering solely our imaginative abilities, but rather by looking at what he calls imag-
inative experiments. These experiments involve, as the quote states, some form of informal
reasoning from the principle of recombination. This means that rather than just loosely
picturing the imaginary horse and the horn, we are imagining a unicorn and inferring its
possibility because it is made by a horse and a horn, and we know that both those two
things are possible, because they are actual. By the principle of recombination, we know
that these things can then be brought together in the imagined way, thus giving us the
image of a unicorn. We can, of course, ask whether this is significantly different from just
imagining things to be the case, but it seems clear that it is at least one step removed
from pure imagination; imaginative experiments are acts of reasoning, not simple acts of
imagining.
Lewis’s principle of recombination is not only meant to have validity for the things
we are more or less familiar with, i.e. the everyday stuff that surrounds us, it should
also have validity on scales which are more alien to us, like the scale of the very small
for example. This means that he is also able to talk about recombinations of point-sized
things, spacetime points, and point-sized bits of matter or fields.368 As we, by speculating
in this way, are moving towards the size scale of the fundamental particles that exist, we
see that this principle is also relevant for the laws of nature. This is explicitly stated by
Lewis, as a part of his argumentation of why the laws of nature are not necessary:
366Lewis (1986a, p. 90)
367Lewis (1986a, p. 90)
368To borrow the terminology he uses when presenting Humean supervenience in (Lewis, 1986b, p. x)
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Another use of my principle is to settle—or as my opponents might say, to
beg—the question whether laws of nature are strictly necessary.369
The laws cannot in general be seen as necessary while still holding on to this principle,
as the entities connected by the laws have no necessary relations to each other, and can be
combined in any way. If we look at a concrete example, we get some idea of just how large
the room of the possible is in Lewis’s modal metaphysics. In On the Plurality of Worlds, he
speculates that positive and negative charge might not be, strictly speaking, incompatible,
but that we may picture that this is something that has happened by accident or by
contingent law in our world.370 In this example we are no longer talking about objects, but
of properties, but the principle remains the same: the properties are completely independent
of each other—anything can coexist with anything else—and following from this we get
the result that properties which are incompatible in our world need not be so. That is,
we might conceive of something which is indiscernible from an electron, for example, but
which has both positive and negative charge at the same time. Even if this is precluded
by the actual laws of nature, that does not mean that such combinations of properties are
impossible.
By presenting such a case, Lewis is able to argue that we can have certain kinds of
possible alien individuals, for example an elementary particle that has both positive and
negative charge, grounded in the principle of recombination, and taking only actually
existing properties into account. The particle from the example will as a result be alien in
some sense, but it will still have no alien properties, as both properties exists in our world
as realised possibilities, they are just combined in a new way.
However, creating alien individuals from this-worldly properties is not enough if we are
to have a framework of possible worlds and individuals which is satisfactory according to
Lewis. In addition to these individuals which are made from duplicates of actually existing
parts of things, his theory also makes room for the principle of recombination to apply in
such a way that in some possible worlds there will also exist individuals who are made
up of parts that are not existing in our world. Worlds with alien individuals will be alien
worlds, and the principle of recombination also applies to these. Since the alien properties,
like any other properties, may be combined in any old way, there must be a lot of alien
worlds, as well as worlds which have both this-worldly and alien properties instantiated.
Hence, the room of the possible according to Lewis’s theory is quite enormous.371
369Lewis (1986a, p. 91)
370Lewis (1986a, p. 92)
371However, it should be noted that Lewis (1986a, p. 114) does state that we are not entitled “just to
make the truth be one way or another by declaration. Whatever the truth may be, it isn’t up to us.” It
should be added that it seems to be highly problematic to answer the question of how we are to get any
sort of knowledge of these alien worlds and alien objects, but this is outside the scope of this thesis.
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7.3 Intuitions regarding laws, and arguing against them
7.3.1 From epistemic to metaphysical contingency?
We have several intuitions about laws. One of the more common intuitions is that things
contrary to the laws of nature, metaphysically speaking, could happen.372 As mentioned
both in the introduction to this chapter, and also elsewhere in the thesis, accepting dispo-
sitional essentialism entails that we also have to accept that our account of laws of nature
might be colliding with our intuitions about those laws. In order to make sense of this
situation it is useful to try to figure out from where our intuitions about the laws of nature
come.
One suggested explanation, found in for example (Ellis, 2001), focuses on how the laws
are clear examples of something which is epistemically contingent, and that we because of
this make the mistake of classifying them as metaphysically contingent as well. That is, the
epistemic and the metaphysical possibilities seems to get mixed up when we assume that
knowledge of possibility may be gained from the fact that something is conceivable:
The imaginability test of possibility thus confuses what is really possible with
what is only epistemically possible. It purports to be a test of what could, really
could, occur in some given circumstances, when in fact it tells us only what we
are able consistently to imagine happening to things that are superficially like
those that exist in these (or in superficially similar) circumstances.373
According to Ellis, what happens in these cases is that something (in this case the laws
of nature), is epistemically contingent, and because of this we conclude that this something
must therefore also be metaphysically contingent. As a result we end up with some form
of confusion of terms, where the domain of epistemology and that of metaphysics are not
separated from each other as they should be.374 However, I want to point out that this
explanation is a bit too simple if it is supposed to be a general answer to the question
of why people take the laws to be metaphysically contingent. In addition, stating that
your opponents are mixing up the domains of epistemology and metaphysics is quite a
serious accusation. At the very least we can be pretty sure that this will not be the case
for all proponents of the contingency of the laws of nature, and because of this we should
investigate whether some other explanation could give a better analysis of the situation.
We find a slightly different explanation in (Bird, 2007), where he argues that the fact
that the laws are epistemically contingent does not suffice as an explanation for why we
commonly see the laws of nature as metaphysically contingent as well. That is, arguing
that this is a confusion of domains is not enough:
372This is referred to as the ‘traditional view’ in (Bird, 2007), and as the ‘standard view’ in (McKitrick,
2018).
373Ellis (2001, p. 233)
374This argument is also in line with Saul Kripke’s general claims in (Kripke, 2005) and (Kripke, 1981).
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[A] direct inference from epistemic contingency to metaphysical contingency is
too poor to be, as it stands, a convincing explanation of apparent metaphysical
contingency.375
Bird holds that if we are to explain what he refers to as the illusion of nomic contingency
we need to focus on how this illusion is created from our ability to imagine the laws
being different. This point must also be included if we are to understand this properly,
and it clearly goes beyond arguing that we are inferring metaphysical contingency because
something is epistemically contingent. The intuitions that result from this ability to imagine
are, it should be noted, influenced and limited by our prior knowledge, and also by our
beliefs about the laws of nature. We cannot imagine things without having some ideas
about what may or may not be possible already, that is, we need a certain amount of
knowledge about the relevant substances or ideas involved in what we are imagining as a
starting point from which we may begin to conceive of further happenings.
In the case of the laws of nature, this could be knowledge of the natures of the substances
involved in a law, experience of how they tend to behave, knowledge of their essences, and
so on. By using this knowledge, or apparent knowledge, as a starting point, we are able to
picture things that may happen to the substance in question, but the picture we are capable
of making is determined by our prior knowledge about the subject. Thus, the epistemic
possibilities we gain from being able to imagine things might be in such a position that they
are overly coloured by the highly fallible ideas we already have. They depend on us, our
knowledge, and our history. What we refer to as metaphysical or real possibility, however,
depends on what really is the case. These possibilities, I argue, depend on the dispositional
essences of the properties of things, and they are also limited by these essences. Hence,
there will be cases where what is really possible collides with what seems possible to us.
We may say that it was easier to postulate the laws of nature as contingent before
the argumentation for the necessary a posteriori was presented by Kripke and Hilary
Putnam.376 However, after the discovery of such necessities, which are neither analytical
nor a priori, this claim became harder to make.377 We note that the a posteriori necessities
are such that we may be able to conceive of their falsity, while it is at the same time the
case that this falsity is absolutely impossible. When the a posteriori necessary truths were
shown to be a real thing, such that our intuitions regarding these statements had to be
wrong, this made it problematic to argue that we can establish possibility in general by
conceiving of things. We may be able to conceive of the situation where Clark Kent is
not Superman, while we at the same time know that the identity between Clark Kent and
Superman is absolutely necessary. The question we need to ask is whether it could be the
case that the laws of nature are in the same situation? Recall the comparison between laws
375Bird (2007, p. 179)
376See (Putnam, 1979) in addition to (Kripke, 2005) and (Kripke, 1981).
377We note that if all and only a priori truths were necessary truths, then conceivable truths would have
been possible truths. (Gendler and Hawthorne, 2002, p. 32)
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of nature and identity statements between names in chapter 5; this is yet another situation
where the two cases are similar. In that case we would be able to conceive of the laws of
nature being different even if this is impossible, something which makes the idea that the
laws of nature should be seen as contingent less robust.
Sidelle (2002), however, argues that while there are necessary a posteriori truths, they
are not necessary in any interesting sense, and they are also unconvincing as an argument
against the use of imagining or conceivability as a way to gain modal knowledge. The laws
of nature are, much in the same way as the necessary a posteriori truth, necessary in a
sense that is not as interesting as it may seem like at first glance, he claims.378 Thus Sidelle
argues along the lines of what is in general known as rationalist theories of modality, which
are grounded in the idea that even though a posteriori necessities exist, we may acquire
significant modal knowledge through a priori means, such as conceivability.379
7.3.2 ‘Playing the role of’
As an example of a statement that seemingly reflects deep metaphysical facts about the
substance in question but which should nonetheless be seen as not having such implications,
Sidelle focuses on the fact that water is H2O. The statement ‘Water is H2O’ is, according
to him, derived from a combination of, firstly, some analytic principle of individuation,
and, secondly, some particular empirical finding. In this case the analytic principle is that
nothing counts as water in any situation unless it has the same deep explanatory features
as the stuff we call ‘water’, and the empirical finding is that the deep explanatory feature
of water is that it is being composed of H2O.
This indicates that these kinds of identities, rather than being metaphysically inter-
esting because they are saying something about the necessary constituents of a substance,
are just examples of some kind of analytic principle of individuation.380 The modal force of
necessary a posteriori truths are thus, according to Sidelle, best understood as something
analytical. That is, as something that is representing linguistic conventions as opposed to
revealing metaphysical features of reality. There is disagreement in the literature regarding
whether statements like ‘Water is H2O’ are laws or if they are just stating facts about the
composition of the substance in question.381 I see no reason to stretch the concept of laws
such as to include statements of necessary composition, but this is not of particular rele-
vance here, as Sidelle’s arguments are the same for a posteriori necessities as they are for
laws. The way he portrays these things, it is the same kind of convention-based necessity
which is established both by laws and other a posteriori necessary truths.
378Sidelle (2002, p. 310)
379Vaidya (2016)
380Sidelle (2002, p. 319ff.)
381Armstrong would for example not see such statements as laws. This is briefly discussed in (Bigelow
et al., 1992, p. 382), where they argue that the distinction does not matter, and that these kinds of
statements dealing with necessary composition can be referred to as ‘laws’.
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To illustrate that statements like this will only show us how the scientists use the
terms, and that the necessity is only based in analyticity, Sidelle claims that even though
we cannot have any worlds where water, as defined by us, is not H2O, there are worlds
where some other stuff than H2O plays the role of water:
[T]here are worlds in which stuff other than H2O does basically what water
does, and occupies the roles that water does here.382
This means that we are supposed to imagine something that looks like water and
plays the actual water-role, and that the term ‘water’ is used to pick out this substance
rather than H2O.383 However, in this case we need to ask what the phrase the role of
water is supposed to mean. We also need to be clear about what the statement ‘doing
basically what water does’ is supposed to encompass. This is not clearly specified in Sidelle’s
argumentation, but we can try to carve out a couple of possible interpretations. First of
all, the statement ‘doing basically what water does’ can be seen as pointing to a substance
doing sufficiently many of the things water does, but this is remarkably vague, and leads
into a discussion of how many and which properties of water are the relevant ones for this
otherworldly water to possess and which are not. Who is to be the judge of this? How do
we know when the otherworldly water is sufficiently like our water to actually be able to
play that role? This interpretation does not seem very fruitful, as it creates a whole set of
new, and hard, questions to answer.
We could, instead, assume that ‘doing basically what water does’ means that the other-
worldly water should fill all the functional roles that our water fills, and see if this helps the
situation somewhat. If this is our starting point, the circumstances are at least substantially
less vague, but there are still a couple of questions which need answering, independent of
which interpretation we settle with. Firstly, we need to ask if there is even a possibility
of some other substance playing the role of water if we are limited by the same chemistry
as we have in the actual world. That is, could some other mix of the chemical elements
produce something which was able to play the functional role of water, or is this statement
in effect also assuming the possibility of a completely different chemistry to ours?384
Secondly, if we agree that in order to have something else behave as water we need a
completely different chemistry to be in place, we must ask whether it is indeed possible that
this completely different substance can enter into all the roles water enters into, in order
to fully behave as water. For example, is the otherworldly water potentially life-sustaining
382Sidelle (2002, p. 319)
383This seems to be in line with Chalmers’s two-dimensional semantics, which suggests that there will be
different answers to the question if water could have been something else than H2O, depending on how the
question is interpreted. Answering yes will indicate that we are thinking about what ‘water’ would have
picked out in a world of the kind Sidelle describes here, where something else plays the water role. Going
into details regarding two-dimensional semantics will be outside the scope of this thesis. See (Chalmers,
2004) for details.
384A different, but related, question is if a completely different chemistry is possible at all.
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in the same way our water is? It seems to me to be the case that if we postulate that
some other substance is playing the role of water, this other substance must also be able to
play the same role water does in the creation and sustaining of life. Would we agree that
something was playing the role of water if this part of the water-role was left out of the
picture? I think not. Following this, we also need to ask whether we should also assume
some radically different lifeforms living in this world, as the life we have in this world is
completely dependent on H2O, and not on some substitute substance. If this is the case,
it seems that we, by postulating otherworldly water are also postulating a world so far
removed from ours that it would definitively not count as a way our world could have
been? After all, this is a world with a completely different basic structure than our world,
it would have to be if we are to have a completely different chemistry supervening on it.
Because of this I hold that this is a world that is at the very least irrelevant for modal
questions in our world.385
If we think about the roles that water plays in our world, it actually seems that some-
thing supposedly playing the role of water, while not actually beingH2O, will have problems
entering into the roles the substance is supposed to have according to the stipulation. It
seems like this otherworldly water cannot easily enter into most of the roles that water
has in our world, except that it might be able to look like water, keeping things afloat like
water, and interact with some parts of the environment like water, that is, it might be able
to, for example, dig out a valley in the same way as our water does. Thus, if we assume
that ‘playing the water role’ entails that the substance in question should enter into all
the roles that H2O enters into, then only H2O will be able to do this.
In order for something else to play this role, there needs to be some restrictions regarding
how the ‘role of water’ is to be understood. The understanding needed must in a sense be
less rich than ‘everything water does’. One could, for example, argue that we should only
include the knowledge we had about water before we knew anything about its chemical
structure, or that we should restrict it to strictly phenomenal aspects of water. But then
we will again be faced with the problem of vagueness mentioned earlier. No matter how we
try to restrict this it is hard to find good arguments in favour of one particular restriction
rather than another. There does not seem to be any reasons for just how restricted this
should be, nor good reasons for why we should settle for a particular restriction rather
than another.
Sidelle, however, seems to hold that the only thing ruled out by the a posteriori necessity
that water is H2O, is that the stuff playing the water role in other worlds is such that, given
the rules of English, we cannot call it ‘water’. He sees it as misleading to speak of essences
and natures as if they were more than semantically determined. This entails that appealing
to the essence or nature of something as an argument for why we cannot simply assume
385Referring back to the discussion of conservative versus radical necessitarianism in chapter 5, section
5.3.2, it seems that someone like Bird might actually go so far as to deem such worlds impossible.
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the possibility of other things playing the roles of these substances in other worlds will
not work, according to Sidelle, as the essences we are appealing to are just reflecting the
meaning we associate with them.386 Nevertheless, even though it is a conceivable scenario
that experiments in some world might some day show evidence that water is not H2O,
seeing this as a genuine possibility, by referring to linguistic conventions seems far-fetched.
This is also addressed by Gendler and Hawthorne as follows:
[T]he loose and inaccurate statement that water might not have been H2O is
a faulty attempt to convey the perfectly acceptable thought that there might
have been a community that was an epistemic duplicate of our predecessors
that rigidly denoted some stuff other than H2O by ‘water’.387
If we compare Sidelle’s position with the one I have been defending in this thesis, it
is clear that the arguments he puts forward are in stark contrast with the essentialist
explanation I favour. Opposing his suggestion I hold that the fact that water is composed
of H2O is something which is metaphysically necessary, and the only thing fully able to
play the role of water is water itself.
7.3.3 Nomic necessity as a middle ground
Another example of how the conceivable may be tied to the possible, in the case of the laws
of nature, is found in (Chalmers, 2002). He argues that it does indeed seem conceivable,
and thus metaphysically possible, that something could travel faster than light, even though
this is clearly not physically possible. In the following quote we find argumentation for the
metaphysical contingency of the laws of nature explained with reference to both our ability
to conceive of them being different and our intuitions about metaphysical possibility:
This case may be metaphysically possible, however, since there might well be
metaphysically possible worlds with different laws. If we invoke an intuitive
conception of a metaphysically possible world as a world that God might have
created, if he had so chosen: it seems that God could have created a world in
which an object travelled faster than a billion meters per second. So in this
case, although conceivability does not mirror natural possibility, it may well
mirror metaphysical possibility.388
This quote exemplifies the fact that it is common to supply the view that conceivability
points towards metaphysical possibility with argumentation for the need of a separate
386Sidelle (2002, p. 332)
387Gendler and Hawthorne (2002, p. 37)
388Chalmers (2002, p. 146). Gendler and Hawthorne (2002) also notes that conceivability has typically
been taken to point towards the metaphysical possibilities, although they are not talking specifically about
laws.
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form of necessity, a particular necessity regarding laws. As discussed earlier in this thesis,
particularly in chapter 4, this kind of necessity is usually referred to as nomic or natural
necessity, because we also have a, perhaps equally strong, intuition that the laws should
have some form of necessity tied to them. Chalmers is apparently managing to cater to both
of these intuitions in the passage which is quoted, by clearly separating the metaphysical
from the natural possibilities. The form of necessity associated with laws is seen as weaker
than metaphysical necessity, hence fewer things will be seen as nomically or naturally
possible than metaphysically possible. This view is also held by Fine (2002), who argues
that none of the main forms of necessity (metaphysical, natural, and normative) can be
reduced to any of the others. We also recognise this view as being similar to Armstrong’s
nomic necessitation discussed in chapter 4 of this thesis. Hence, we see that there are
several different philosophers arguing, quite forcefully, that there is a need for more than
just the one kind of necessity I argue for.389
However, we recall from chapter 5, the dispositional essentialist view of laws entails a
kind of collapse, where the domain of the metaphysical possibilities and necessities ends
up being exactly the same domain as that of the nomic possibilities and necessities. That
is, there are no possibilities going beyond the laws of nature according to the view I give
my support to. Because of this, I have aimed to show, throughout this dissertation, that
getting rid of the category of nomic necessity is defensible. Not only that, but I also hold
that the identification of the natural necessities and possibilities with the metaphysical
ones is a positive feature of the account of properties and laws I support—it makes it
more parsimonious. As proposed and defended in chapters 2 and 5, this will follow from
understanding the laws as determined by the dispositional essences of properties. To recap,
this is because this explanation, with its focus on properties, gives a picture of the laws as
metaphysically necessary, de re. As a result, there is no need for a separate form of necessity
for the laws, as the natural necessities are already seen as being reducible to metaphysical
necessities.390 What is important to note, however, is that when the laws are understood
in this way, the question regarding the possibility of different laws of nature is not merely
a question regarding some restricted form of necessity, the natural necessity, but rather a
question about genuine metaphysical modality.
It is clear that we cannot argue against the fact that it is quite easy for us to imagine
the laws being different, and we cannot argue against people having certain intuitions
about the laws and their metaphysical status.391 In addition, our intuitions seem to be
strengthened by the fact that laws are seen to be the product of more or less reliable
empirical investigations. That is, throughout history our view of what the correct laws of
389Logical necessity aside.
390Or vice versa of course. I address one of the reasons why we might want to speak of metaphysical
rather than nomic possibility and necessity in these cases in chapter 3, namely the wish to describe the
metaphysical in a way that makes it less mysterious and less vague, as well as tying the metaphysical to
actual properties in the actual world.
391Recall that the laws of nature discussed are not the scientific laws we have today.
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nature are have been revised over and over again, and because of this it seems like they
are not absolutely necessary. All of these features taken together may well be viewed as
something that ground our intuition that the laws of nature could have been different than
what they actually are. This means that if we wish to argue that the laws are necessary
in the strongest sense, we have to argue against our intuitions. It also means to say that
in certain philosophical debates intuitions should not be allowed to play a significant role,
even though they may be strong intuitions. This may be seen as problematic:
[M]any philosophers have strong intuitions that natural laws are not necessary
in the strongest possible sense—that a natural law which obtains in this, the
actual world, need not obtain in every possible world.392
Intuitions like these, which many philosophers have, are often seen as pointing towards
the idea that the laws of nature are providing some weaker form of necessity than meta-
physical necessity, as mentioned above. However, it appears that the highlighting of the
role played by intuition is often not backed by argumentation strong enough to show that
the intuitions may indeed be allowed to play this particular part. For example, in Lewis’s
case, there are clear arguments for why we should let conceivability play a restricted role
in our explication of possibility. The question is whether we are willing to accept these
arguments, as well as the further philosophical framework related to them more generally
(in the case of Lewis’s metaphysical framework).
At other times, as in the Lowe quote above, we are just presented certain suppositions,
where it seems to be implicitly assumed, though not explicitly argued for, that conceivabil-
ity should have some importance when it comes to judging what is and is not possible. So
while we cannot argue against the fact that this is a common intuition to hold, it should
still be investigated whether this intuition should be given any significant role when it
comes to our judgements about the laws of nature. That is, we should be more sceptical
that the intuitions are suitable to play this role.
In chapter 3, we saw how Borghini and Williams explicitly argue for a notion of meta-
physical possibility which goes beyond the laws of nature. Also, we saw that Vetter does
not want to reach a conclusion about this, but keeps the door open for this being the case.
Thus, giving intuitions substantial influence on philosophical theories is not something
which is limited to those accounts I have categorised as more or less Humean. Whereas
Borghini and Williams do not present specific details regarding this issue, Vetter is putting
considerable weight on intuitions when it comes to figuring out what should be seen as pos-
sible according to her view. We recall how there are conflicting intuitions at play when it
comes to the relations between dispositional accounts of possibility and the laws of nature.
This was so, firstly, because the metaphysically possible is commonly seen as a very wide
category of possibility—encompassing more than what is possible according to the laws of
392Lowe (2006, p. 142)
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nature—whereas it does at the same time not seem to be the case that something could
have a disposition to violate an actual law of nature.393
This is, particularly for Vetter, grounded in extensional correctness which can be ex-
plicated by the following two points:
1. We have certain ‘firm convictions’ about what is metaphysically possible and what
is not394, and
2. these firm convictions should mostly come out true on any metaphysical account of
modality.395
Whereas one can argue that we should not allow intuitions such a role in philosophical
theorising, we cannot deny that the intuition that the laws of nature are contingent is a
common intuition to have. Hence, if we are to argue that the laws of nature are necessary,
it is important to figure out how and why it may be the case that we, in this circumstance,
seem to have strong intuitions that point towards making wrong conclusions regarding pos-
sibility. In the next section I will present an example showing how our intuitions, although
seeming sensible, can be shown to be wrong.
7.4 Showing intuitions to be mistaken
As mentioned in chapter 5, both Vetter (2015, p. 247) and Lowe (2006, p. 142) specifies
that we need to be able to come up with good reasons if we want to argue for philosophical
standpoints which goes against what our intuitions tell us. Since it is well established that
the dispositional essentialist claims that the laws of nature are necessary, and that the
domain of the metaphysically possible is identical with that of the nomically possible, it
would follow that the burden of proof is on the essentialist side of the table. They are the
philosopher that so clearly have the commonly held intuitions against them. Recall the
following claim made by Lowe:
[W]e would need to be given good reasons for thinking that these intuitions
are mistaken, as well as some explanation for our possession of those intuitions
despite their being mistaken ones.396
393Vetter (2015, p. 281-282)
394Note that it is not always the case that we intuitively judge too much to be possible. If we stick to
the idea that intuitive judgements are those which are not being made on the basis of an explicit reasoning
process, we can say that one such ‘firm conviction’ could be that we cannot make lead into gold. We’ve
heard about the failed alchemy experiments, and the endeavour has been portrayed as ridiculous, so we
might settle with the conviction that this is impossible. However lead, bismuth and mercury have all been
successfully turned into gold, although at an astronomical cost economically. See, for instance, (Aleklett
et al., 1981).
395Vetter (2015, p. 15). I take these ‘firm convictions’ to largely correspond to what has been referred
to as intuitions.
396Lowe (2006, p. 142)
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This entails that we both need to examine where our intuitions may come from, and
that we also have to investigate whether we have any reasons for giving them any eviden-
tial significance, or if we have stronger arguments for accepting an account of laws and
properties which goes against our intuitions. We have to ask ourselves if our intuitions and
our ability to imagine the laws being different than they actually are should be seen to
reflect their modal status, or if this puts the human cognitive ability in a position it should
not be in.
7.4.1 An example: salt dissolving in water
In this section I will give a response to Lowe’s claim. I have already noted that there are
two different things addressed in the quote, and I will focus on them in turn. Firstly, he
asks for good reasons to abandon the strong intuitions we have, and secondly he demands
an explanation of how we have come to hold erroneous beliefs regarding possibilities. The
second part of the claim has already been discussed to some extent in section 7.3 of this
chapter, but I will return to this question in section 7.4.3 as well. In order to address the
first part of the remark, I present a concrete example, discussed in the literature, aiming
to show that our intuitions are not trustworthy when it comes to at least some of the
laws of nature.397 If we are able to establish that some laws which were initially viewed as
contingent can be shown to still actually be necessary, we are in effect undermining the
conceivability grounding their contingency. If we are able to do this, we are also responding
to the first part of Lowe’s remark, that we need good reason to abandon our intuitions.
It should be noted that if our quite strong intuitions may be shown to be wrong in this
respect, this might be seen as an argument not to trust our intuitions blindly in other cases
as well. In fact, one of my aims in this section is to show that we are not just dealing with
a single counterexample in this case, but rather with a more general argument.
So far in this chapter I have presented reasons to assume that the laws of nature are
contingent; we have the force of intuition, our ability to imagine them being different, and
the fact that they are epistemically contingent. This entails that in order for our examples
to be effective in showing that our assumptions about the modal status of the laws of nature
are often mistaken, we need to find cases which are clearly imaginable, but which are also
epistemically contingent and a posteriori as well. If we are able to find such examples, they
will undermine the reasons for assuming the contingency of laws presented in this chapter.
A successful counterexample will give us reason to argue that those plausible groundings
of the claim that the laws of nature are contingent are unreliable. In short, a successful
argument would mean that we should be very careful regarding what work we assume our
intuitions are able to do in modal metaphysics.
Let us now turn to the salt example. To make sure that this example has consequences
397This example is discussed in, for example, (Bird, 2001), (Psillos, 2002), and (Beebee, 2002).
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for the advocate of a Humean or generally categoricalist view of modality, the example is
presented as a thought experiment, where the fundamental laws considered are assumed
to be contingent. In addition, there are no parts of the argument that rely on us having a
dispositional essentialist view of modality (or laws, or properties). This means that even
if our most basic laws should prove to be contingent, we can show that some supervening
laws will still be necessary, in a non-trivial way. No matter what starting point we have
regarding the modal status of the fundamental laws, we end up with some important laws
being necessary. That is, the thought experiment shows that there are two situations we
can be in, as follows.
1. The fundamental laws are necessary, and the supervening laws will also be necessary.
2. The fundamental laws are contingent, but some important supervening laws are still
necessary.398
The law in question in the example is the supervenient, or higher-level, law that salt
dissolves in water. It is supervenient in the sense that it depends on several lower-level
conditions being the way they are; notably the chemical structure of salt, the chemical
structure of water, and the particular relationship between these two substances that en-
sures that the one dissolves in the other, especially Coulomb’s law of electrostatic action.
In addition, we note that it is clearly conceivable that salt could fail to dissolve in water,
so an important part of the thought experiment is to consider what would have to be in
place in a world where the law that salt dissolves in water turns out to be false. That is, we
wonder which features of the world are different in this case, leading to the wanted result.
In the actual world, NaCl and H2O are related by Coulomb’s law through the elec-
trostatic attraction, a force of attraction which supervenes on Coulomb’s law. The very
existence of NaCl depends on a set of lower-level laws, and Coulomb’s law is a part of this
set. A surprising claim is that if any of the laws in the set are false, then NaCl necessarily
does not exist.399 When we assumed that it could be possible for salt not to dissolve in
water, this was clearly not the kind of result we anticipated. In order to see how this result
might still be the case, let us look at the details of the argument.
I have already described how it is the case that the law that salt dissolves in water
supervenes on Coulomb’s law of electrostatic action, and that this lower level law is suf-
ficient to make salt dissolve in water. If we claim that the laws of nature are contingent,
we will assume there to be some world where it is not the case that salt dissolves in water.
However, for this to be the case it turns out that Coulomb’s law must also be false in
that world, as this is one of the more fundamental laws responsible for the fact that salt
398Bird (2001, p. 267f.)
399Bird (2001, p. 272)
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dissolves in water.400 Given what salt is constituted of, and the ionic binding between the
atoms in the molecule, the force of electrostatic action is sufficient for the salt’s sodium
and chlorine ions to dissolve in the water. Hence it is the case that a world where it is not
the case that salt dissolves in water is a world where the electrostatic force as described in
Coulomb’s law does not exist either. In order to ensure that salt not dissolve in water, we
have to make sure we remove that in virtue of which salt actually dissolves in water.
This world, without Coulomb’s Law, contains another important fact as well. If we look
at the compounds of common salt, Na and Cl, and the binding between them, we note that
it is precisely the electrostatic force that is responsible for keeping the ions together. So
the force we have just stipulated as non-existent, as a result of salt not dissolving in water,
is responsible for keeping the ions of the salt molecule together. This means that a world
without the force keeping Na and Cl together, is a world without salt.
Hence, we can draw two important conclusions from this thought experiment. Firstly,
we may say that if the law in question is false, then at least one of the substances related
by the law does not exist. Secondly, we can state that if the substances related in the law
exist, then the law in question is true, and must be true. This means that we also have the
biconditional that the law is true if and only if the substances in question exists; there
will be no possible case where we have the substances but do not have the relevant laws.
A further consequence in this case is that even if some of the fundamental laws grounding
Coulomb’s Law should prove to be contingent, it is still necessary that salt dissolves in
water:
The law is necessary in the current manner because of the subtleties of the way
in which it supervenes on the lower-level laws. Those subtleties tend to escape
the attention of even those among us who knows what is going on beneath the
surface (one rarely engages in physical chemistry and modal metaphysics at
the same time).401
The features that make the important contribution to how this example works are, as
Bird points out, hidden completely for those of us who do not know the chemistry. It seems
naive to assume that this is the only such case. The main feature of interest here is the
fact that it is the same lower level law and the same force which is responsible both for
salt dissolving in water and for salt actually existing as a composite substance. This means
that there is no metaphysical possibility that salt could fail to dissolve in water. At the
same time, note that the situation is clearly epistemically contingent.
There are some important things to remark about this thought experiment. First of
all it is not, and is not meant to be, an argument for the necessity of the laws of nature
400I specify ‘lower level’ and ‘more fundamental’ because even though Coulomb’s law is a law operating
on a considerably more fundamental level than many other laws, Coulomb’s law in itself also depends on
more fundamental features of the world.
401Bird (2007, p. 178)
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in general, because it does not capture all laws. It captures only some of them, and these
are not the fundamental ones, so we cannot rightfully use it as a general reason. It may,
however, be used as an argument in favour of not trusting our intuitions blindly when it
comes to the laws of nature. If we take this example seriously, arguing that our intuitions
regarding the contingency of laws should always be followed does not carry a lot of weight.
Thus we may also infer, as Bird does, that “the force of intuition is a very weak argument
against the dispositionalist claim that all the laws of nature are necessary”.402 Since our
intuition can be so wrong in this particular case, we should not assume it to be correct
when it comes to the fundamental laws either.
7.4.2 Objections and the down-and-up structure
Bird’s article ‘Necessarily, Salt Dissolves in Water’ has been met with criticism from, among
others, Beebee and Psillos.403 Both of them suggest that the conclusion that salt necessarily
dissolves in water is wrong, but they use different strategies to get this point across. Beebee
suggests that in another possible world, Coulomb’s law could be a disjunctive law, that is,
most of the time it will be identical to Coulomb’s law in the actual world, but not always,
and when it operates in the alternative way, salt will not dissolve in water.404 Beebee’s title
‘Contingent Laws Rule’ suggests that she thinks the contingency of the laws of nature is a
prevalent feature of them, and not something which relates to this example alone.405 I am
not persuaded by Beebee’s point.
What is particularly troubling about Beebee’s argument is, firstly, the way she assumes
that in the situations when Coulomb’s law fails to hold—when the alternative law holds
instead—there is no particular reason for this happening.406 Her example is simply pos-
tulating a significantly different world without there being any particular circumstances
leading to this difference in Coulomb’s law operating (the fact that it is a disjunctive law in
this world): it just happens for no particular reason, so it seems ad hoc. Secondly, she just
assumes this stipulation to represent a metahysical possibility, with no further qualification
for why this would be the case except stating that she sees “no reason to suppose that it
is not a possible world”.407
No dispositional essentialist would agree with Beebee’s way of seeing laws as brute
facts which can just happen to be one way or another, but her view of the laws and of
properties entails that she will be able to make such claims, because the parts of a world
are much looser connected to each other on her view.408 Assuming that a law which is
402Bird (2007, p. 179)
403Beebee (2002), Psillos (2002)
404Beebee (2002, p. 253-254) The details of the alternative equation is not important.
405This is in line with (Beebee, 2000), which was mentioned in chapter 4.
406Beebee (2002, p. 253f.)
407Beebee (2002, p. 253)
408See chapter 4 for a discussion of different views of laws compatible with this general categoricalist
view of the world.
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saying something about charge can be disjunctive, and that it can be like this without any
particular reason can, for example, be seen to entail that one variety of the law might be
fundamental—not depending on anything else—whereas the other version might not be.
But in the actual world Coloumb’s law does depend on other features of the world having
to do with charge. This means that if we propose to change Coloumb’s law, other things
will have to change too.409 Coulomb’s law and charge do not exist independently of each
other.
Psillos’s reply is different, and does not deal with Coulomb’s law and salt as a composite
substance. He suggests instead that water possibly could have been structured in a slightly
different way, thus making it less polar, enough to strip it of its role as a solvent, while still
retaining its identity as water.410 Thus, Psillos is able to avoid stirring the features of the
argument making it work the way it does, namely the relationship between the truth of
Coulomb’s law and the existence of salt. This relationship is left the way it is. Because water
can plausibly still be seen as water even after this change has been postulated, Psillos holds
it to be “perfectly possible (metaphysically) that there is a world w in which water does
not dissolve salt”.411 Yet again, we see that it is assumed that metaphysical possibilities
can be made possible simply by way of statement. In this case it should be clear that it is
defensible that the substance in question might still, rightfully, be seen as water without
this entailing that the world described is a possible world.
I will avoid debating whether or not the substance in question is to be classified as water
or not, because in this case we can argue against Psillos even if the changed substance is
correctly ascribed to be water. In order to show this, we need to look at some more general
mechanisms which lie behind the situations described in these examples. We will return
to Psillos’s concrete case later. What should be noted about both these replies, however,
is that they attempt to find counterexamples, but they both fail to see the bigger picture
which lies behind the example. This might be because Bird himself pays too little attention
to this when presenting the example (in his (Bird, 2001)), focusing instead on the details
making it work. This is rectified in (Bird, 2002), where he is replying to both Beebee and
Psillos. There he is examining the more general tendencies underlying the case of the salt
and water. Let us examine this topic now.
As noted earlier, I hold that dispositional essentialism is a holistic view of properties
and laws. This is an important feature of it, when compared with the other views discussed
in this thesis. One way of seeing this is by noting what Bird (2002) refers to as the down-
and-up structure of laws. An important consequence of this structure is that the example
about salt and water, although being particularly clear and simple, is not unique in any
way. What is described in the example are general tendencies manifested in the relationship
between higher-level laws and lower-level laws, or between these sets of laws and properties
409Recall the holism discussed in chapter 6, and the dispositional essentialist web of properties.
410Psillos (2002, p. 255-256)
411Psillos (2002, p. 256)
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or phenomena. The more general point is this. Certain (perhaps all) higher level laws of
nature might turn out to be necessary because of the way they supervene on the lower
level laws. And certain substances, such as salt, might necessarily have certain properties
because of the same relationship. In the salt and water example this was extremely clear
because it was the same law being responsible for both the fact that salt exists and the
fact that salt dissolves in water. All other examples may not be as clear as this, but it
is the same relationship between higher and lower level laws which is at play. Here is the
structure I have in mind:
1. Higher level law L concerns substance S
2. The identity and existence of S entail that one of a family of closely similar lower
level laws {Ci} must hold.412
3. At the same time, L supervenes on the lower level laws in such a way that if any of
{Ci} holds, then L would also hold.
4. Hence: The existence of S entails that L holds, and so there is no world in which S
exists but L fails to hold of it.413
To show how this would work also for cases which are perhaps slightly less striking
than the one just discussed, Bird (2002, p. 259) briefly proposes yet another example
showing that the same structure is in play when it comes to the behaviour of the elements
of the periodic system. These elements are also composed of more fundamental entities,
and because of this they display certain lawful behaviour which reflect non-fundamental or
higher level laws. One such behaviour is that the elements, when heated to incandescence,
emit light radiation at distinct discrete wavelengths. This emission spectrum is one of the
‘signatures’ each element makes, that is, each element has a particular spectrum which can
be used to identify it, for example when we want to know what a particular star is made
of.
However, we can ask whether this emission spectrum is a necessary feature of the ele-
ments. It is easy for us to imagine that the emission spectrum of Hydrogen, for example,
was not those discrete and distinct four lines but rather continuous, similar to when light
pass through a prism. Thus, we might also have the idea that this is a metaphysical pos-
sibility. In light of the reply arguments from Beebee and Psillos I cannot see that this
statement is in any worse condition than the statements they propose as possibilities in
their replies to Bird. What we need to ask in this case, and what both Beebee and Psillos
fail to ask is two questions. 1) Where is the change in question is supposed to come from?
and 2) Which consequences will this counterfactual change have for the world in total?414
412In the case of the salt and water example, all of these laws would be such that if they allowed the
existence of salt, they would also lead to salt dissolving in water.
413This captures (Bird, 2002, p. 258)
414This was also discussed in chapter 6, section 6.3.2.
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A world where Hydrogen, or any other element, emits a continuous spectrum would have
to be a world where the behaviour of the electrons were not quantized, that is, it would be
a world without quantum mechanics. And even if some of the building blocks of our world
could perhaps exist in a world without quantum mechanics, the atoms of our world could
not.415 As discussed in chapter 6, there are certain things we need to take into account
when picturing counterfactual situations in these kinds of examples (where we postulate
what seems like a small change in the behaviour of a small part of the world). We always
have to take into account what would lead to this change being present. Then, in turn,
we have to take into account what those changes would mean for the rest of the world.
Postulating that small ungrounded changes to the world actually could be made seems
highly unlikely given what we know about the close-knit structure of the most fundamental
entities we know the existence of. Because of this closely interconnected structure of the
microscopic world, we should realise that a world with atoms, built and structured in the
way our atoms are, is also a world with quantum mechanics, and, hence, also a world with
discrete emission spectra. There is no room for change here, and thus we see, also in this
case, that the proposed difference at a higher level leads to some change on a lower level.
This change will in turn influence both the laws and the entities at the higher levels. This
is what the down-and-up structure amounts to.
There is, however, an element of uncertainty here. We have to acknowledge that how
big an influence such changes will have depends on the number of fundamental laws in our
world, something we presently have no complete knowledge of. If our world has only one
fundamental law, this down-and-up structure will be pervasive; or, if the world has a small
number of closely integrated laws, the down-and-up structure will at least be a common
feature of the world.416 In the latter case, where there are these closely interconnected laws
at the fundamental level, the adjustment of just one higher level law will have to have sig-
nificant consequences for many of the fundamental laws. Because of the interconnectedness
in such worlds, this will entail that there will also be significant consequences for many or
all of the higher level laws, as well as for the existence of substances and phenomena which
depend on them.
This is the same structure which was represented by a graph in chapter 6, and in much
the same way we are also in this case seeing the same effect: the consequences of our
postulated minor change to the world have themselves many unexpected consequences.
Regarding the current example, we see that assumptions which entail we are in a world
without quantum mechanics has to take into account that this will influence all higher level
415Note that the question of whether or not certain building blocks of the world, say quarks, could
possibly exist in a world without quantum mechanics is not a question for philosophers to answer. No
amount of a priori speculation can give us this answer, and we need to trust the scientists to do this kind
of work.
416Bird (2002, p. 266). Of course we do not know which of these situations we are in, but current science
suggests that our universe represents one of these two possibilities, and the philosophical assumption that
is dispositional essentialism is in line with this.
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laws, phenomena, and substances which depend on quantum mechanics. If we are correct
about this, the world will be ripe with examples of how seemingly innocent assumptions
about small differences in the world will have consequences far beyond what was intended
by the assumption.
If we take the down-and-up structure into account we see that the point is not that
there is some particular feature tied to the existence of salt and water which is at stake
here. The point is that this structure is postulated to reflect a general tendency at play in
the world. This makes it much harder to truthfully assume changes in the nomic structure
of the world as real metaphysical possibilities. If we look at Psillos’s argument again—
posing that the actual water be replaced with a less polar alternative—we cannot get away
with simply asking whether such a substance could rightfully be seen as water. Even if it
could, we must also ask whether the proposed substance could exist at all. For there to be
a difference in the structural composition of water, making it less polar, something must
be different at a lower level. And this something will not only be tied to the existence and
properties of water, but also to several other substances and phenomena, as well as higher
level laws.417
From these examples we see, in line with what has been stated earlier in this thesis,
that the dispositional essentialist cannot accept as possible any suggestions of slight nomic
change to the world. The focus on the down-and-up structure shows that these changes
which might appear small to us are, perhaps contrary to our intuitions and expectations,
leading to substantial changes having to be made to the rest of the world. These changes
might even, as in the example with salt and water, entail that substances participating in
the changed situation are no longer possible entities.
7.4.3 The limited use of intuitions
If we go back to Lowe and his claim regarding our intuitions, the salt example as well as
the general down-and-up structure at play, provide an answer to the issue raised in the
first part of the quote. (Namely, that we should have good reason for thinking that our
intuitions are mistaken.) The second part of Lowe’s remark, focusing on the need for some
kind of explanation for why it is the case that we are possessing such mistaken intuitions,
is nevertheless not answered by the example. I turn to this question now.
Even if it seems to be the case that we have quite good arguments why we should be
sceptical of our intuitions regarding laws, we should still be careful not to discredit all
the intuitions we have. Being able to perform modal judgements is important and plays a
significant role, for instance when it comes to deciding what to do in a given situation. If
our abilities to conceive of things had little or no connection with what is really possible,
417A minor point regarding Psillos’s example is that it entails water would no longer be liquid, so it
might not even be the case that it represents a proper counterexample, if we demand that both liquid
water and salt be present for it to be seen as a well-functioning counterexample.
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this would be a very confusing activity, to put it mildly. It does not seem to be too bold
a statement to assume that we do have the ability to conceive of things for a reason, and
that having intuitive ways of acting in certain situations has proved to be a useful skill
to have throughout evolution. Being able to sense that some situation may be dangerous
despite not having been in an identical situation before could be life saving, and it is as
such a trait which might be handed down through the generations.
These useful intuitions will, I suggest, typically revolve around things existing on the
same size scale as us—what Austin refers to as ‘moderate-sized specimens of dry goods’.418
An example can be the ability to imagine that the shadow in the bushes is a predatory
animal, and act accordingly in response to that. These situations may be seen as examples
of cases where our intuitions and the things we are able to conceive of, are, to a rather large
degree, overlapping with the things that are in fact possible. There is a genuine possibility
to be attacked by animals when walking in the woods at night (at least in some woods),
hence it is useful to be able to conceive of such possibilities.
In addition, it should be noted that essentialists like myself should be very careful not
to argue for dispensing of all kinds of intuitive reasoning, because much of the background
for the essentialist arguments also stem from intuitions. One may for example argue that
assumptions presented in (Kripke, 2005) and (Kripke, 1981) lie in the background of es-
sentialist views like my own, and Kripke appeals to intuitions on several occasions in these
works. Both the thought experiments regarding the essential properties of objects, and his
ideas about the necessity of origin may be sees as fuelled by arguments ultimately based
on intuitions. Because of this, we may argue that intuitions, at least to some extent, are
of importance also for the dispositional essentialist view of properties. Assumptions made
by advocates of such a view are not completely freed from the influence of intuitions (and
perhaps nothing in philosophy is). Hence, claiming that arguments from intuitions are all
bad, would effectively mean an undermining of my own view. This indicates that there
are times where the use of thought experiments involving conceivable situations or intu-
itions could be defended, but that we should be careful to recognise the limitations such
arguments will have. We still have to ask where such a limitation should be placed, and it
seems clear that the answer to this will have to be somewhat vague.
One relevant limitation in the present context is that there is no reason to assume that
we should be able to intuitively picture real or relevant possibilities when we move beyond
the size scales we are familiar with. That is, as soon as we move from those ordinary
middle-sized things we fill our everyday life with, and start to look at the very big or the
very small, we no longer seem to have any advantage of being able to picture relevant
possibilities. This means that both when we deal with things on an atomic scale, and when
we are speaking of things on a scale of, say, planets, solar systems, or galaxies, our intuitions
are no longer relevant in the same way as they are when we are going about our everyday
418Austin and Warnock (1962, p. 8)
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lives. It may still seem to us that we can correctly picture things on those scales, that we
have intuitions also there, but one need only look at a few examples from contemporary
physics to see that nature outstrips our imaginative abilities on these scales on a regular
basis.
The same will be the case when it comes to time scales. We may be able to consistently
conceive of things happening on the scales of minutes, hours, days, or years, but we are
not, it seems, capable of doing the same when it comes to things happening in either very
short or very long time spans. We may hear about the separation of the strong force at
10−35 seconds after the Big Bang, but I argue that we have no sense of what this really
means; we cannot picture in our minds what 10−35 seconds really is. And, in the same way,
we cannot properly conceive of how much time will pass before the sun will die, because
the time scales for such events are too far removed from the one where the human life
takes place. So, while intuitions may often be useful—this is part of the reason why we
have them—this usefulness is limited to those time and size scales which are similar to
those where we lead our life.
There are, arguably, good reasons why we would be able to conceive of relevant pos-
sibilities on these familiar scales, but we should note that there is no reason to assume
that our ability to conceive of things and the real possibilities are completely overlapping
even here. We do not, however, find any reasons why we should have similar success when
evaluating things like the laws of nature. There is no need for us to be able to intuitively
say anything about the modal status of the laws. Being able to this does not give us any
advantage at all.
I suggest, in general, that the set of the things we are able to conceive of and the set
of all real possibilities are overlapping to a greater or lesser degree depending on how far
removed the situation is from the scale on which we live our lives. We have a significant
overlap when it comes to our daily middle-sized affairs, less so when we move away from
this. In addition, it is important to specify that the possible and the conceivable are best
seen as sets that are overlapping, not as the possible being a subset of the conceivable. We
should acknowledge both that we are able to conceive of things which are not possible, and
that the possibilities of the world may outstrip our imagination.
7.5 Conclusion
I have argued that the fact that something is conceivable does not permit inferring that
this something is also possible. Even when things seem intuitively possible for us, because
we are able to consistently picture it in the mind, we should be very careful not to assume
that this gives us any real insight into the modal status of things. I find the question of the
modal status of the laws of nature particularly interesting in this respect, as our ability to
conceive of them being different is a vital part of the explanation for why it is so common
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and easy to assume the laws to be contingent. But neither this, nor the fact that the laws
are epistemically contingent and a posteriori permits us to make this inference.
Some of the notions used to defend the view that the laws may be contingent are unclear
at best. As a concrete example I looked at the idea of something other than H2O ‘playing
the role of’ water, and argued that if all roles of water should be covered in such a case,
then arguably only H2O can play this role. If one assumes a less rich understanding of the
notion of ‘playing the role of’, it is very unclear how this should be restricted, and what
this role should be seen to entail. Even more important is the insight that although we may
easily conceive of laws as contingent, there are examples showing that such assumptions
may have consequences we do not initially see. The example presented in this chapter shows
that even though we may assume that the law that salt dissolves in water is contingent,
the result of the thought experiment is the insight that if salt exists in a world, it will
necessarily have the property of dissolving in water. The laws of nature are so closely tied
to the natures of the things that exist in the world that we cannot simply assume something
with regard to the laws without this having effects on the properties of the things that exist
in that world as well.
I did, however, note that we should be careful not to go too far in our rejection of the
influence of intuitions. They may still have a role to play both in our day-to-day life, as well
as in philosophical thought experiments. What should be noted is their limited usefulness
when it comes to scales beyond those on which we lead our lives. This means that when
it comes to the scales where the laws of nature are grounded, we should not expect the
human ability to conceive of things to be able to accurately single out what is and what is
not possible.
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Conclusion
This thesis has defended dispositional essentialism about fundamental properties. I have
argued that our basic ontology should include the category of powers—sparse fundamental
properties which are essentially dispositional. Assuming powers to exist gives us, firstly,
an account of property identity at the fundamental level, secondly, an account of the
fundamental laws of nature which follows from the relations between the fundamental
properties, and thirdly, a way of grounding possibility in the actual world. A central idea
driving the arguments here was the intention to firmly locate the powers in the area of
fundamental metaphysics. This does not entail that there cannot be any non-fundamental
powers existing in the world, but we do not have strong enough arguments for this claim
to be made at the present moment.
According to a powers-based account of laws of nature, the fundamental laws are re-
flecting the dispositional essences of fundamental properties. That is, they are grounded
in essential relations between these powers. As they are grounded in relations which could
not have been different, the laws of nature are absolutely, metaphysically, necessary. This
is usually viewed as the most problematic aspect of dispositional essentialism, because the
laws of nature are generally assumed to be contingent. The view that the laws of nature
could have been different is an intuition so deeply rooted in us that even some prominent
dispositionalists (whether essentialist or not) actively try to accommodate this into their
accounts of modality. I have argued, to the contrary, that even those dispositional theories
of possibility which are not essentialist cannot accommodate possibilities in tension with
the laws of nature.
The more common strategy of tying possibility to something which is dispositional is not
by going through the dispositional essences, but rather through the dispositional features
of ordinary objects, such as certain glasses being fragile, hence disposed to break. This
disposition supports the claim that the glasses could possibly break. The dispositionalist
accounts of modality discussed in my thesis see dispositions like fragility as something which
is connected with possibility rather than with the counterfactual conditional, because the
conditional analysis of dispositions has been shown to be inadequate on several occasions.
However, as it turns out, the analysis in terms of possibility has some serious issues
too. I have, in particular, shown that the missing stimulus condition in the definition
of dispositional possibility leads to the unfortunate consequence that the domain of the
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possible will include certain happenings which should rather (and quite uncontroversially
so) be deemed impossible. This entails that the dispositionalist accounts of possibility are
not able to single out all and only those happenings that are possible. I conclude that
when it comes to accounting for dispositions, both the route through possibility as well
as the one going through counterfactuals are problematic. Interestingly—as we recacll—
both Borghini and Williams and Vetter argue that their account of possibility could either
actively accommodate possibilities going beyond the laws of nature, or at least keep the
door open for such possibilities. However, I have shown that the features supposed to deliver
these kinds of possibilities are not working in the desired way.
I have suggested that if what we are after is an explanation of metaphysical possibility,
there is no need to base our explanation on mere dispositions, thus avoiding the problems
tied to the definitions of such dispositions altogether. My proposal instead is that an
explanation or a determination of the possible in powers and the laws of nature is a viable
option. Due to the laws of nature being metaphysically necessary, the domain of the possible
resulting from such an explanation will be considerably smaller than what other accounts
argue for. The hope is that it will also be more correct.
However, given that the view that the laws of nature are necessary is so controversial, we
need to make sure that the dispositional essentialist account of laws can compete with those
based upon categoricalism about fundamental properties. After all, the categoricalists have
intuition on their side in this case. Thus I have articulated the dispositional essentialist
account of laws such that it is able to do better than accounts based upon either Humean
supervenience, or nomic necessitation. We are able to explain the instances of laws (which
is problematic for the proponent of regularity theory), and we have no problem explaining
what laws are (which is a problem for the advocate of Armstrong’s account).
Nevertheless, the dispositional essentialist account is faced with serious problems of
their own both when it comes to the so-called global laws, and when it comes to the
fundamental constants. Regarding the global laws, the solution I explored relies on a re-
examination of our understanding of these laws or principles. If these principles are not
correctly seen as laws but rather as some kind of meta-principle or similar, it will not be
correct to demand that they be analysed in the same way as the laws. When it comes to
the fundamental constants, we need additional results from science before we are able to
conclude. However, some important considerations should be made regarding the way we
think about these constants. They might, firstly, not actually be fundamental but rather
depend on something else themselves. In that case they cannot so easily be changed as we
might think. This part of the dispositional essentialist account clearly needs more research.
However, the way I have presented these issues still points towards the laws being robustly
necessary; neither global laws nor fundamental constants will pose a threat to this.
In addition, I have argued that the way the fundamental properties, according to dis-
positional essentialism, are related to each other entails that this is a holistic view about
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fundamental properties. That is, the world, at this level, is a web. If we take this thought of
a web of properties a little further, by including some ideas from graph theory, we see that
in certain graphs (the asymmetrically ones) the whole structure of the graph contributes
to the identity of the nodes. I have suggested that this is one plausible explanation of the
relationship between the properties at the fundamental level. This means that tiny changes
to the nomic structure of the world, often presented as genuine possibilities, are not pos-
sible according to dispositional essentialism. We need to take into account that what is,
by us, postulated to be small changes made to a world, often entail far more substantial
changes than what was intended, and the result will often be that the world becomes so
different that it ends up being modally irrelevant. I have referred to this as resistance to
nomic change.
Nevertheless, even though we are able to argue convincingly for the necessity of the laws
of nature, we have to fave the fact that the contingency of the laws appears to many a very
common intuition, namely that the laws of nature could have been different. This requires
a discussion of both the role that intuition can be allowed to have, and the connection
between conceivability and possibility. I have shown, through examples, that our intuitions
when it comes to the laws of nature are not trustworthy, and thus, that using arguments
based upon intuitions or conceivability more generally is not advisable when it comes to
these kinds of questions. This does not mean that intuitions are without value. When
the domain of discussion is close to the scales on which we live our everyday lives, both
intuition and the ability to conceive of possible happenings is of value to us. However, the
fundamental laws of nature are far removed from this domain, thus we should concede that
when it comes to questions concerning the laws, our intuitions can safely be disregarded.
202 Conclusion
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